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Power sharing regimes in resource management, including co-governance and 
co-management schemes, are now common across New Zealand. These 
schemes bring together iwi and the Crown to facilitate various environmental 
objectives. These arrangements often utilise the tenants of tikanga Māori, in 
particular the concept of kaitiakitanga, and are generally provided for outside 
of the Resource Management Act 1991. This thesis shows how two iwi, Ngāi 
Tahu of the South Island, and Ngāi Tūhoe of Te Urewera in the central North 
Island, are utilising such schemes to promote the interests of their people. It 
explains that Ngāi Tahu have built up co-governance in a patchwork manner, 
utilising the provisions of their settlement to build three distinct co-
management arrangements in Canterbury. The thesis shows that Ngāi Tahu 
have yet to gain full co-governance capacity, but may well have a future role at 
the table in regional Canterbury governance from 2016 onwards. In 
comparison, Ngāi Tūhoe have been granted a different kind of governance 
arrangement that arguably goes beyond co-governance. This governance 
arrangement is based off the fact that legal personality has been granted to Te 
Urewera, and will allow Ngāi Tūhoe to promote the interests of their people in 
a unique way. The thesis will show that the face of co-governance is changing, 
and the future face of such arrangements may well give iwi more control. 
However, that there are pitfalls associated with such resource management 
power sharing schemes that must be taken into account when planning for 





Anamata. Time to come, hereafter, futures. 
Aroha. Love, charity, generosity.  
Atua. Ancestor with continuing influence, god, demon, supernatural being, 
deity, ghost, object of superstitious regard, strange being. 
Hapū. Sub-tribe, clan grouping. 
Hui. Gathering. Meeting.  
Iwi. Tribe. 
Kai. Food.  
Kai Awa. Food from the river. 
Kai Ika. Food from fish. 
Kai Manu. Food from birds. 
Kai Moana. Food from the sea. 
                                                 
1 Definitions are sourced from www.maoridictionary.co.nz. 
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Kai Rakau. Food from trees. 
Kai Roto. Food from the lakes.  
Kāinga. Food store. 
Kaitiaki. Guardian, steward. 
Kaitiakitanga. Guardianship, stewardship.   
Kaiwhakahaere. Director, CEO.  
Kaumātua. Tribal elder. 
Kaupapa. Topic, policy, matter for discussion, plan, purpose. 
Kawa. Mārae protocol. 
Kererū. Wood pigeon.  
Kingitanga. King Movement. 
Ko au te Awa, ko te Awa ko au. I am the River, the River is me.  
Kuia. Elderly woman, grandmother, female elder. 
Mahi. To Work.  
Mahinga Kai. Cultivation of food, food gathering.  
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Mana. Prestige, authority, control, power, influence, status, spiritual power, 
charisma.  
Mana atua. Sacred spiritual power from the atua.  
Mana motuhake. Self-determination, inter-dependence 
Mana tangata. Power and status accrued through one's leadership talents, 
human rights, mana of people. 
Mana whenua. People with territorial rights, power from the land, authority 
over land or territory, jurisdiction over land or territory. 
Manaakitanga. Sharing, hospitality to the fullest extent that honour could 
require. 
Mārae. Open area in front of the meeting house, often used to describe 
collection of buildings around this area.  
Mātauranga. Knowledge, wisdom, understanding, skill. 
Mauri. Life principle, vital essence, special nature. 
Mokopuna. Grandchild.  
Ngā mataa waka. Māori who are not mana whenua to the area in which they 
live. 
Ngāi Tahu Whānui. Gathering of Ngāi Tahu people. 
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Ngāi Tahutanga. Ngāi Tahu tikanga.  
Noa. Free from tapu or any other restriction; 
Ōnukurana Tūhoe. Natural resources arm of Tūhoe. 
Pākehā. New Zealander of European Descent.  
Papatipu rūnanga . 18 Ngāi Tahu groups of hapū. 
Papa-tū-ā-nuku. Earth mother and wife of Rangi-nui 
Pōwhiri. Welcome ceremony on a mārae. 
Rāhui. The customary usage of rāhui refers to a prohibition against 
trespassing in a particular area; used in the case of tapu or to temporarily 
protect natural resources. 
Rangatira. Chief, to be of high rank. 
Rangatiratanga. Effective leadership. 
Rangi-nui. Sky father and husband of  
Rohe. Tribal territory. 
Rohe-pōtae. Tribal territory 
Rūnanga. Tribal council. 




Tāne. Son of Papa-tū-ā-nuku and Rangi-nui, God of Forests 
Tangaroa. Son of Papa-tū-ā-nuku and Rangi-nui, God of the Sea. 
Tangata whenua. People of the land.  
Taniwha. Water spirit, monster, dangerous water creature 
Tapu. To be sacred, prohibited, restricted, set apart, forbidden, under atua 
protection.  
Tāwhirimātea. God of the winds. 
Te Kerēme. The Ngāi Tahu Claim 
Te Waipounamu. The South Island. 
Te Whitu Tekau. The Seventy. 
Tika. To be correct. 
Tikanga. Rules, laws, Māori legal system.  
Tino Rangatiratanga. Māori sovereignty movement. 
Tohu. The metaphysical or symbolic description of things. 
Tohunga. Skilled person, chosen expert, priest, healer 
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Tōpuni. Literally Dogskin cloak, used in a resource management context as an 
area of significance.  
Tuākana. Elder siblings.  
Tūhoetanga. Tūhoe tikanga. 
Tupua. Goblin, object, strange being.  
Tūpuna. Ancestors, grandparents.  
Utu. Concept of reciprocity in order to maintain balanced relationships 
between people and the Gods. 
Waiora. Health, soundness. 
Wairua. Spirit, soul.  
Wairuatanga. Spirituality, acknowledging the metaphysical world. 
Wāhi taonga. Historical sites or places of great significance. 
Wāhi tapu. Sacred place, sacred site - a place subject to long-term ritual 
restrictions on access or use. 
Whakapapa. Genealogy, genealogical table, lineage, descent. 
Whairawa. Assets, to be wealthy.  
Whakataukī. Proverb, significant saying. 
18 
 
Whānau. Family grouping.  
Whānaunga. Relative, relation, kin, blood relation. 
Whānaungatanga . Kin relationships between people and the rights and 
obligations that follow from the individual’s place in the collective group. 




4 Introduction and Methodology 
In this thesis I explore how two very different iwi, Ngāi Tahu in Canterbury of 
the South Island and Ngāi Tūhoe of Te Urewera in the North Island, are using 
co-governance arrangements in resource management law to gain regional 
influence and promote the interests of their people. The thesis takes the form 
of four chapters. The fifth chapter outlines the relevant law and policy that 
affects the formulation and execution of such arrangements. The sixth chapter 
shows that Ngāi Tahu have used their Treaty of Waitangi Settlement as a 
building block to create three resource management power sharing 
arrangements in Canterbury but have failed to fully secure total co-governance 
in their efforts. The seventh chapter will detail the 2013 Ngāi Tūhoe 
Settlement, which is unique for its creation of legal personality for Te Urewera 
and the resulting governance entity that will represent this new legal entity. 
The Ngāi Tūhoe governance arrangements go beyond other contemporary co-
governance schemes, and create a new form of governance. The eighth chapter 
concludes that legal personality is a crucial factor in securing good resource 
management power sharing arrangements, that the Ngāi Tūhoe arrangements 
have set the standard for future Crown-Iwi governance arrangements, and 
outlines some of the pitfalls of such arrangements. I will show that the future 
of co-governance is a scheme that involves a higher degree of participation for 
Iwi. I will also explain that co-governance is a political vessel into which the 
Crown can pour as much or as little power sharing as it wishes  
4.1 Methodology 
This research was undertaken at the University of Canterbury in the School of 
Law in conjunction with the Ngāi Tahu Research Centre, during 2013-2015. 
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The Ngāi Tahu Research Centre provided invaluable support and cultural 
guidance throughout the course of this thesis. The project was undertaken from 
the cultural perspective of myself, the author, who has whakapapa links to 
Ngāti Tama (Taranaki) and Ngāti Pamoana (Whanganui), but who grew up in 
Wellington in a predominately Pākehā environment. The research is therefore 
influenced by my cultural context.    
This project focused on two main case studies, Ngāi Tūhoe in Te Urewera, and 
Ngāi Tahu in the Canterbury region. Ngāi Tahu has a vast rohe, and 
Canterbury was selected over other areas of their rohe as it is the centre for 
Ngāi Tahu administratively, and is also the home of the author. There are other 
resource management power sharing arrangements that are ongoing in other 
parts of the Ngāi Tahu rohe, such as the Titi Islands and Muriwai; I have 
chosen to focus on the arrangements in Canterbury.  
This research was conducted in a sociolegal manner. Sociolegal research aims 
to understand how law and policy is working in practice, which is why this 
approach was taken. Sociolegal research can pose many challenges. The first 
of these is securing a solid definition of what exactly sociolegal work is: 
Michael Salter and Julie Mason put forward a key belief that underpins the 
concept, “Empirically, law is a component part of the wider social and 
political structure, is inextricably related to it in an infinite variety of ways, 
and can therefore only be properly understood if studied in that context”.2 
Understood at times as ‘filling a gap’ between law in books and law in 
                                                 
2 Michael Salter and Julie Mason Writing Law Dissertations: An Introduction and Guide to the Conduct of Legal 
Research (Pearson Education Limited, England, 2007) at 122. 
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practice, sociolegal research assesses the “practical impact of law in action”3, 
specifically, “sociolegal research frequently addresses law in action in the 
sense that it seeks to gain empirical knowledge of the actions, relationships, 
and attitudes of parties affected by legal proceedings”.4 Amongst the various 
forms sociolegal research can take, the research undertaken in this thesis 
adopted the ‘empirical approach’. Salter and Mason define empirical research 
as “the gathering of an analysis of facts about law in action, experiences of the 
practical impact of legal proceedings upon different groups in society”.5 The 
research analysed the practical effect of resource management power sharing 
arrangements created by policy and statute, and specifically how these 
arrangements affected ‘different groups in society’, therefore it was logical 
that an empirical socio-legal methodology was taken.  
The research was split into three key stages:  
A literature review. This involved reading historical materials on each iwi. 
This included books and Waitangi Tribunal papers. This literature review was 
undertaken to understand the relationship between the Crown and each iwi, 
and to understand the governance journey taken by the tribes in question. 
An examination of contemporary policy. This stage required the reading of 
statute and policy relating to the power sharing schemes in which each iwi is 
involved, to understand the mechanisms that have been put in place to 
                                                 
3 At 130. 
4 At 152. 
5 At 165. 
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establish each arrangement. It was necessary to understand the bones of each 
arrangement to then apply the knowledge taken from the third stage of this 
project to flesh out these bones. 
Semi-structured interviews. The final stage of the research was to interview 
key stakeholders from Ngāi Tahu, Ngāi Tūhoe, and the Crown. Each of these 
interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner, the participants were 
given the opportunity to read the questions asked and topics to be discussed 
beforehand, and were then interviewed face to face and recorded using a voice 
recorder. These interviews were then transcribed. This stage was conducted in 
order to understand the practical effect of the policy and statute that provided 
for each iwi’s power sharing arrangement with the Crown. This three stage 
process ensured that I covered both the theoretical and practical elements of 
each iwi’s governance journey.   
Empirical sociolegal research, when compared to traditional black-letter 
analysis, poses some challenges. The researcher can have difficulty obtaining 
raw data, and experiences further issues interpreting that data. Additionally, it 
can be difficult to control variables, such as consistent interview questions 
between differing subjects, and results can have more than one possible 
cause.
6
 Moreover, the sociolegal researcher can face significant ethical 
dilemmas, such as obtaining full consent of interviewees, and protecting 
                                                 
6 At 165. 
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confidentiality with regard to how data is utilised and published.
7
 Several such 
challenges arose during the research process. 
The biggest challenge was the interview process. Transcription work is long 
and tedious, and often interviews were transcribed that did not produce much 
data which ultimately contributed to the overall thesis. I also lost three 
interviews through the malfunction of equipment. The interviews and 
transcription period was time consuming and this was a significant challenge. 
Of these interviews, only some of the information obtained was eventually 
utilised in the written thesis.  
As part of the research project, I attended Nga Matapopore meetings from 
September 2013 – March 2014 with the permission of the former chair of Nga 
Matapopore, Dr Te Maire Tau. Nga Matapopore is the steering committee that 
has the mandate from the mana whenua of Christchurch, Ngāi Tūāhuriri, to 
engage in the Canterbury Earthquake Rebuild. One of the difficulties of 
attending these meetings was establishing what information was available to 
use in this thesis, and what was restricted due to confidentiality. I also attended 
the Select Committee Hearings for the Te Urewera-Tūhoe Bill in Whakātane 
on 19 February 2014 in order to understand some of the issues that were being 
debated in the Bill, and to speak to stakeholders. The overall research and 
writing process was cohesive and the sociolegal approach was effective in 
answering the research question.   
                                                 
7 At 172. 
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5 Law and Policy Background 
Naku te rourou nau te rourou ka ora ai te iwi 
With your basket and my basket the people will live 
Co-governance arrangements in resource management in New Zealand see iwi 
and the Crown co-operating together in a power sharing capacity to make 
important decisions about natural objects and areas. Two such iwi, Ngāi Tahu 
and Ngāi Tūhoe, are utilising these schemes to gain regional influence and 
through this influence, promote the interests of their people. The well-known 
whakataukī above refers to co-operation, and highlights the importance of 
everyone doing their part and sharing their resources. This is the very essence 
of a co-governance arrangement. 
In this thesis I examine how co-governance in resource management in New 
Zealand is being used as a tool by two very different iwi, Ngāi Tahu in 
Canterbury in the South Island and Ngāi Tūhoe (Tūhoe) in Te Urewera in the 
North Island, to increase the regional influence of each iwi. In order to 
evaluate the different schemes that each iwi are working with and assess how 
they are using these to promote the interests of their people and how this, in 
turn, is changing the face of co-governance, it is necessary to understand the 
underlying law, cultural context and policy. This chapter draws on current 
literature to explore these factors and to explain the current landscape. 
Firstly, this chapter will give some definitions of governance, in order to 
understand co-governance. I then seek to explain the difference between co-
25 
 
governance and co-management. In this section, the positives and negatives of 
the concepts of co-governance and co-management will be analysed. 
The second section of this chapter will provide a discussion of the interaction 
of tikanga Māori and the resource management legislation regime. Iwi 
involved in power-sharing arrangements bring tikanga Māori principles to the 
boardroom table, so it is necessary to understand how these work. This section 
will discuss the legislation that governs resource management, the Resource 
Management Act 1991 (RMA). I will explain how the RMA engages with iwi 
and hapū interests, and how the courts have analysed this engagement. This 
section will evaluate the provisions within the Act that specifically legislate for 
a form of power sharing, and will show that the Act falls short of being an 
effective vehicle for delivering co-governance.  Therefore, Māori have to look 
outside the RMA to pursue effective co-governance. 
The third section will discuss the interaction of resource management law and 
tikanga. Tikanga is Māori law and custom, and it is necessary to understand 
tikanga when evaluating a co-governance scheme, as Māori participants will 
be heavily influenced by tikanga.
8
 In particular, the term kaitiakitanga will be 
explained. Kaitiakitanga is a tikanga environmental management ethic, and is 
therefore particularly relevant in iwi-Crown power sharing resource 
management arrangements. 
This chapter will show that resource management legislation as it stands is 
inadequate to fully provide for tikanga Māori with relation to co-management 
                                                 
8 Tikanga can be both plural and singular. In this context, the singular will be used.  
26 
 
and co-governance, and as such, these arrangements must be provided for 
outside of the RMA.  
5.1 Governance and Co-Governance 
Power sharing regimes between iwi and the Crown in resource management 
are often couched in terms of ‘co-governance’. The term is rarely defined, and 
means different things to different people. It is often overlapped with the term 
co-management, and there is no official guidance in legislation as to what the 
term means. The root of co-governance is ‘governance’. Therefore, in order to 
understand co-governance, I must first examine the concept of governance 
itself. A succinct, all-encompassing definition of the term ‘governance’ is hard 
to find. This reflects the complex nature of the term and the subjective nuances 
that ‘governance’ engenders. One useful base definition can be found in the 




The legal rules, institutional arrangements and practices that 
determines who controls the entity being governed and who gets 
the benefits that flow from it. Governance includes how major 
policy decisions are made, how various stakeholders can 
influence the process, who is held accountable for performance, 
and what performance standards are applied. 
This base definition can be built on depending on the context. This thesis 
examines iwi-Crown governance of natural resources in New Zealand. 
Therefore it is useful to look to how governance works in the contexts of 
                                                 
9 D A Lincove International encyclopedia of the social & behavioral sciences (American Library Association dba 
CHOICE, Middletown, 2002) at 346. 
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environmental and indigenous relations. Steven Bernstein, in a paper 
examining environmental governance, states that:
 10
   
Governance, at any time and in any place, is the sum of collective 
understandings and discourse about material capabilities, 
knowledge (normative, ideological, technical and scientific), 
legitimacy (the acceptance and justification of the right to rule by 
relevant communities), and fairness (which… may include 
notions of accountability, representation, and responsibility, as 
well as distributive justice).  
Robert Joseph, in a paper comparing Māori and Pākehā governance structures, 
notes that governance is:
 11
 
The process through which institutions, businesses and citizens 
articulate their interests, exercise their rights and obligations and 
mediate their differences… Governance methods include 
structures, processes, norms, traditions and institutions, and their 
application by group members and other interested parties 
I consider that these definitions build a basis for what governance is in the 
context of this thesis. 
One aspect that is agreed upon by many authors is that governance is not to be 
confused with government. It is a much broader term than government “which 
concentrates on state actions versus society and market… ‘Governance’ looks 
                                                 
10 Steven Bernstein “Globalization and the Requirements of "Good" Environmental Governance” 2005 4(3-
4) Perspectives on Global Development and Technology at 652. 
11 Robert Joseph “Contemporary Maori governance: new era or new error?” 2007 22(4) New Zealand 
Universities Law Review at 684. 
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at steering and self-regulation on both sides, public and private”.12 Joseph 
warns that the tendency to confuse these two terms leads to “unfortunate 
consequences” including narrowing the range of strategies available to deal 
with problems that might arise in a governance situation.
13
 Government is only 
one of the many range of stakeholders that might be involved in governance 
decisions.  
What then, is “good” governance? Joseph stresses that “there is no single 
world-wide model for best practice governance due to differences in legal 
systems, institutional frameworks and cultural traditions”.14 As a useful 
starting point for determining “good governance”, Ulrich Karpen has 
highlighted as an effective measure an Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) list of the following priorities:
15
 
 Evidence based policy making 
 Integrity in the public sector, credibility and trust; 
 Regulatory management, 
 Multi-level government 
 Interaction between the public and private sectors 
                                                 
12 Ulrich Karpen “Good governance” 2009 12(1-2) European Journal of Law Reform at 20. 
13 Joseph, above n 11. 
14 Joseph, above n 11. 
15 OECD Public Governance and Territorial Development, Directorate, Public Governance Committee, Report on consultation 
with the Stakeholders, Draft Principles for Transperancy and Integrity in Lobbying (24 Dec 2009 2009) in Karpen, 
above n 12. 
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 Human resources management; and 
 Fiscal sustainability 
However, I consider that good governance will be subjective and determined 
by the unique characteristics of each system being governed. Governance 
brings together the various philosophical decision-making pathways within an 
entity. Ultimately these governance decisions will decide the path forward 
taken by that entity, and are therefore crucial to the future strategy and day-to-
day running of that entity.  
5.2 What is Co-governance? 
In New Zealand, co-governance is a way of sharing governance power that is 
used to recognise the role of Māori as a Treaty of Waitangi partner, in order to 
encourage increased tangata whenua involvement and participation. These 
schemes occur predominantly in the sphere of resource management, and are 
negotiated between “defined and identifiable Māori groups and Crown 
agencies”.16 Ngāi Tahu and Ngāi Tūhoe are engaged in such arrangements 
within their rohe, and are utilising these schemes to build regional influence.  
For Māori, co-governance schemes allow them to participate in a form of 
resource management that they have often been locked out of for many 
generations, in an effort to compensate for historical injustices.
17
 For the 
Crown, these arrangements allow them to devolve some decision making 
                                                 
16 Linda Te Aho Power-sharing and natural resources (Victoria University of Wellington, 2011) at 1. 
17 P. Ali Memon and Nicholas A. Kirk “Maori commercial fisheries governance in Aotearoa/New Zealand 
within the bounds of a neoliberal fisheries management regime” 2011 52(1) Asia Pacific Viewpoint at 107. 
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power, while retaining overall control. In co-governance schemes across New 
Zealand, iwi representatives and Crown agents sit on governance boards to 
decide the crucial governance goals of the organisation. Membership numbers 
are generally equal, or close to being equal. Such boards are designed to be co-
operative and are encouraged to operate in good faith and in a collaborative 
manner. 
In co-governance arrangements, the agents that act on behalf of the Crown are 
generally representatives from local, district or regional government. Co-
governance boards implement the Resource Management Act 1991 in relation 
to the resources in question and make the all-important planning decisions 
under the scope of the Act. Other Acts, such as the Conservation Act 1987, the 
Wildlife Act 1953 and the National Parks Act 1980, may well be considered 




In New Zealand legislation there is no written definition of the term co-
governance. The term itself is mentioned in four statutes – two are Treaty 
settlements,
19
 and two are river management schemes that are derived from 
Treaty settlements.
20
 However none of this legislation provides an official 
interpretation. A term that is used in a similar context to co-governance is co-
management. Co-management is provided for in three of the acts that co-
                                                 
18 See Ngāti Tūwharetora, Raukawa, and Te Arawa River Iwi Waikato River Act 2010 at s 16. 
19 Raukawa Claims Settlement Act 2014, Ngāti Manuhiri Claims Settlement Act 2012. 
20 Nga Wai o Maniapoto (Waipa River) Act 2012, Ngāti Tūwharetora, Raukawa, and Te Arawa River Iwi 
Waikato River Act 2010. 
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governance is set out in, and one additional piece of legislation.
21
 There is a 
similar lack of statutory definition of this term.  
However, there are sources outside of the legislation that do define co-
governance and co-management. One example which deals with the terms in 
the specific context of iwi participation in resource management is the 2010 
Deed in Relation to Co-governance and Co-management of the Waipa River. 
Paragraphs 3.6 – 3.8 set out a more structured outline of the expectations of 
each of these two power sharing arrangements than is found in statute. Co-
governance is described as setting the primary direction to achieve outlined 
restoration goals, while co-management is structured as a collaborative 
partnership that implements the direction set under the co-governance 
framework. Guiding principles for these co-governance and co-management 
structures include respect for mana (authority), mauri (life-force) and waiora 
(spirituality) of the rivers involved, and principles to do with practical and 
effective outcomes.
22
 Tikanga Māori and mainstream environmental science 
are considered to be guidelines of equal importance in these schemes. 
Outside of legislation and Treaty Settlements, co-management and co-
governance have been considered in some depth by various academic 
commentators. Co-management has been the focus of several studies. Jeremy 
Baker, in his paper ‘The Waikato-Tainui Settlement Act: A new High-Water 
Mark for Natural Resources Co-management’ gives a concise explanation of 
                                                 
21 Co-management is not set out in the Ngāti Manuhiri Claims Settlement Act 2012 but is provided for in 
Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Claims (Waikato River) Settlement Act 2010. 





 Baker describes co-management as denoting “formalized 
(sometimes statutory) collaborative arrangements linking local communities 
and governments”, and notes that “there is a continuum of possible co-
management schemes providing for differing degrees of power sharing”.24 
This is echoed by Phillipa Norman, who agrees that co-management 
arrangements can vary. Nonetheless, Norman states that certain characteristics 
must be present in co-management arrangements. These include shared power 
and joint decision-making, shared responsibility, co-operation and consensus, 
and drawing on a range of knowledge systems.
25
 
Local Government New Zealand (LGNZ) has published a guide to the co-
management systems in place around the country. LGNZ show a series of 
structures where increased levels of community involvement flow from 
‘informing’ to ‘partnership/community control’:26 
                                                 
23 Jeremy Baker “The Waikato-Tainui Settlement Act: A New High-Water Mark for Natural Resources Co-
management” 2013 24(1) Colo J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y 163 at 166. 
24 At 166. 
25 Phillipa Norman Crown and Iwi co-management: A model for Environmental governance in New Zealand (University 
of Auckland, 2011) at 19. 
26 Local Government New Zealand Local Authorities and Māori: Case studies of local arrangements. (Wellington, 




Figure 1: Co-management structures 
This diagram suggests that anything as low-level as simply giving information 
as co-management. I consider that this is remarkable as it seems to ignore the 
co-operative nature of such arrangements and denotes very little practical 
power sharing. An iwi can share information with a local government entity 
that then ignores this information, reducing any influence that iwi might have 
and essentially making the engagement redundant. I believe it is most 
definitely not an equal power sharing arrangement, and does not reach the 
level of equality suggested by the term ‘co-governance’. 
34 
 
Co-governance has many similar characteristics to co-management, such as 
shared responsibility and decision making power. However, while the two 
concepts are very similar and are often used in the same context, there is some 
difference. Co-governance offers a higher degree of power sharing than co-
management does.  There has been academic discussion regarding the 
differences between the two concepts. Catherine Iorns Magallanes has noted 
the interchangeability of the terms co-management, joint management, and 
more recently, co-governance.
27
 She explains that “any such use at the 
moment is probably due to a political choice based on the more normal 
distinction between governance and management. ‘Governance’ certainly has 
a connotation of greater authority than ‘management’ does”.28 It is 
questionable as to whether this is mere semantics, but I consider that at a 
practical level co-governance does entail a higher level of responsibility and 
input than co-management. 
At a functional level, those in governance roles whom I interviewed had some 
distinct and contrasting views about the difference between co-governance and 
co-management. These stakeholders did not hold one distinct view on the 
topic, and in fact, in some cases, had completely differing opinions. I consider 
that this reflects the unclear nature of the differences between the two terms. In 
a Canterbury context, ECAN Commissioner Rex Williams notes:
 29
  
                                                 
27 Catherine Iorns Magallanes “Co-governance and co-management of natural resources” (World Indigenous 
Lawyers Conference, Hamilton, 6 September 2012) at 1. 
28 At 2. 
29 Interview with Rex Williams, ECAN Commissioner (Rachael Harris, March 13, 2014).  
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A governance level is very different from a management level. 
Management is based on expected outputs, and at co-management 
people just perform tasks to achieve those outputs. Co-
governance is different in that you’re not actually sure what the 
outputs are, and the co-governors have to debate the issues to 
define the outputs.  
Williams’ colleague, ECAN Commissioner Donald Couch, who is Ngāi Tahu, 
believes that co-governance can trigger conflicts to do with mana, and that co-
management is where the real power is, as this is control at a more basic 
level.
30
 Couch’s view can be juxtaposed to that taken by Ngāi Tahu academic 
Dr Te Maire Tau who thinks that there is a lack of clarity between the two 
terms as the boundaries between governance and management are never 
clear.
31
 In contrast to Couch, Tau believes that true power lies at a governance 
level, as input at a governance level allows iwi to do things how they want and 
in their own way. I believe that the contrast in opinion between these two Ngāi 
Tahu authorities highlights the lack of clear definition between these two 
terms. This shows that these schemes are often used interchangeably 
depending on the politics of each arrangement. I posit that neither type of 
arrangement has strict boundaries or definitions, rather, both terms can be used 
as a convenient vessel with which the Crown can pour into it what it likes.  
Co-governance schemes are used as resource management tools and as 
methods of settling Treaty grievances and managing important taonga, while 
still allowing residual control to rest in the hands of the Crown. Consequently, 
                                                 
30 Interview with Donald Couch, ECAN Commissioner (Rachael Harris, 11 March 2014). 




such schemes are likely to be more palatable to the average tax payer than a 
full hand over of control. When considering the differences between co-
governance and co-management, an analogy with a yacht can be used: to 
navigate an ocean, a co-governor would set the course and man the tiller, 
whereas a co-manager would be raising the sails and swabbing the decks. 
At a practical level, it would appear that no clearly defined boundaries exist 
between co-management and co-governance, despite the higher connotation of 
authority that the term ‘co-governance’ gives. There is a spectrum of power 
sharing arrangements in resource management. Arrangements labelled ‘co-
management’ and ‘co-governance’ sit at different places along this spectrum. I 
will therefore use the term ‘power sharing arrangement’ throughout this thesis 
to denote any scheme that sits on this spectrum. Both Ngāi Tahu and Ngāi 
Tūhoe have utilised different power sharing arrangements to increase regional 
influence.  
Resource management power sharing schemes exist across New Zealand. 
They have been implemented by the RMA, Treaty settlements, and policy 
written specifically for the scheme in question. Each of these arrangements has 
a certain level of power sharing involved in it, and as such some have a higher 
level of influence than others. Some examples of power sharing arrangements 
between iwi and the Crown that are currently in operation include a JMA 
between Tūwharetoa and Taupō District Council32, a co-governance 
                                                 





arrangement over the Te Arawa Lakes,
 33
 and co-management and co-
governance structures for the Waikato River.
34
 
5.3 Positives and Negatives of Co-governance and Co-
management 
Co-governance and co-management schemes are different, but for the purpose 
of investigating the positives and negatives of these power sharing systems, 
the literature discussing them will be examined together. These systems have 
been positively received by some. Linda Te Aho states that “enhancing 
people’s rights will lead to more effective governance and management of 
resources”.35 Academics such as Te Aho see increased Māori decision making 
power in resource management as essential, explaining that power sharing 
schemes are empowering for Māori who have often been locked out of 
resource management decisions for the majority of post-Treaty history. Co-
governance has positive connotations of decolonisation. Jonathan Paquette has 
linked the ascension of co-management with the rise of decolonisation of 
public administration.
36
 Power is removed from the hands of central 
government and returned to iwi.  
                                                 
33 Local Government New Zealand, above n 26 at 6. 
34 A variety of legislation forms these arrangements, including the Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Claims (Waikato 
River Act) 2010. 
35 Te Aho, above n 16 at 1. 
36 Jonathan Paquette “From Decolonization to Postcolonial Management: Challenging Heritage 
Administration and Governance in New Zealand” 2012 12(2) Public Organization Review at 128. 
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Power sharing schemes in resource management are designed to give Māori 
increased influence. For Māori, it is a method of regaining respect for their 
right as tangata whenua, a recognition that “they were here first”.37 Iwi are 
willing to engage in co-management and co-governance systems because it is 
one way of establishing control over resources that they used to manage 
traditionally. While it is not the full hand over of control that may be preferred 
by some iwi, it is one concession that the central government will make. I 
consider that the Crown will still retain overall control, and will often set the 
parameters of how far it is prepared to give back authority in the context of the 
scheme. 
Notably, both indigenous and non-indigenous stakeholders have critiqued co-
management and co-governance systems. Some non-indigenous stakeholders 
view such systems as undemocratic. Norman observes that “detractors argue 
that Māori should aim to secure more influence through election to local 
government”.38 When the Waikato River Settlement was initiated, then-
Federated Farmers President, Don Nicolson, authored an op-ed in the New 
Zealand Herald lambasting co-governance.
39
 His scathing attack on the 
Waikato power sharing arrangements claimed that co-governance was both 
undemocratic and a faulty analysis of the Treaty. He argues that:
 40
 
                                                 
37 Interview with Tony Sewell, CEO Ngāi Tahu Property (Rachael Harris, 11 June 2014).  
38 Norman, above n 25 at 27. 
39 Don Nicolson “Flawed concept of co-governance misrepresents Treaty” NZ Herald (Auckland, 11 May 
2010). 
40 At 1. 
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 Co-governance is a new, untried way of governing the nation’s 
resources. … Co-governance is highly undemocratic, because 
decisions are made by appointees. … Sacrificing democracy for 
the sake of a Treaty settlement is outrageous. 
I consider that Nicolson’s opinion is one that is particularly telling as it comes 
from the seat of Federated Farmers (FF). FF is often a key stakeholder in lands 
that are the subject of resource management power sharing schemes, such as 
Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere and the Waikato River. These comments reflect 
that often contentious nature of the Treaty Settlement process, and the 
differing views that will always be taken by stakeholders that have different 
priorities and goals.  
Scientists have also raised questions about power sharing systems in resource 
management, with concerns over the clash of mainstream science and tikanga 
Māori. Geoff Wilson and Ali Memon have studied environmental co-
governance in South Island forests.
41
 Their paper observes that such systems 
“have been far from successful as a means to empower local indigenous 
communities and to promote sustainable environmental practices”.42 Their 
critique of power sharing arrangements between iwi and central government 
stems from the clash between traditional management methods in tikanga and 
mainstream science-based forest management. Wilson and Memon state that 
“policy frameworks involving indigenous peoples are often based on the 
assumption that indigenous people and conservation managers strive for the 
                                                 
41 Geoff A Wilson and P Ali Memon “The contested environmental governance of Maori-owned native 
forests in South Island, Aotearoa/New Zealand” 2010 27(4) Land Use Policy. 
42 At 1198. 
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same ‘bio centric’ objectives, even though resource use is often more central to 
indigenous self-determination than altruistic frameworks”.43 They also note 
that mainstream conservationists often hold the unrealistic view that 
indigenous people will preserve land that is given back to them in the state that 
they received it, despite the differences in cultural opinion about what 
conservation is, and the fact that Māori may wish to develop the land for 
economic and cultural purposes.
44
  
Wilson and Memon conclude that tikanga Māori environmental management 
in forests may clash with mainstream science, as “cultural, economic and 
social factors combine to create forest management pathways that are complex 
and that may not necessarily be compatible with Western notions of ‘ideal’ 
biodiversity protection”.45 This can be extended to co-governance and co-
management regimes in other environmental contexts such as riparian repair, 
where tikanga and mainstream management ideologies may not be well 
matched. Often, Māori do not separate environmental management and 
sustainable economic development; activities such as the annual cull of mutton 
birds by southern Ngāi Tahu Rūnanga reflect this. Mainstream thinking, on the 
other hand, tends to separate environmental conservation and economic 
growth.  
The clash of mainstream conservation values with tikanga Māori has been 
examined by others. Baker has noted “while Western and Indigenous 
                                                 
43 At 1200. 
44 At 1208. 
45 At 1208. 
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conceptions of conservation share a common interest in sustainability, merging 
two systems rooted in different worldviews and unequal in power is not 
straightforward”.46 Mark Prystupa has examined the case of Te Waihora/Lake 
Ellesmere. 
47
 Prystupa notes that groups including Forest and Bird, Public 
Access New Zealand and Federated Mountain Clubs were opposed to co-
management of Te Waihora “for fear that there will be degradation in 
conservation values and a limiting of access to these areas”.48 He also notes 
the efficacy of complaints from these stakeholders, as these groups retain a 
significant membership and have close ties with the Department of 
Conservation.
49
 In Australia, this conflict has also emerged. In Booderee 
National Park in New South Wales, the government’s commitment to a 
particular version of biodiversity “has the ability to interfere with Aboriginal 
cultural aspirations”.50 I consider that co-governance and co-management 
regimes in New Zealand challenge the mainstream management system. As 
such, those in the dominant culture may be less inclined to apply management 
perspectives from a different culture.  
Academics who are of Māori heritage have also explored some of the 
challenges that arise with resource management power sharing regimes. 
Rawinia Higgins argues that co-management is a compromise that has arisen 
                                                 
46 Baker, above n 23 at 171. 
47 Mark V. Prystupa “Barriers and strategies to the development of co-management regimes in New Zealand: 
the case of Te Waihora” 1998 57(2) Human Organization [H.W. Wilson - SSA] at 140. 
48 At 140. 
49 At 140. 
50 David Farrier and Michael Adams “Indigenous-Government Co-Management of Protected Areas: 
Booderee National Park and the National Framework in Australia” 2011 at 37. 
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as a result of the parameters of negotiation and settlement that “change as 
quickly as the governing political parties”.51 She draws attention to the 




These legal structures do not provide iwi with the agency to 
create structures that are uniquely Māori beyond the bounds of 
the law. Iwi are forced into a dichotomy over their cultural and 
economic capital that appears to emphasise the latter rather than a 
symbiotic development of both. 
I consider that co-management will by its very nature affect the self-
determination of an iwi, as they are forced into a mainstream model. Such a 
power sharing system is a concession, rather than an outright victory for 
Māori. Ngāi Tahu Adjunct Professor and member of the Te Waihora Co-
governance group, Anake Goodall, has described it as “horse-trading”.53 The 
late Nin Tomas saw such systems as a compromise, although she considered 
that there was  a positive effect by such power sharing arrangements on 
mainstream thought, describing co-management as “a halfway house to re-
educating Western thinking away from the micromanagement of ‘my’ ‘sacred’ 
‘individual’ ‘property’ ‘rights’ and towards accepting, if not adopting, a 
broader environmental indigenous-based worldview”.54 The concerns of these 
                                                 
51 Rawinia Higgins "Those that trespass will be relish for my food" (Victoria University of Wellington, 2011) at 2. 
52 Above n 51. 
53 Interview with Anake Goodall, Member of the Te Waihora Co-Governance Board (Rachael Harris, 17 July 
2014). 
54 Nin Tomas “Māori Concepts of Rangatiratanga, Kaitiakitanga, the Environment, and Property Rights” in 
David Grinlinton and Prue Taylor (eds) Property Rights and Sustainability – the evolution of property rights to meet 
ecological challenges (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Netherlands, 2011) at 220. 
43 
 
prominent Māori reflect the compromising nature of collaborative 
management and governance. 
I therefore posit that while co-governance and co-management schemes are 
aspirational and generally well received by Māori, the system is not perfect. 
This reflects the diverse and evolving nature of Treaty relationships, and the 
ongoing development of law and policy in this area. Treaty settlements 
continue to test the limits of how far the Crown is prepared to relinquish 
authority. I conclude that the spectrum of resource management power sharing 
schemes provide convenient vessels that the Crown can use to give back iwi 
some decision making, while allowing it to retain overall control.  
5.4 Resource Management in New Zealand 
In order to examine how resource management power sharing arrangements 
between iwi and the Crown are changing the face of co-governance, it is 
necessary to explore the foundations for resource management in New 
Zealand. The very basis for iwi management and governance of their own 
natural resources in New Zealand is found in Article Two of the Treaty of 
Waitangi, New Zealand’s founding document. The English version of Article 
Two provides that: 
Her Majesty the Queen of England confirms and guarantees to the 
Chiefs and Tribes of New Zealand and to the respective families 
and individuals thereof the full exclusive and undisturbed 
possession of their Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and other 
properties which they may collectively or individually possess so 








The Queen of England agrees to protect the chiefs, the subtribes 
and all the people of New Zealand in the unqualified exercise of 
their chieftainship over their lands, villages and all their treasures. 
Both translations provide for ongoing Māori environmental management over 
their own resources. As such, in the context of resource management power 
sharing arrangements it is necessary to examine traditional Māori resource 
management practice and law, or tikanga, as well as mainstream law. 
This thesis examines co-governance in a resource management context. The 
overarching legislation in this context is the Resource Management Act 1991 
(RMA). Enacted expressly to consolidate a variety of legislation that covered 
various environmental regulations, the RMA acknowledged that the 
environment and the economy in New Zealand are interlinked. The RMA 
consolidated legislation including the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967, 
the Clean Air Act 1972 and the Town and Country Planning Act 1977. The 
original architect of the Act, Sir Geoffrey Palmer QC, noted that the Act 
“represented a deliberate shift on the part of New Zealanders away from 
economic advancement at any cost towards long term economic and 
environmental sustainability”.56 The Act is also recognised as the one of the 
first major pieces of overarching environmental legislation to broadly 
                                                 
55 John Wilson “Nation and government - The origins of nationhood” (2012) 
<http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/document/4216/the-three-articles-of-the-treaty-of-waitangi>. 
56 Geoffrey Palmer Protecting New Zealand's Environment: An Analysis of the Government's Proposed Freshwater 
Management and Resource Management Act 1991 Reforms (September 2013) at 3. 
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incorporate tikanga Māori principles, although the Town & Country Planning 
Act did provide for some recognition of Māori interests. Section 4 of the 
Conservation Act 1987 also required that the provisions be interpreted in such 
a way as to give effect to the principles of the Treaty.
57
 This section will 
explain how the RMA incorporates tikanga Māori, and I will show that it is an 
inadequate mechanism for delivering effective co-governance.  
The RMA vests day-to-day control and management of resource management 
in local and regional councils. The central government retains control through 
the creation of instruments such as national policy statements and national 
environmental standards, such as the New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement.
58
 
At a regional level, resource management planning is formulated by regional 
policy statements and regional plans.
59
 At a district level, district plans are 
adopted by district and city councils.
60
 The Resource Management Act is 
particularly important to co-governance agreements, as within its purpose and 
principles we find the very basis for the legislation that allows such 
agreements to exist.  
Part 2 of the Act contains the purpose and underlying principles of the Act. 
Section 5 provides that sustainable management is the concept that underpins 
the entirety of the RMA. Palmer defines sustainable management as 
                                                 
57 Derek Nolan Environmental and resource management law (LexisNexis N.Z, Wellington, N.Z, 2011) at 877. 
58 National policy statements are governed by s 45, national environmental standards are governed by ss 43-
44. 
59 Regional policy statements are governed by ss 59-62. 
60 District plans are governed by ss 72-77. 
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“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs” and stresses that this 
principle of sustainable management is not about economic development at the 
expense of the environment.
61
 Section 6 is designed to give guidance to some 
of the matters that should be considered in achieving sustainable management, 
including the relationship of Māori to their lands and taonga. Section 7, 
particularly the subsection that recognises kaitiakitanga, will be discussed 
later. Section 8 provides that any person undertaking functions under the Act 
shall have regard to the principles of the Treaty. 
The RMA and the Treaty of Waitangi have had significant interaction since 
the establishment of the legislation. The Treaty is a hugely influential 
document, and the enunciations of its principles have been explored in depth 
by the courts over the past thirty years since the landmark SOE Case in 1987.
62
 
In Carter Holt Harvey Ltd v Te Rūnanga  o Tūwharetoa Ki Kawerau a list of 
‘central principles’ of the Treaty was said to include: partnership; mutual 
obligations to act reasonably and in good faith; active protection; mutual 
benefit; development; and Rangatiratanga, which was given as ‘a tribal right to 
manage resources in a manner compatible with Māori custom’.63 These 
principles are highly influential on the collaborative nature of power sharing 
arrangements. 
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Derek Nolan explains that it has been long established law that the Treaty of 
Waitangi Act 1975 and the RMA are distinct regimes and that Treaty claims 
are not to affect RMA processes.
64
 He notes, however, that there are links 
between these two regimes, such as in the instance of power sharing 
agreements. Nolan specifically highlights the review of regional and district 
plans available to Waikato River Iwi under the Waikato-Tainui Raupatu 
Claims (Waikato River) Settlement Act 2010 as an example of this.
65
  
The Waitangi Tribunal in the WAI 262 report, released in 2011, argues that 
the RMA is not “Treaty Compliant” and requires reform to comply with the 
Treaty.
66
 The reasoning for this is that several sections intended to give Māori 
more representation have become essentially irrelevant. The accusation of 
irrelevancy includes s 33, discussed below. The Tribunal also recommended 
reforms that go beyond amending s 8, including: providing for enhanced iwi 
management plans, improving mechanisms for delivering control, a 
commitment to capacity building, and greater usage of national policy 
statements.
67
 These principles all echo the power sharing ethic of co-
governance agreements. 
Sections 6 and 7 are currently undergoing reform. They are to be consolidated 
into one section, ostensibly to speed up the process for property 
                                                 
64 Nolan, above n 57 at 898. 
65 Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Claims (Waikato River) Settlement Act 2010. 
66 Waitangi Tribunal Ko Aotearoa Tēnei: Report on the Wai 262 Claim (Wellington 2011); Gerald Lanning and 
Kathleen Bell “Making the RMA "Treaty-compliant" - the Waitangi Tribunal's report on WAI262” 2012 
Resource Management Bulletin at 122. 





 These reforms, targeted as they are to increase economic 
development through the building of housing and commercial developments 
more efficiently, are highly unlikely to provide iwi much more decision 
making power in their rohe. I therefore conclude that the RMA is an 
insufficient vehicle for delivering effective power sharing arrangements, 
despite some provisions that, on face value, are designed for this purpose. 
5.5 Section 36 Joint Management Agreements  
The basis for resource management power sharing arrangements should 
logically be the RMA. One section of the RMA that does provide for a lesser 
form of power sharing arrangement in resource management is found in ss 
36B-36E, which provide for Joint Management Agreements (JMAs). JMAs 
emerged as a result of a 2005 amendment to encourage collaboration between 
Māori and central government.69 The amendment was introduced following 
commentary that the language of the RMA meant that Māori were reduced 
merely to a consultation role, rather than fulfilling a full role as a Treaty 
Partner. Baker, in a 2013 commentary, noted in many cases “decisions have 
been made on a non-notified basis, denying Māori any participation in the 
management process… Māori appeals against decisions made under the RMA 
have been largely unsuccessful”.70 JMAs were offered as a solution to this 
dissatisfaction. Section 36(B)-(E) provides:  
                                                 
68 Isaac Davison, “Auckland Council Red Tape in the Spotlight” (New Zealand Herald, online ed. 22 January 
2015) url: http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=11389946. 
69 Baker, above n 23 at 180. 




36B Power to make joint management agreement 
(1)A local authority that wants to make 
a joint management agreement must— 
(a) notify the Minister that it wants to do so; and 
(b) satisfy itself— 
(i) that each public authority, iwi authority, and group that 
represents hapū for the purposes of this Act that, in each case, is a 
party to the joint management agreement— 
(A) represents the relevant community of interest; and 
(B) has the technical or special capability or expertise to perform 
or exercise the function, power, or duty jointly with the local 
authority; and 
(ii) that a joint management agreement is an efficient method of 
performing or exercising the function, power, or duty; and 
(c) include in the joint management agreement details of— 
(i) the resources that will be required for the administration of 
the agreement; and 
(ii) how the administrative costs of 
the joint management agreement will be met. 
(2)A local authority that complies with subsection (1) may make 
a joint management agreement. 
36C Local authority may act by itself 
under joint management agreement 
50 
 
(1)This section applies when 
a joint management agreement requires the parties to it to perform 
or exercise a specified function, power, or duty together. 
(2)The local authority may perform or exercise the function, 
power, or duty by itself if a decision is required before the parties 
to the joint management agreement can perform or exercise the 
function, power, or duty and the joint 
management agreement does not provide a method for making a 
decision of that kind. 
36D Effect of joint management agreement 
A decision made under a joint management agreement has legal 
effect as a decision of the local authority. 
36ETermination of joint management agreement 
Any party to a joint management agreement may terminate 
that agreement by giving the other parties 20 working days' 
notice. 
 
Baker notes that iwi have been unenthusiastic about entering these agreements, 
as they require Māori decision makers to balance Māori interests with other 
matters of national importance. Consequently, this seriously constrains Māori 
self-determination with respect to resource management.
71
 Natalie Coates has 
observed that JMAs can be problematic as implementation requires that the 
agreement is an ‘efficient’ method of exercising function, power, or duty.72 
                                                 
71 At 180. 
72 Natalie Coates “Joint-management agreements in New Zealand : simply empty promises?” 2009 13(1) 
Journal of South Pacific Law ) at 33. 
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‘Efficiency’ as a measure is challenging as, if the JMA requires more tax payer 
money for it to function, it will not be deemed efficient.
73
 
 A second issue raised by Coates is the lack of certainty surrounding the 
arrangements; the agreements can be cancelled by either party at any time, 
indeed, if there is any distrust between the parties this could potentially 
discourage iwi from entering into joint management agreements.
74
 
Additionally, there are requirements that iwi entering into JMAs under the Act 
are to work within the parameters and restrictions of the Act; this may well 
discourage iwi seeking these types of arrangements.
75
 In comparison, resource 
management power sharing schemes that are enacted under their own 
legislation such as the Waikato River arrangements statutorily compel the 
relevant authorities to work with the iwi.
76
 I contend this provides a much 
more certain and attractive environment management option for mana whenua 
than a JMA under the RMA.  
One currently functioning JMA is the Joint Management Agreement between 
Taupō District Council and Tūwharetoa Māori Trust Board, which came into 
force on 17 January 2009. The agreement allows for joint decision-making 
regarding resource consent and private plan change applications in relation to 
Māori land in the Taupō District that is part of the Tūwharetoa rohe. The 
                                                 
73 At 33. 
74 At 34. 
75 At 36. 
76 Ngāti Tūwharetora, Raukawa, and Te Arawa River Iwi Waikato River Act 2010; Waikato-Tainui Raupatu 
Claims (Waikato River) Settlement Act 2010. 
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Taupō District Council and Tūwharetoa Māori Trust Board have each 
appointed two commissioners who have then selected one further 
commissioner and appointed a Chairperson to make decisions under this 
JMA.
77
 The Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Claims (Waikato River) Settlement Act 
2010 also provides for JMAs to provide decision making in relation to river 
related activity including planning, consenting and monitoring.
78
  
The Tūwharetoa agreement has set out principles to do with the development 
and operation of JMAs, including “promoting the overarching purpose of the 
settlement to restore and protect the health and wellbeing of the Waikato river; 
promoting the principle of co-management; respecting the rights and 
responsibilities of Waikato-Tainui to the river; and using best endeavours to 
ensure joint management agreements are achieved and enduring”. The creation 
of a JMA under s 36 is one statutory method that can be used to create power 
sharing arrangements, although I consider that such schemes are not suitable 
for allowing full self-determination of iwi and are therefore less popular than 
other co-management and co-governance options. 
5.6 Section 33 Delegation of Functions 
Another section of the RMA that allows for a lesser form of power sharing 
between iwi and Crown is s 33. Under this provision, a local authority may 
transfer authority to an iwi for functions such as deciding resource consents, 
joint procedural involvement for policy statements and plans, and issuing 
                                                 
77 Joint Management Agreement between Ngāti Tūwharetoa and Taupō District Council, above n 32. 
78 Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Claims (Waikato River) Settlement Act 2010 ss 41-55. 
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requirements for heritage orders to protect places of special significance on 
spiritual and cultural grounds.
79
 Section 33 states: 
33 Transfer of powers 
(1) A local authority may transfer any 1 or more of its functions, 
powers, or duties under this Act, except this power of transfer, to 
another public authority in accordance with this section. 
(2) For the purposes of this section, public authority includes— 
(a) a local authority; and 
(b) an iwi authority; and 
(c) [Repealed]  
(d) a government department; and 
(e) a statutory authority; and 
(f) a joint committee set up for the purposes of section 80; and 
(g) a local board (within the meaning of section 4(1) of the Local 
Government (Auckland Council) Act 2009. 
(3) [Repealed] 
(4) A local authority shall not transfer any of its functions, 
powers, or duties under this section unless— 
(a) it has used the special consultative procedure set out in section 
83 of the Local Government Act 2002; and 
                                                 
79 Nolan, above n 125 at 904. 
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(b) before using that special consultative procedure it serves 
notice on the Minister of its proposal to transfer the function, 
power, or duty; and 
(c) both authorities agree that the transfer is desirable on all of the 
following grounds: 
(i) the authority to which the transfer is made represents the 
appropriate community of interest relating to the exercise or 
performance of the function, power, or duty: 
(ii) efficiency: 
(iii) technical or special capability or expertise. 
(5) [Repealed] 
(6) A transfer of functions, powers, or duties under this section 
shall be made by agreement between the authorities concerned 
and on such terms and conditions as are agreed. 
(7) A public authority to which any function, power, or duty is 
transferred under this section may accept such transfer, unless 
expressly forbidden to do so by the terms of any Act by or under 
which it is constituted; and upon any such transfer, its functions, 
powers, and duties shall be deemed to be extended in such 
manner as may be necessary to enable it to undertake, exercise, 
and perform the function, power, or duty. 
(8) A local authority which has transferred any function, power, 
or duty under this section may change or revoke the transfer at 
any time by notice to the transferee. 
(9) A public authority to which any function, power, or duty has 
been transferred under this section, may relinquish the transfer in 
accordance with the transfer agreement. 
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When s 33 was enacted, it was hailed as a “significant section”.80 Despite the 
existence of this provision, which allows for co-management of functions 
under the framework of the Act, its implementation has fallen well short of its 
potential.
81
 Hamish Rennie has explained that the very inclusion of iwi 
authorities as public authorities “reflects in part the intention of the Labour 
Government in 1990 to facilitate the empowerment of Māori”. The 2011 
Waitangi Tribunal report on the WAI 262 claim observed that the potential for 
s 33 has not been realised.
82
 
While there have been over twelve requests to transfer powers to iwi, none of 
these have been granted.
83
 Robert Joseph and Tom Bennion have questioned 
whether iwi would even want such a transfer of power under the RMA, noting 
that “if an iwi authority has a s 33 transfer of power it will have to act 
judicially – that is, fairly and impartially and in accordance with the RMA and 
relevant plans… For example it will have to weigh Māori concerns in balance 
with other matters of national importance”.84 I consider that this is a fair 
comment, and helps us to understand why this provision has not been utilised 
to the extent that legislators perhaps envisaged. Rennie has noted that iwi 
authorities do not often have the resources to support such a transfer under s 
                                                 
80 Robert Joseph and Tom Bennion “Challenges of incorporating Maori values and Tikanga under the 
resource management act 1991 and the local government bill - possible ways forward” (2003) 6 Yearbook 
of New Zealand Jurisprudence Error! Bookmark not defined. at 24. 
81 Hamish Rennie Section 33 Transfers - Implications for co-management and kaitiakitanga (looseleaf ed, DSL 
Environmental Handbook). 
82 Lanning and Bell, above n 66. 
83 Joseph and Bennion, above n 80 at 24. 
84 At 26. 
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33, as they “do not have the powers to obtain rates to support their 
administration of transfers”. 85 Without the financial support from central 
government to enact the duties that would otherwise be required of central 
government agents, iwi authorities are unlikely to show enthusiasm for such a 
transfer. I posit that if central government was truly committed to providing 
iwi with the ability to utilise this section, adequate funding should be made 
available.  
Rennie argues that there is an inherent power imbalance in s 33. He notes that 
due to the fact that the Crown authority has the capacity to unilaterally revoke 
a transfer of power, any iwi authority recipient would be at a disadvantage.
86
 
This power differential is at odds with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, 
which promote co-operation and equal partnership. I believe it reflects the 
traditional iwi-Crown relationship provided by colonisation, where there is a 
power disparity in favour of the Crown. 
Sections 33 and 36B-36E of the RMA provide some foundational attempt to 
allow for power sharing in resource management. These two sections do 
allow, at least in theory, for some form of power sharing under the Act. 
However, as these forms of power sharing provided for in the Act do not allow 
for equal sharing of power, consequentially I consider that they are less useful 
to tangata whenua than other power sharing arrangements. While the existence 
of these two sections is a step in the right direction, their restrictions have 
                                                 
85 Rennie, above n 81. 
86 Rennie, above n 81. 
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meant that iwi have had to look beyond the RMA to secure more meaningful 
resource management power sharing arrangements. 
 Sections 33 and 36B-E do not allow iwi to fully invest in resource 
management in a method compatible with tikanga Māori. They restrict iwi 
self-determination, and the fact that s 33 has never seen a transfer of powers to 
an iwi authority is telling. This thesis will examine two iwi that are engaged in 
resource management power sharing arrangements that have been specifically 
provided for outside of the RMA. 
5.7 Tikanga and Western Law 
Co-governance schemes between iwi and Crown do not sit in an isolated 
vacuum. Such arrangements will be influenced by the context in which they 
operate. In order to understand how these power sharing arrangements are 
working, we must therefore examine the exterior influences. Where iwi and 
the Crown work together the tenants of tikanga Māori should be considered.  
Tikanga Māori is the term used to describe Māori customary law. Tikanga 
Māori principles are incorporated throughout New Zealand’s legal system in a 
variety of formats. Tikanga has become increasingly more recognised as part 
of the common law over the past thirty years. Historically, as Robert Joseph 
explains, tikanga was recognised by the colonial government as a genuine 
source of law.
87
 Initially, following the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, 
tikanga was acknowledged by authorities – in 1840 Governor Hobson “issued 
                                                 
87 Robert Joseph “Re-creating Legal Space for the First Law of Aotearoa-New Zealand” (2009) 17 Waikato 
Law Review: Taumauri at 74. 
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orders to Shortland, police magistrate of Kororāreka, that ‘a rigid application 
of British law to the Māori should be avoided in favour of some sort of 
compromise’”.88 Joseph suggests that the most important yet overlooked 
acknowledgement of tikanga Māori was s 71 of the New Zealand Constitution 
Act 1852:  
And Whereas it may be expedient that the Laws, Customs, and 
Usages of the Aboriginal or Native Inhabitants of New Zealand, 
so far as they are not repugnant to the general principles of 
Humanity, should for the present be maintained for the 
Government of themselves, in all their relations to and dealings 
with each other, and that particular districts should be set apart 
within which Laws, Customs, or Usages should be so observed. It 
should be lawful for Her Majesty, by any Letters Patent to be 
issued under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom from time to 
time to make Provisions for the purposes aforesaid, any 
repugnancy of any such Native's Laws, Customs, or Usages, to 
the Law of England or to in any part thereof, in any wise 
notwithstanding. 
Despite this provision clearly acknowledging the legitimacy of tikanga Māori, 
s 71 was never used, and eventually was repealed in 1986. It does, however, 
give us an insight into early colonial legal thought on Māori customary law. At 
this point, before later court rulings nullified the Treaty of Waitangi, and 
tikanga was actively repressed through legislation such as the Tohunga 
Suppression Act 1907,
89
 tikanga Māori was recognised as a legitimate legal 
source.  
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Initially, native custom and native proprietary right were acknowledged by the 
colonial courts. In 1841, the first major case to recognise tikanga Māori in the 
form of a native proprietary right was R v Symonds.
90
 Symonds upheld the 
doctrine that “upon the assumption of sovereignty by the British Crown over 
New Zealand, the indigenous inhabitants’ customary title continued… to be 
incorporated into the mainstream legal system”. This acknowledgement was 
followed by Re the Lundon and Whitaker Claims Act 1871, where the Court 
clearly stated “the Crown was bound, both by the common law of England and 
by its solemn engagements, to a full recognition of native proprietary right”.91 
‘Solemn engagements’ is the wording used to acknowledge the Treaty of 
Waitangi, and ‘native proprietary right’ are the tikanga principles 
acknowledging property rights.  
This recognition of legitimacy, however, was later to be restricted by the 
courts in a complete judicial denial of tikanga Māori. In Wi Parata v Bishop of 
Wellington, the court in effect held that all property rights under Māori 
customary law (tikanga Māori) were extinguished simply by the Crown’s 
acquisition of sovereignty.
92
 This ruling asserted, essentially, that tikanga 
Māori depended “on the grace and favour of the Crown” and that accordingly 
“there is no customary law of the Māoris of which the Courts of law can take 
cognizance”.93 With one judgment, Prendergast CJ reduced the Treaty of 
                                                 
90 R v Symonds (1847) NZPCC 387. 
91 Re the Lundon and Whitaker Claims Act (1872) NZPCC 387. 
92 Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3 NZ Jur (NS) 72. 
93 RH  Bartlett Native Title in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, Australia, 2004) at 8. 
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Waitangi and its recognition of tikanga Māori to the “simple nullity” he 
declared it to be. Despite the argument “being given short shrift” by the Privy 
Council in Nereaha Tamaki v Baker,
94
 this attitude permeated the general 
stance towards tikanga and customary rights for many more years.
95
 The 
substantive effect of Wi Parata was to remove tikanga Māori as a source of 
law from the New Zealand legal system, despite early recognition from the 
settler government. 
In the 1970s and 80s, there was a shift in societal thought towards the 
recognition of tikanga Māori. The Māori cultural renaissance of this time 
period saw an increased focus on Treaty rights. This was instrumental in the 
institution of the Waitangi Tribunal as an independent commission of enquiry 
through the  Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975. Jurisdiction was given to the 
Tribunal by s 6 of the Act to inquire into the claims of any individual Māori or 
group of Māori.96 Section 8 of the Act gave the Tribunal jurisdiction to enquire 
into proposed legislation.  
The first significant legislative attempt of the government to recognise Treaty 
obligations was the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986. Section 9 of the Act 
explicitly stated, ‘nothing in the Act shall permit the Crown to act in a manner 
that is inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi’. Section 9 led 
to the SOE Case, a Court of Appeal judgment that recognised the principles of 
the Treaty included issues of sovereignty, active protection, partnership, and 
                                                 
94 Nereaha Tamaki v Baker (1901) NZPCC 371. 
95 Bartlett, above n 93 at 8. 
96 The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 at s 6 and the preamble of the Act. 
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consultation.  The SOE Case was crucial for Māori as for the first time in close 
to one hundred years the validity of the Treaty and the rights that stemmed 
from it were recognised. The case acknowledged the importance of 
partnership, fiduciary duty, and good faith. From these principles, which 
recognise the sharing of power and delegation of management, the beginning 
of the development of resource management power sharing arrangements can 
be seen.  
Tikanga Māori is an established part of New Zealand’s legal history. It was 
first explicitly recognised in the early days of settlement, then completely 
ignored and buried, before being reborn in the 1980s with the recognition of 
the ‘Principles of the Treaty’. The next question that must be considered is 
what exactly is tikanga? 
5.8 Understanding Tikanga in a Modern Setting 
Just as Western law changes as new legislation is enacted to reflect differing 
social norms, tikanga Māori is not a static concept. What is considered 
appropriate conduct in tikanga varies from tribe to tribe – in the context of this 
thesis, Tūhoetanga will be different from Ngāi Tahutanga in some aspects. 
Nonetheless, with respect to the dynamic nature of tikanga, there is a common 
basis and a set of core values that underpins tikanga.
97
  
Tikanga Māori concepts of ownership of environmental resources are derived 
from guardianship, in contrast to the exclusive ownership model currently seen 
                                                 
97 Linda Te Aho “Tikanga Maori, historical context and the interface with Pakeha law in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand” (2007) 10 Yearbook of New Zealand Jurisprudence at 10-14. 
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in New Zealand land law. Traditionally, tikanga Māori customs and values 
derive from the Māori world view of the creation of the universe, the 
importance of genealogy (whakapapa) and personification of natural forms 
and phenomena.
98
 Māori cosmology is intricately linked with what is accepted 
environmental management. In their mythology, the Earth and the Sky are 
personified in the form of Papa-tū-ā-nuku, the Earth Mother, and Rangi-nui, 
the Sky Father.
99
 The offspring of Rangi and Papa have also received 
personification and deification, and include Tāne, the God of the Forest, 
Tangaroa, the God of the Sea, and Tāwhirimātea, the God of the Winds, 
amongst others.
100
 In a Māori cosmological world view, these gods are seen to 
be guardians of the natural resources that they are responsible for and certain 
protocol must be observed in respect of this..  
For Māori, their connection to the land is based in these whakapapa and 
guardianship concepts, and is deeper than a fee simple title, or a life interest in 




The term “living planet” could be used to describe the world as 
seen in the Māori worldview. They believe in a spiritual essence 
(wairua) in all things, animate and inanimate. People are seen as 
only one small part of a “great chain of being” (and not of any 
greater importance than other beings). Respect for the spirits in 
                                                 
98 M. Roberts “Kaitiakitanga: Maori perspectives on conservation” 1995 2(1) Pacific conservation biology at 
10. 
99 Te Ahukaramū Charles  Royal Māori creation traditions (9 November 2012 ed, 2012) at 1. 
100 At 1. 
101 Robert Bruce Hay The contribution of Maori cosmology to a revision of environmental philosophy (1989) at 158. 
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things (shown through their religious practices) and reverence for 
certain paramount gods (atua) is woven into the fabric of their 
lives, in their thinking, and in their perceptual style. The gods are 
considered a family, representing all aspects of their environment. 
Te reo Māori reflects the deep connection of Māori to the land and waters of 
Aotearoa; whenua means both land and afterbirth, hapū means both sub-tribe 
and to be pregnant, whānau means both family and to give birth.102 This 
spiritual regard for natural resources as ancestors is interlinked with other 
principles of tikanga Māori. 
The Māori cosmological world-view is reflected in the tenets of tikanga Māori. 
There are several common core principles that underpin tikanga, although no 
full list has ever been agreed upon. Robert Joseph gives a list of fundamental 
tikanga lore and values, including:
103
 
 Whānaungatanga – kin relationships between people and the 
rights and obligations that follow from the individual’s place 
in the collective group; 
 Wairuatanga – spirituality, acknowledging the metaphysical 
world; 
 Mana – encompasses political influence as well as intrinsic 
authority, honour, status, control, and prestige of an individual 
and group; 
                                                 
102 James D. K. Morris and Jacinta Ruru “Giving voice to rivers : legal personality as a vehicle for recognising 
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103 Joseph, above n 87 at 88. 
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 Tapu – generally seen as part of a code for social conduct 
based upon keeping safe and avoiding risk, as well as 
protecting the sanctity of revered persons, places and objects 
and traditional values; restriction laws; 
 Noa – free from tapu or any other restriction; 
 Utu – concept of reciprocity in order to maintain balanced 
relationships between people and the Gods; 
 Rangatiratanga – effective leadership; and 
 Manaakitanga – sharing, hospitality to the fullest extent that 
honour could require; 
 Aroha – charity, generosity; 
 Kaitiakitanga – stewardship and protection, often used in 
relation to natural resources. 
These values are common to most iwi, although their application may change 
from iwi to iwi and hapū to hapū. The tenets of tikanga do not stand alone; 
they will be interlinked in their application.  
Tikanga Māori is not to be confused with kawa. Where tikanga is law, kawa is 
ritual and procedure.
104
 Both tikanga and kawa are very much still in practice. 
Such law and rituals are still followed at pōwhiri, on mārae, and tikanga Māori 
customary references can be found in the constitutional documents of a 
number of Māori legal entities such as Te Kauhanganui o Waikato and Te 
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Rūnanga a Iwi o Ngapuhi.105 Values derived from tikanga Māori are not rigid, 
frozen concepts that are locked in the past. These values are historic, but 
change as the modern context requires them to.
106
  Tūhoe social worker 
Nikapuru Takuta explains, “The tikanga you were born with and grew up with 
on the mārae doesn’t fit with the tikanga in town. You have to manoeuvre 
through new tikanga around alcohol, drugs, sex, relationships, work”.107 
Tikanga, therefore, must be flexible, and able to change with variances in 
culture and values. I consider that the adaptation of co-governance as a 
working resource management power sharing model can be seen to be an 
embodiment of that flexibility. 
Tikanga values control the approach taken by Māori to resource management. 
The connection between tikanga Māori and the environment means that the 
traditional Māori system is holistic. It ensures harmony within the 
environment, and provides measures, checks and balances daily, as well as 
preventing intrusions that cause permanent imbalances and ecocide.
108
 In a co-
governance context, the concept of mauri is important. Mauri is life force or 
state of wellbeing, and natural resources have their own mauri.
109
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Restoring the mauri of a degraded resource has become an important tikanga-
based concept in environmental management. In a paper on Canterbury Water 
Management, Caygill emphasises the importance of addressing the mauri of 
Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere in its restoration.
110
 The concept has recently been 
brought into the digital age with the establishment of the Mauri-ometer 
website by Ngā Pae o te Māramatanga.111 This site allows the user to assess 
environmental impacts of various case-studies under the framework of 
restoring mauri. Mauri is a crucial Māori concept in resource management. 
Nganeko Kaihau Minhinnick displays the interaction between Māori and 
natural resources in the diagram below: 
                                                 
110 David Caygill “Irrigation in Canterbury” 2014 (Unpublished) Primary Industry Management at 2. 




Figure 2: A Māori view of the Natural and Physical Resources (Minhinnick, 1985) 
This diagram displays the importance of tikanga principles such as 
genealogical links, and spiritual balance. Note the closeness of holism and 
spirituality to the central personifications of the resources, and the overall 
holistic and community centred approach to resource management. I consider 
that this diagram fits with comments made by Nin Tomas, “we are the subjects 
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of the environment, and to believe that we are its masters is delusional”.112 
Tikanga Māori environmental management can be compared to Minhinnick’s 
diagram of the mainstream Pākehā system. 
 
Figure 3: Pākehā view of Natural Resources (Minhinnick, 1985) 
                                                 
112 Thomas in Grinlinton and Taylor, above n 54 at 226. 
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In comparison, a mainstream view of natural resources has a tendency to be 
much more aligned with capitalism and resource exploitation, with the 
exception of the conservationists who take a preservationist approach to 
environmental management. Whereas Māori intrinsically link whānau, hapū 
and iwi participation with resource management, in comparison the 
mainstream system only involves community participation as a reactionary 
measure. I contend that a Māori approach to environmental management is 
very much governed by the values of tikanga Māori.  A power sharing 
resource management scheme will see an attempted amalgamation of these 
two sets of values.  
Tikanga Māori is a legal system in its own right that affects the decisions and 
values made by people in New Zealand to this day. It is a living and breathing 
system of laws that change dynamically to reflect social norms and values, as 
mainstream law does also. Tikanga values reflect the Māori cosmological 
worldview. Māori do not see themselves as removed from the environment, 
they see themselves as very much belonging to the planet. This is reflected by 
the terminology ‘tangata whenua’ or people of the land.  I believe that iwi 
participants in a co-governance scheme will bring tikanga to the co-
governance board room table, and as will be discussed in chapters 6 and 7, an 
effective resource management power sharing scheme will see an 
amalgamation of two world views. 
5.9 Kaitiakitanga  
Tui tu te mārae a tane. Toi tu te mārae a Tangaroa. Toi tu te Iwi. 
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The New Zealand legal system provides a raft of legislation to allow for 
environmental management. For Māori, however, the system of laws and 
guidelines that covers resource governance is encapsulated in tikanga, and 
particularly in the principle of kaitiakitanga. The above whakataukī states the 
important relationship between Māori and the environment. It is important to 
understand what kaitiakitanga is and how it works as this is the environmental 
ethic that will guide iwi decision makers in resource management power 
sharing schemes such as co-governance arrangements.  
Roughly translated as ‘stewardship’, the word kaitiaki itself is derived from 
the verb ‘tiaki’, or to guard, to protect, to watch for. The prefix ‘kai’ is used to 
connote the doer of the action, in this case, the guardian, or protector.
114
 In 
modern environmental planning, the use of kaitiakitanga has become more 
common in the mainstream and is used in legislation and planning documents, 
including in the RMA. Despite the increasing commonality of the term in 
dominant culture, it is often not understood by the majority of Pākehā.115  
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In order to understand the nature of the term, it is therefore necessary to 
analyse Māori conceptions of Kaitiakitanga. Te Kauhanganui member Carmen 
Kirkwood explains the concept as:
116
 
Kaitiaki is a big word. It encompasses atua, tapu, mana. It 
involves whakapapa and tika; to know ‘kaitiaki’ is to know the 
Māori world. Everybody on this planet has a role to play as a 
guardian. But if you use the word kaitiaki, that person must be 
Māori because of the depth and meaning of the word and the 
responsibilities that go with it. The reason is that to be a kaitiaki 
means looking after ones blood and bones – literally. One’s 
whānaunga and tūpuna include the plants and animals, rocks and 
trees. We are all descended from Papatuanuku; she is our kaitiaki 
and we in turn are hers. 
Kirkwood’s summary of the concept of kaitiakitanga is supported by other 
Māori commentators. Rakiihia Tau, a Ngāi Tahu elder, stated that 
kaitiakitanga includes the “obligation to safeguard the wellbeing and mauri of 
ancestral lands, water, sites wāhi tapu, value flora and fauna, and other taonga 
in Ngāi Tahu’s rohe for future generations”.117 Rachel Selby and others echo 




Kaitiakitanga is an inherent obligation we have to our tupuna and 
to our mokopuna; an obligation to safeguard and care for the 
environment for future generations. It is a link between the past 
and the future… Kaitiakitanga is not an obligation which we 
choose to adopt or ignore; it is an inherited commitment that links 
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mana atua, mana tangata and mana whenua, the spiritual realm 
with the human world and both of those with the earth and all that 
is on it. 
I therefore contend that kaitiakitanga is a role that is more than just on-the-
ground management. Rather, it encompasses a large spiritual element, and 
reflects the intergenerational approach taken by Māori to resource 
management. Māori take a long term approach, also known as the ‘seven 
generation rule’, believing that “no environmental effect should be caused that 
detrimentally affects the physical, spiritual and cultural health of up to seven 
generations into the future – the ‘not yet born’; and that the present generation 
does not have the right to sever the relationships it has with the environment as 
they have been received on trust from the ancestors”.119  
Tomas explains that the Māori approach to environmental management can be 
directly contrasted with the mainstream system, which focuses on shorter and 
shorter time frames and the rights of the individual rather than collective 
responsibility.
120
 Regarding mainstream environmental management, she 
observes:
121
   
The general rule seems to be that if it is quantifiable, then it is 
alienable. Once it is alienable, then we can put a price on it. Once 
its price is known, we can stand in line to profit until its value is 
exhausted – and then we simply toss it aside and start again. This 
attitude is based on the false belief that we live in an infinite 
universe with infinite resources. 
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The mainstream system of natural resource management has a tendency to 
conflict with kaitiakitanga, although the conservationist approach can be seen 
to be more in line with this concept. 
In traditional Māori practice, kaitiaki were often spiritual or animal guardians, 
manifested through animals, birds, fish, and taniwha.
122
 This reflects the Māori 
worldview or anthromorphism of nature, and the link between the spiritual 
world and the physical world. Māori Marsden has highlighted the contrast of 
this approach with that found in mainstream culture, and the resulting 
scepticism felt by Māori regarding the mainstream conservation approach and 
governmental resource management policies.
123
 Marsden and Tau have 
emphasised the link between kaitiakitanga and Rangatiratanga, both have 
noted that practicing kaitiakitanga is the responsibility of the rangatira.
124
 In a 
resource management power sharing context, I contend that the role of the 
kaitiaki will be taken on be the members of the governance or management 
board. Arguably then, a non-Māori member of this board could facilitate the 
role of kaitiaki, and questions arise as to whether this is an appropriate 
responsibility for someone who is not mana whenua. I posit that such schemes 
see a delicate interaction of mainstream policy and tikanga Māori. 
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5.9.1 Kaitiakitanga – examples in legislation, case law and 
policy  
The term kaitiakitanga has been utilised in legislation, case law and policy in 
New Zealand. The term is found in the RMA and in various environmental 
policy documents. The interpretation section of the RMA provides 
“kaitiakitanga means the exercise of guardianship by the tangata whenua of an 
area in accordance with tikanga Māori in relation to natural and physical 
resources; and includes the ethic of stewardship”. However, when the 
legislation was first enacted, there was no definition provided, reflecting the 
complex nature of the interpretation of this term and the reluctance of 
lawmakers to define a Māori concept. 
Section 7 of the RMA provides for specific concepts to be considered in 
sustainable management. The section provides: 
7. Other matters 
In achieving the purpose of this Act, all persons exercising 
functions and powers under it, in relation to managing the use, 
development, and protection of natural and physical resources, 
shall have particular regard to— 
(a) kaitiakitanga: 
(aa) the ethic of stewardship: 
(b) the efficient use and development of natural and physical 
resources: 
(ba) the efficiency of the end use of energy: 
(c) the maintenance and enhancement of amenity values: 
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(d) intrinsic values of ecosystems: 
(e) [Repealed] 
(f) maintenance and enhancement of the quality of the 
environment: 
(g) any finite characteristics of natural and physical resources: 
(h) the protection of the habitat of trout and salmon: 
(i) the effects of climate change: 
(j) the benefits to be derived from the use and development of 
renewable energy 
 
Section 7 forms part of the ‘Māori Trilogy’ in the RMA and gives statutory 
recognition to the importance of the term ‘kaitiakitanga’. In addition to the 
definition given by the Act, the exact meaning of this term has been given 
judicial consideration in several cases. This has been discussed at length by 
Derek Nolan.
125 
It was held by the Planning Tribunal in Tautari v Northland 
Regional Council that kaitiakitanga “requires ongoing involvement and is a 
responsibility to care for something of great value for the survival of the 
tribe”.126 In Minhinnick v Minister of Corrections, the Environment Court 
stated that kaitiakitanga “requires tangata whenua to be provided with the 
opportunity to exercise guardianship of the natural and physical resources of 
                                                 
125 Nolan, above n 57 at 891-897. 
126 Tautari v Northland Regional Council PT A55/6. 
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the area in accordance with tikanga Māori”.127  The courts have made a 
specific endeavour to interpret and understand exactly what this term is. 
A second issue for the courts to determine when considering kaitiakitanga is 
determining who exactly the kaitiaki is or are. Nolan has specifically stated 
that kaitiakitanga should be exercised by the hapū who have mana whenua, 
and that hapū should be able to give guidance on how that resource should be 
developed and to what extent.
128
 Several cases have been decided regarding 
the determination of the kaitiaki of the resource. In Tawa v Bay of Plenty 
Regional Council the Planning Tribunal held that the appropriate forum to 
decide which tribe was mana whenua and therefore kaitiaki was in fact the 
realm of the Māori Land Court, not the Tribunal.129 In the 2004 case of Te 
Pairi v Gisborne District Council the Environment Court held that the correct 
mechanism with which to investigate who holds the rights to claim kaitiaki 
when there are disputes over who has mana whenua is s 30 of Te Ture 
Whenua Māori Act 1993.130 It has been expressed by the courts that the fact 
that the land in question was no longer Māori land and had not been owned by 
Māori for some time is irrelevant.131 Nolan notes that it is possible for more 
than one whānau or hapū to have mana whenua over a particular area and that 
                                                 
127 Minhinnick v Minister of Corrections NZEnvC A43/04 in Nolan, above n 125 at 892. 
128 Nolan, above n 57 125 at 892. 
129 Tawa v Bay of Plenty Regional Council PT A18/95. 
130 Te Pairi v Gisbourne District Council NZEnvC W93/04, Te Ture Whenua Māori Act 1993. 
131 Waikanae Christian Holiday Park v Kapiti District Council CIV-2003-485-1764. 
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even when just one body is recognised as mana whenua, it is still important to 
acknowledge any important relationships that others may have to that area.
132
  
In addition to recognition in statute and by the courts, kaitiakitanga has also 
been recognised in various regional policy documents. In the Canterbury 
context, one such document is the Canterbury Water Management Strategy 
2010. This policy document outlines the way that Canterbury water is to be 
distributed and governed throughout the region. It specifically incorporates a 
chapter on kaitiakitanga.
133
 This chapter explores the concept in a Canterbury 




 Restoring and rehabilitating degraded Mahinga kai sites 
 Assessing the cultural implications of proposed 
developments, including preparing cultural impact 
assessments 
 Lodging submissions and presenting evidence on resource 
consent applications and plan development processes. 
 Forming constructive relationships with environmental 
agencies such as councils, the Department of Conservation 
and the Fish and Game Council. 
The chapter emphasises the weight of tikanga principles, noting “it is 
important to emphasise that while the role of kaitiaki has evolved to 
                                                 
132 Nolan, above n 57 at 893. 
133 ECAN, above n 122 at 31. 
134 At 32. 
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accommodate contemporary resource management processes, Ngāi Tahu are 
still guided and remain true to their cultural foundations based on mauri (life 
force) and mātauranga (knowledge)”.135 The full effect of utilising tikanga 
Māori in water management in Canterbury will be explored in Chapter 6 of 
this thesis. 
5.9.2 Kaitiakitanga – examples in practice 
I consider it useful to look at examples of kaitiakitanga in practice to 
understand how mainstream environmental management and tikanga interact 
in the context of co-governance. The function of the kaitiaki is essentially to 
see that correct tikanga is followed with regards to the resource that is being 
managed. It includes, but is not limited to: declaring tapu; applying or lifting 
rāhui; developing guidelines for fisheries to ensure conservation; and 
establishing guidelines and procedures for recreational and commercial 
activities involving the resource in question.
136
 
A method in which a kaitiaki may help to protect the resource would be to put 
in place a rāhui. A rāhui is effectively a ban that restricts access to the area of 
resource until the tapu is removed.
137
 A rāhui is temporary, an important 
aspect. Rāhui offers a means of adaptive control and sustainable development, 
as environmental indicators allowed, without locking up the resource at times 
                                                 
135 At 32. 
136 Minhinnick, above n 108 at 10. 
137 Jonathan Jull Traditional Māori Methods for Natural Resources Management in a Contemporary World - options and 
implications for Te Waihora Lincoln University (1989) at 14. 
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of abundance. This can be seen to be a contrast to the conservationist 
approach, where preservationist tactics are preferred.  
In addition to tools such as rāhui, kaitiaki may act in other ways. In Te 
Urewera, despite its illegality since 1921, Tūhoe people have continued to 
manage and harvest kererū, or wood pigeon.138 Their methods of managing the 
resource as kaitiaki include adhering to traditional harvest times (between 
April and July, with the core time of hunting May and June), and only 
harvesting kererū when they have been feeding on toromiro fruit.139 Lyver et 




It was widely believed among the elders (of Tūhoe) that the 
kererū could sense the desecration of its mana and mauri when 
traditional tikanga was disregarded. … For example the elders 
stressed that kererū should be plucked and prepared for eating 
only when back in the community, so that hunters did not leave 
feathers or other traces of the harvested kererū on the forest. They 
believed that, if the feathers or the remains of a harvested bird 
were left scattered beneath a toromiro tree or in the forest, the 
kererū would respond by vacating the area and making 
themselves unavailable to hunters.  
Marsden has also highlighted the negative consequences of not appropriately 
following tikanga in gathering food. Toheroa are a large pipi-like shellfish, and 
                                                 
138Philip O'B Lyver, Christopher J. Jones and James Doherty “Flavor or forethought: Tuhoe traditional 
management strategies for the conservation of Kereru (Hemiphaga novaeseelandiae novaeseelandiae) in 
New Zealand” 2009 14(1) Ecology and Society at 3. 
139 At 41. 
140 At 46. 
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are considered a delicacy. They were once populous in Northland, particularly 
on Ninety Mile Beach, and the rest of the West Coast. Gathering toheroa at the 
appropriate time was a significant occasion for many whānau. However, 
despite the restrictions put on gathering toheroa by tribal elders, toheroa 
canneries were set up to commercially process the shellfish. The elders warned 
that not following tikanga would mean that “the Mauri of the toheroa would 
depart and there would be no toheroa left”. This proved an accurate prediction. 
Kaitiaki exercise their responsibilities according to traditional tikanga up and 
down the country. The term has received some criticism for being “lost in 
translation” in legislation, with the feeling amongst some that it is not a term 
that can ever be correctly harnessed by mainstream policy or statute.
141
 Those 
who are in a position of kaitiaki, the mana whenua, will often be the 
representatives who are engaged in co-governance arrangements. I therefore 
consider it necessary to understand the ethic and responsibilities of 
kaitiakitanga that they will be bringing to this role. 
5.10 Legal Personality 
In order for Iwi to be effective partners in a resource management power 
sharing scheme, the recognition of some form of legal personality is required. 
This thesis will show that both Ngāi Tahu and Ngāi Tūhoe have been able to 
effectively engage with the Crown as an equal Treaty Partner in governance 
level arrangements, partly because there has been some ‘thing’ that has had 
legal personality with which the Crown can form an effective and equal Treaty 
                                                 
141 Interview with Nigel Harris, Ngāi Tūāhuriri Board Member (Rachael Harris, 23 October 2014). 
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partnership. In the case of Ngāi Tahu, the tribe itself has had its legal 
personality recognised, and in the case of Tūhoe, the area of Te Urewera has 
been recognised as a legal person.  
Legal personality for a non-human entity has existed in some form since the 
13
th
 Century. John Dewey attributed the basis of the fiction of legal personality 
to Pope Innocent IV (1243-1254).
142
 Pope Innocent used the doctrine to 
separate the legal existence of monasteries from monks, so that the 
infrastructure of the monasteries could exist, despite the monks themselves 
taking a vow of poverty.
143
 The concept of legal personality for corporations is 
well established, and the doctrine of corporate personality has been debated at 
length for well over one hundred years.
144
 
Sir John Salmond, one of New Zealand’s greatest early legal thinkers, 
developed distinct views on legal fictions in our legal system.
145
 In the 7
th
 




A legal person is any subject-matter to which the law attributes a 
merely legal or fictitious personality. This extension, for good and 
sufficient reasons, of the conception of personality beyond the 
                                                 
142 John Dewey “The Historic Background of Legal Personality” (1926) 35(6) Yale Law Journal 655 at 665. 
143 At 665. 
144 For a review of the early jurists on legal personality, refer to Arthur Machen “Corporate Personality” 
(1911) 24(4) Harvard Law Review. 
145 John H. Farrar “Salmond and corporate theory.” (2008) 38(4) Victoria University of Wellington Law 
Review at 925. 
146 John Salmond Jurisprudence (7th ed, Stevens & Haynes, London, 1893). 
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limits of fact – this recognition of persons who are not men – is 
one of the most noteworthy feats of the legal imagination. 
Legal personality is well-established for all sorts of entities including 
corporations, nation states and ships. However legal personality for an iwi in 
New Zealand has been a contested issue. 
O’Regan describes the recognition of tribal legal personality as a “fundamental 
element of tino rangatiratanga”.147 With the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, 
the Crown recognised the existence of iwi as a legal entity. It had to recognise 
the existence of iwi in order to engage in land sales.  However, once land sales 
were completed, it was in the interests of the Crown to then deny the existence 
of the iwi.
148
 I contend that by recognising the legal personality of tribes, the 
Crown acknowledged their inherent tino rangatiratanga and the mana that 
came with that. This tino rangatiratanga was derived from the tribal 
whakapapa, not the authority of the Crown. This was unpalatable to the settler 
government, who in 1858 had spoken freely of wanting to “stamp out the 
beastly communism of the Māori”.149 
It is well established that there is power in numbers – one needs to look no 
further than the labour union movement to see benefits of negotiation as a 
crowd. One method of reducing the power of an entity is to split it into its 
individual components. This tactic was applied by the settler government in 
                                                 
147 Tipene O'Regan “Old Myths & New Politics” (Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, N.Z, 2014). 
148 Tipene O'Regan 'Te Kereeme: The Claim’ (Macmillan Brown Lecture Series 1998). 
149 At 4. 
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the 1860s with the introduction of the New Zealand Settlements Act 1863.
150
 
This Act had the effect of removing the legal status of the tribe and reducing it 
to a collection of individuals. Individuals have significantly less power and 
influence than a collective whole. This legislation invalidated legal personality 
for all iwi across New Zealand, an action that O’Regan believes to be “the 
single biggest breach of the Treaty that there has been”.151 I believe that this 
was one tactic that the Crown was able to utilise to deny the mana and 
influence of iwi in New Zealand.  
A point of difference between the Ngāi Tahu settlement and every settlement 
since (with the exception of Waikato-Tainui), is that Ngāi Tahu lobbied for the 
recognition of its tribal legal personality. This is discussed in Chapter 6. The 
recognition of legal personality for a tribe is an important part of establishing 
an equal-footed resource management power sharing scheme, as recognition 
of legal personality is recognition of mana, and for iwi, mana is a crucial part 
of their authority and identity. It is a powerful tool to deny the existence of 
something that is trying to negotiate for past wrongs. How can you have 
committed any wrong against a party if that party does not legally exist?  
Chapter 7 discusses how the concept of legal personality has been applied to 
Te Urewera. Here, the region of the former Te Urewera National Park has 
been made its own legal entity. Although in the Te Urewera case study Tūhoe 
have not had their tribal legal personality acknowledged, under Tūhoetanga Te 
                                                 
150 New Zealand Settlements Act 1863 was introduced to punish tribes who were seen to have fought against 
the Crown in the New Zealand Wars. Their land was confiscated as punishment.  
151 O’Regan above n 173. 
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Urewera and Tūhoe are an indivisible entity, thus the personality of the tribe 
has been recognised in effect, and an effective partner to form a co-governance 
arrangement has been created. This thesis will show that acknowledging the 
legal personality of an entity creates a legally acknowledgeable Treaty Partner 
with which the Crown can form a co-governance partnership. I contend that 
without legal personality, the Crown is simply forming a partnership with a 
collection of individuals. This is an asymmetrical arrangement, and I consider 
that such an unequal agreement does not form effective co-governance.  
5.11 Conclusion 
Co-governance and co-management resource management power sharing 
schemes operate in a complex context of different legal and cultural factors. 
These must be taken into account when examining how iwi have utilised such 
schemes in furthering the interests of their people. The various types of power 
sharing arrangements that currently exist sit on a spectrum, and therefore I 
consider that is not possible to define a bright line between co-governance and 
co-management. It would appear, however that co-governance schemes offer 
more authority and mana to the Iwi party involved than co-management 
schemes, but this is disputed amongst some stakeholders. I believe that the 
Crown uses co-governance and co-management schemes as political tools to 
devolve as much or as little power as it wishes to iwi. 
What is clear is that the Resource Management Act provides an insufficient 
basis for power sharing arrangements. While there are some sections that 
appear to provide for both parties to adequately power share as modern Treaty 
partners, these are ineffective and therefore iwi must look outside the RMA. 
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Sections 33 and 36BB-36E of the RMA have the potential to enable iwi to 
participate fully in environmental power sharing, but so far have fallen short of 
this goal. 
In order to evaluate how Ngāi Tahu and Ngāi Tūhoe have engaged in resource 
management power sharing arrangements, and how these have changed the 
face of co-governance in New Zealand, it is also crucial to understand tikanga 
Māori. The tikanga that surrounds environmental management will be brought 
to the table by iwi when they engage in power sharing schemes such as co-
governance arrangements. Of particular importance are the tikanga around 
mauri and kaitiakitanga. The law has attempted to engage with the 
terminology of tikanga, to a limited extent.  
The recognition of the legal personality of a tribe or a natural entity is required 
to create a Treaty Partner with which the Crown can engage in a co-
governance arrangement with. As the face of co-governance changes, the 
Crown may well give more power to iwi to enforce their form of 
environmental management within their rohe, and so give greater effect to 
tikanga Māori. This thesis will show how Ngāi Tahu and Ngāi Tūhoe have 






6 Ngāi Tahu and Resource Management Power 
Sharing Schemes 
Ngāi Tahu have utilised a variety of resource management power sharing 
arrangements to build regional influence in Canterbury, since the time of the 
Ngāi Tahu Treaty settlement in 1996. Their participation in these 
arrangements has enabled the iwi to build authority across Canterbury and 
promote the welfare of its members. This chapter will show how, since the 
signing of their Treaty Settlement in 1996, Ngāi Tahu have continued to build 
their capacity to gain a ‘seat at the table’ in regional governance. Ngāi Tahu 
have used their Treaty settlement legislation and subsequent power sharing 
schemes to build up a patchwork of functional co-governance capacity, but 
have yet to fully reach co-governance in Canterbury.  I will outline how the 
Crown has used a variety of power sharing arrangements that fit along the 
power sharing spectrum discussed in Chapter 5 to gradually give the tribe back 
some decision making authority in their rohe, but that Ngāi Tahu has yet to 
reclaim proper regional governance decision making power from the Crown. 
Ngāi Tahu are the principal iwi for the majority of the South Island and are 




                                                 




Figure 4: Ngāi Tahu Rohe 
In the 2013 Census, 54, 819 respondents identified as being of Ngāi Tahu 
descent.
153
 The tribe trace their lineage back to Paikea, who came to New 
Zealand from Hawaiki on the back of a whale.
154
 Paikea had a descendant 
called Tahupōtiki, and it is from him that Ngāi Tahu take their name. The tribe 
were originally based on the East Coast of the North Island, but migrated to 
the South Island, where they conquered the tribes residing there, intermarrying 
                                                 
153 Statistics NZ “Iwi Data” (2013) <http://www.stats.govt.nz/Census/2013-census/data-tables.aspx>. 
154 Te Maire Tau “Ngai Tahu” (2014) <http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/ngai-tahu >. 
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with Ngāti Mamoe and Waitaha to form the iwi as they are known today.155  
Ngāi Tahu signed the Treaty of Waitangi with the Crown at Akaroa, Ruapuke 
and Ōtākou in 1840.156 
This chapter will show how Ngāi Tahu have slowly built co-governance 
capacity since the 1990s, utilising a variety of schemes to do so. It first 
outlines the basis for Te Kerēme, the Ngāi Tahu Treaty of Waitangi Claim, 
exploring some of the key provisions that have allowed Ngāi Tahu to engage 
in its later power sharing structures. It will show how the Claim led to the Ngāi 
Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998, which provided key provisions to enable 
the iwi to participate and engage in resource management power sharing 
schemes, although to a lesser degree than full co-governance. The legislation 
also set out the commercial redress portion of the Settlement, which was also 
crucial in leading Ngāi Tahu to the position of influence they are in today. 
These two elements of the Settlement acted as building blocks which the tribe 
have used to increase their co-management and co-governance capacity. These 
provisions have led to three large power sharing arrangements in Canterbury, 
which in turn have allowed Ngāi Tahu to deeper develop their regional 
authority.  
The chapter will explore three specific power-sharing arrangements in 
Canterbury that Ngāi Tahu have been involved in since settlement. I consider 
that none of these schemes reach full co-governance and instead sit along the 
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spectrum of power sharing arrangements discussed in Chapter 5, but 
nonetheless I consider that each arrangement has allowed the iwi to build upon 
its functional governance capacity in the region. The arrangements in question 
are the Lake Ellesmere/Te Waihora Co-governance scheme, the Canterbury 
Water Management Strategy and the tribal involvement in the Christchurch 
Rebuild.  
With the reconstitution of Environment Canterbury (ECAN) and the planned 
transition of Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) powers in 
2016 to local authorities, there will shortly be a vacuum in regional 
governance. The framework for regional governance in the near future is not 
known. Ngāi Tahu wish to be a part of whatever configuration future regional 
governance takes in order to continue advancing their interests. A permanent 
seat at regional council level has the potential to allow the tribe genuine 
regional governance authority. 
6.1 Te Kerēme 
Te Kerēme is the Ngāi Tahu name for their Treaty Settlement Claim, which 
provided the basis for the Ngāi Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998. Te Kerēme 
is the foundation of Ngāi Tahu’s ability to engage in co-governance.  The 
Claim took many years of hearings and negotiations with the Crown. Sir 
Tipene O’Regan has reflected on the impact of Te Kerēme:157 
                                                 
157 Nicola Carrell “Innovation in Reconciliation - the Ngai Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998” 1999 3 New 
Zealand Journal of Environmental Law at 180. 
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As I look into the eyes of my mokopuna I reflect that the Ngāi 
Tahu claim is now seven generations old. In many ways it has 
become our grievance, a culture of grievance. In that sense Te 
Kerēme is a taniwha, a monster that has consumed our tribal lives 
through the years as generation after generation has struggled for 
justice. 
O’Regan aptly summarises the importance with which the iwi regarded Te 
Kerēme. The Claim was intergenerational and a significant influence on 
contemporary Ngāi Tahu identity. The iwi themselves describe Te Kerēme as 
“a long time coming”.158 The first petition by the tribe to the Courts over the 
legality of sales of Ngāi Tahu land occurred in 1868.159 The Smith-Nairn 
Royal Commissioner Judge McKay reported in 1887 that “only a substantial 
endowment of land secured to Ngāi Tahu ownership would go some of the 
way to right so many years of neglect”.160 The findings of the Commission 
were never acted on due to a change of government, and “its report virtually 
sank without a trace”.161 I consider that this reflects the settler government’s 
attitude towards their Treaty responsibilities of this time period. 
Various commissions were to follow. All of these highlighted the poverty that 
had been forced on the tribe as a result of the land sales of the 19
th
 Century. 
The 1921 Native Lands Commission led by Robert Noble recommended £354 
000 as compensation in relation to Kemp’s 1848 purchase ($28.8 million 
                                                 
158 TRONT “Claim History” (2013) <http://ngaitahu.iwi.nz/ngai-tahu/the-settlement/claim-history/>. 
159 At 1. 
160 At 1. 
161 Waitangi Tribunal The Ngāi Tahu Report 1991 (Wellington, 1991) at 173. 
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adjusted for inflation today).
162
 The tribe rejected this amount, saying it was 
inadequate.
163
 Despite this rejection, the 1944 Labour government enacted 
legislation without consultation with Ngāi Tahu to pay the Ngāi Tahu Māori 
Trust Board a sum of £300 000 at £10 000 a year for 30 years.
164
 The 1944 




Te Kerēme was filed by Rakiihia Tau on 28 August 1986, and was followed 
by seven amending claims over the next two years.
166
 The claim revolves 
around what Ngāi Tahu views as the “Nine Tall Trees”. Eight of these 
represent different areas of land purchased from the iwi, and the ninth ‘Tree’ 
deals with Mahinga Kai.
167
 This thesis does not seek to explain each of the 
detailed claims, and those searching for further information should read the 
1991 Waitangi Tribunal report on the matter. 
 Following the 1991 Tribunal report, the Crown and Ngāi Tahu began the 
negotiations for a settlement, but these collapsed in 1994.
168
 Negotiations 
resumed in 1996 after the intervention of then Prime Minster, Jim Bolger.
169
 In 
                                                 
162 Tau, above n 154. 
163Ministry for Culture and Heritage “The Ngai Tahu Claim” (2014) 
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the meantime, the Waitangi Tribunal had released its 1995 Ancillary Claims 
report.
170
 The resumption of the negotiations saw swift progress towards 
settlement, and in September 1997, the Crown and Ngāi Tahu concluded their 
negotiations and presented the proposed settlement to iwi members for 
ratification. Ngāi Tahu rangatira encouraged the acceptance of the settlement; 
consequently 94% of iwi members who voted approved the settlement.
171
 The 
Deed of Settlement was signed at Kaikoūra on 21 November 1997, and finally, 




It can be seen that the long process of Te Kerēme is reflective of the complex 
nature of the claim. The Ngāi Tahu Claim was one of the very first to be dealt 
with by the Crown under the claims settlement process initiated in the 1990s. 
The Crown was tentatively feeling out the parameters of the ‘rules’ of 
settlement. The compromises that were made with regards to natural resource 
management reflect the explorative nature of Treaty Settlements at this time. I 
consider that the Treaty Settlement process remains one that is somewhat 
experimental – returning governance and management control to a people 
without returning their sovereignty is not a simple task.  If the Ngāi Tahu 
Settlement were being negotiated today, the iwi may well have gained more 
power with regards to resource management decision making, if precedents 
such as those found in Te Urewera and the Whanganui River are to be 
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followed. Ngāi Tahu led the way in Treaty Settlements, and as such, 
compromises had to be made.  
6.2 Legal Personality for Ngāi Tahu 
Recognition of Ngāi Tahu’s legal personality was important as it was one of 
the fundamental steps that the iwi engaged in that has allowed them to enter 
effective resource management power sharing arrangements, and this concept 
has contributed to the rise of Ngāi Tahu in Canterbury regional politics. I 
contend that a power sharing arrangement where legal personality has been 
recognised is a more equal and valid arrangement than one where this concept 
is absent. The practical consequence of recognising legal personality is that 
any power sharing arrangement that is developed is formulated between two 
equal partners, rather than the entity that is the Crown, and an assortment of 
individuals that legally have no collective power. 
Prior to the establishment of legal personality of the tribe through legislation, 
the Crown had denied the existence of Ngāi Tahu, saying instead that they 
were just a collection of individuals.
173
 There are issues with recognising legal 
personality, as it is interlinked with the politically difficult concept of tino 
rangatiratanga. Tino rangatiratanga can be defined as the inherent sovereignty 
and self-determination of an iwi, and the mana that flows from that 
sovereignty.  The recognition of Ngāi Tahu’s legal personality has formed a 
crucial part of their journey to gain regional authority. Without this legal 
personality, the tribe would not be able to assert their mana. Additionally, the 
                                                 
173 Interview with Sir Tipene O’Regan, Ngāi Tahu Elder (Rachael Harris, 30 September 2014).  
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Crown and the iwi would never be on an equal footing following the Treaty 
Settlement. 
In simplified terms, the effect of removing legal personality from an entity is 
very damaging to the mana and power of that entity. If two parties are in a 
contract, and Party A simply states “you, Party B, do not exist”, then Party A 
can remove themselves from their responsibilities of that contract. Nullifying 
the legal personality of the tribe was another tool utilised by the colonial 
government to remove itself from its Treaty obligations. I consider that this 
was a method for the Crown of declaring moral bankruptcy, a way of giving 
themselves a ‘clean slate’ with which to deal with iwi.   
The quest for legal personality began with the establishment of the Ngāi Tahu 
Māori Trust Board in 1928, in order to help identify the beneficiaries of 
compensation that had been proposed by the 1921 Commission. The Board 
was reconstituted by legislation in 1946, enabling funds to be administered 
from the 1944 Settlement.
174
 In 1955, the Ngai Tahu Trust Board Act 1946 
was replaced by the Maori Trust Boards Act 1955. However, while the newly 
recognised NTMTB was recognised as a legal entity that had been mandated 
partially from statute, in the 1980s members decided it was an insufficient 
body to represent Ngāi Tahu interests in the settlement by iwi members.175 The 
NTMTB was restricted in its actions by the paternalistic actions of the 
Government; for example, NTMTB was required to seek approval from the 
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Minister of Māori Affairs before spending more than $400.176 Another 
structure was therefore required to deliver genuine tino rangatiratanga to the 
tribe.  
Legal personality for Ngāi Tahu began to seem more of a possibility when the 
former Labour Government passed the Runanga Iwi Act 1990. This modern 
interpretation of the Rūnanga system was modelled on its historical origins, 
and would have allowed groups such as hapū and urban Māori Authorities to 
apply for “iwi authority status” under the jurisdiction of the Māori Land 
Court.
177
 The Act was designed to provide for “iwi empowerment”, and as 
Rennie explains:
178
   
Ultimately, the Rūnanga Iwi Act would have provided 
mechanisms and processes for Māori to define what an iwi 
authority was and the RMA (Resource Management Act) would 
have the mechanisms to transfer functions, powers, and duties to 
such iwi authorities to empower them to directly exercise their 
kaitiaki responsibilities 
However, the Act had a short life and it was repealed when the Bolger-led 
National Government was elected in 1990.
179
 The repeal of the Rūnanga Iwi 
Act meant that Ngāi Tahu had to seek other avenue for their legal personality 
for the purposes of Te Kerēme and the settlement.  
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In order to seek legal personality, Ngai Tahu decided to seek recognition of the 
tribal council, by 1991 renamed Te Rūnanga o Ngai Tahu, as the 
representative of the tribe’s collective interest and the vehicle for its legal 
personality. A supplementary report to the Ngai Tahu Report 1991 was 
presented to the Minister of Māori Affairs on 1 February 1991 regarding legal 
personality. The report recommended that:
180
 
As a matter of urgency and importance, the Minister of Māori 
Affairs introduce legislation constituting the Ngāi Tahu Iwi 
Authority to conduct and conclude negotiations with the Crown 
on the Ngāi Tahu claim resolution. The tribunal supports the 
claimant proposal as put to it and endorses the view that any 
incorporated structure should logically be also empowered to 
provide for the future implementation of Ngāi Tahu goals and 
aspirations. … [The Tribunal] recommends to the Crown that 
legislation be effected so as to appoint and constitute the Ngāi 
Tahu Iwi Authority as the appropriate legal personality to act on 
behalf of the iwi. 
Following the Waitangi Tribunal report, negotiations began regarding the 
introduction of legislation that would enable the re-establishment of a legal 
personality for the iwi. The first iteration of the Bill was titled the Ngai Tahu 
Rangatiratanga Recognition Bill. This title clearly displays the link between 
legal personality and tino rangatiratanga. Crown Law officials were anxious 
about the recognition of Ngāi Tahu’s rangatiratanga.181 The discomfort of the 
Crown around the terminology eventually won over, as by the third and fourth 
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draft of the legal personality Bill there was not a single reference to 
rangatiratanga contained in the recitals or in the Bill.
182
 This discomfort with 
returning tino rangatiratanga to iwi has been present throughout the Crown’s 
Treaty Settlement process, and I consider that co-governance is one method 
that the Crown has created in order to form a compromise over governance 
without returning tino rangatiratanga.  
While the legislation in the form of Te Runanga O Ngai Tahu Bill was 
introduced into Parliament in July 1993, it was not given its final reading in 
Parliament until 17 April 1996 due to inter-tribal politics that were at play. The 
Royal Assent was given to the Te Runanga O Ngai Tahu Act 1996 on 24 April 
1996, and this dissolved the Ngāi Tahu Māori Trust Board and replaced it with 
the entity now known as Te Rūnanga  o Ngāi Tahu, or TRONT. TRONT is the 
body that represents the legal personality of the tribe, and it is answerable to 
the Rūnanga of Ngāi Tahu and their people. 
However, I would contend that the legal personality established by the 
TRONT Act is not the same as the inherent legal personality that the iwi had 
before the Crown removed it by the New Zealand Settlements Act 1863. The 
legal personality that was possessed by the tribe at that point was derived from 
their whakapapa and tino rangatiratanga under tikanga Māori. The legal 
personality that is now possessed by the tribe has been granted by an Act of 
Parliament, and is derived from the sovereignty of the Crown. It is therefore a 
lesser form of recognition, and does not manifest full tino rangatiratanga. 
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TRONT is also established by s 6 of the Act as a body corporate. Giving legal 
personality to a corporation is well established law, but there are questions to 
be asked as to whether a body corporate is the best vehicle to act on behalf of a 
tribal group that previously held its legal personality out of its own 
whakapapa. 
The TRONT Act, although set up to deliver legal personality to the tribe, does 
not include the words ‘legal personality’ or ‘tino rangatiratanga’ anywhere in 
it. I believe that this reflects the discomfort felt by the Crown in recognising 
any sovereignty of Māori. The fact that no other iwi except Waikato-Tainui 
has managed to gain legal personality in this way is noteworthy. Other iwi 
including Ngā Puhi and Ngāti Ruahine have advanced the notion of having 
their legal personality recognised, but they have seen “flat out refusal” from 
the Government.
183
 This clearly shows the contentious nature of recognising 
the legal personality of the tribe.  
I consider that the recognition of Ngāi Tahu’s legal personality has facilitated 
the creation of robust power sharing schemes that recognise the mana that the 
tribe has regained. Regaining legal personality for Ngāi Tahu has allowed the 
tribe to participate in resource management power sharing schemes as an equal 
Treaty Partner, more so than if they did not have this status. For a fully equal 
resource management power sharing scheme to exist in any future capacity – a 
scheme that truly reflects the mana and rangatiratanga of the iwi who are the 
Treaty partner in such an arrangement – the legal personality of the tribe or the 
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area being governed should be recognised. In this way, the Crown is 
accountable to an entity that is a genuine governance partner.  
6.3 The Settlement – Environmental Management Provisions 
Ngāi Tahu power sharing capacity has been built from the ground up. The 
foundation for this capacity is the Ngāi Tahu Treaty Settlement legislation. 
The Ngāi Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998 received the Crown’s assent on 1 
October 1998. The landmark settlement dealt with the claims that had been 
lodged under the ‘Nine Tall Trees’ of Ngāi Tahu. The Settlement included the 
commercial redress component, the vesting of certain properties in Te 
Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu, and the Mahinga Kai claim. The Ngāi Tahu Treaty 
Settlement provided the basis for the tribe to build its commercial influence 
and to engage in the resource management power sharing arrangements in 
Canterbury that the tribe are using to increase regional authority.  
Several different provisions were included in the Ngāi Tahu Settlement Act 
which have allowed the iwi to build the tribe’s resource management power 
sharing capacity. These included specific sections designed to provide for dual 
management of designated natural resources within the Ngāi Tahu rohe, and 
general provisions that allowed Ngāi Tahu to work alongside the Department 
of Conservation (DOC). These provisions have allowed Ngāi Tahu to build up 
a series of different partnerships with the Crown.  
Arguably, the most important of the ‘Nine Tall Trees’ of Ngāi Tahu that 
formed the basis for Te Kerēme was the claim for Mahinga Kai. ‘Mahi’ means 
‘work’ and ‘kai’ means ‘food’, so this term can be literally translated as ‘to 
work the food’. Mahinga Kai is the traditional form of food and resource 
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gathering for Ngāi Tahu, and can be seen as both an economic and cultural 
activity. The 1991 Ngāi Tahu report defines Mahinga Kai as: 184 
The tribal resources in and on the land, in the forests and in the 
rivers, lakes and sea and in the sky. It includes kai ika, kai moana, 
kai awa, kai manu, kai roto, and kai rakau. Ngāi Tahu see their 
Mahinga Kai in a holistic way.  
The claimants alleged that Ngāi Tahu, in breach of Article Two of the Treaty, 
had been dispossessed of their Mahinga Kai by the Crown, through such 
actions as refusing the iwi access to their traditional hunting, fishing and food 
gathering grounds. Part 12 of the Ngāi Tahu Claims Settlement Act provided 
for cultural redress to make amends for the Crown’s failure to recognise 
Mahinga Kai. It features provisions that refer to the statutory advisor role of 
TRONT, the existence of Tōpuni, place names, taonga species, and DOC 
protocols. The Mahinga Kai section provides the general power-sharing 
provisions that Ngāi Tahu have used to build their co-governance capabilities.  
One set of the Part 12 provisions that have allowed for tribal input into 
resource management decision making are the sections of the Act that deal 
with Tōpuni. Tōpuni are areas of land administered under the National Parks 
Act, the Conservation Act, or the Reserves Act 1977 which have Ngāi Tahu 
values.
185
 While Tōpuni status does not override any other status, it does allow 
for an overlay of Ngāi Tahu values. As such, DOC will be required to 
recognise these values, and must undertake specific actions in line with these 
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principles. One example of this engagement in practice is the education of 
climbers of significant mountains that they should not stand on the top of its 
peak due to the tapu nature of the mountain.   
The Tōpuni provisions provide for fourteen areas of public land that are 
symbols of Ngāi Tahu mana and rangatiratanga, including Castle Hill, Mt 
Earnslaw and Mt Aspiring.
186
 Section 241 provides that the New Zealand 
Conservation Authority must have particular regard to Ngāi Tahu values when 
considering any management aspect to do with Tōpuni.  This is one set of 
general provisions that allows for the iwi to build resource management power 
sharing capacity. I contend that these provisions do not meet full co-
governance, as they are effective at an operational and output-focused level 
and do not involve shared goal-setting and navigational direction by Ngāi 
Tahu and the Crown for the areas in question. They do, however, sit on the 
resource management power sharing spectrum, and are an example of how the 
Crown uses this as a compromise to return some power to iwi while retaining 
overall control. This distinction reflects the difficulty in defining these terms 
discussed in Chapter 5.  
The Claims Settlement Act provides for arrangements relating to specific sites 
over the South Island.
187
 Several of these are Canterbury based. One such site 
is Aoraki/Mount Cook, New Zealand’s highest mountain. The Settlement 
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allowed for the name change from Mount Cook to Aoraki/Mount Cook, in 
recognition of the significance of the mountain’s place in Ngāi Tahu creation 
traditions. Part 3 of the Settlement Act vests Aoraki/Mount Cook in TRONT. 
In return, s 16(1) provides that TRONT must gift back the mountain. This 
temporary re-vesting has yet to take place. TRONT themselves state that the 
re-gift concept is a deliberate move to assert their legal personality, observing 
“the very act of gifting the mountain to the people of New Zealand confirms 
that the person making the gift has the mana, or power, to do so”.188 TRONT 
also references the power sharing nature of these arrangements, noting that the 
return of Aoraki is a continuing symbol of their commitment to the co-
management of areas of high historic, cultural and conservation value.
189
  
Another specific provision in the Ngāi Tahu Settlement Act that has been a 
building block for co-governance in Canterbury was the vesting of the bed of 
Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere in TRONT. Te Waihora was one of three lakes 
that had its bed vested in TRONT as a result of the Settlement. Also returned 
were Muriwai (Coopers Lagoon) and Lake Mahināpua. Under mainstream 
law, a lake can be split into various property rights, including: its bed; its water 
column; the subsoil and minerals below the bed; the plants and animal species 
in the water column; the banks of the land around the lake; and the airspace 
immediately above it. All of these are considered individual property rights. 
This is in direct contrast to tikanga Māori, which views a lake as one entity 
that is not available to be owned by any one individual; rather it is a taonga 
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that a collective group are responsible for as kaitiaki, as discussed in Chapter 
5. The iwi claimed for the return of the whole lake, an issue that the Waitangi 
Tribunal noted was “deeply intertwined with Ngāi Tahu’s Mahinga Kai”.190 
However, just the fee simple estate of the bed of the lake was returned to Ngāi 
Tahu.
191
 This formed the basis for a co-governance arrangement between the 
iwi and local government, and it can be seen that this deal reflects the nature of 
compromise that permeates the Treaty Settlement process. 
These provisions of the Claims Settlement Act represent Ngāi Tahu’s starting 
point for the changing face of co-governance in the Canterbury region. The 
tribe shifted from a position of no formal influence to one with broad powers 
across the South Island. The site-specific provisions of Aoraki and Te Waihora 
provide the foundation for influence in Canterbury resource management. 
Aoraki has become more symbolic over the past 16 years since settlement; 
however, Te Waihora has become the focus of an important power-sharing 
scheme that provides a genuine attempt at co-governance. I posit that this is 
because of the lesser economic potential for Aoraki; Te Waihora has valuable 
eel, flounder and mullet fisheries. The Settlement Act can be seen to be the 
genesis for Ngāi Tahu’s increasing role in power sharing arrangements in 
Canterbury.  
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6.4 The Settlement – Commercial Provisions 
The Ngāi Tahu Claim Settlement Act also includes provisions of significant 
commercial importance that have allowed the tribe to build their commercial 
capacity and have contributed to the tribe’s development of significant 
regional influence. The large Ngāi Tahu property base in Christchurch has 
given them influence as property owners within the city. The Act has provided 
Ngāi Tahu with the capacity to build a large business portfolio, including 
holdings in property, tourism, agriculture and housing. The below diagram 
shows the business organisational structure of TRONT:
192
 
                                                 




Figure 5: TRONT organisation structure 
These entities have been built up from the financial compensation given to 
TRONT by way of the Settlement Act. The economic redress provisions in the 
Act provided Ngāi Tahu with $170 million.193 The commercial ‘bolt-ons’, 
principally the Right of First Refusal and Deferred Selection Process, 
increased the value of the $170 million. These bolt-ons also included a 
relativity provision. This provision means that the Crown must ‘top-up’ the 
financial compensation paid to Ngāi Tahu once the Crown reaches its $1 
billion ‘fiscal envelope’, although the Crown only has to pay this when 
                                                 




specifically asked by Ngāi Tahu. Ngāi Tahu describes this relativity provision 
as “a mechanism to help mitigate our losses and future proof us against the 
uncertainty of an evolving Treaty Settlement Process”.194 With the signing of 
the Ngāi Tūhoe settlement, this provision was triggered, with Ngāi Tahu 
receiving a pay-out of roughly $56 million.
195
 This safeguard has ensured that 
the Crown remains accountable for its Treaty breaches, and it makes certain 
that the value of Ngāi Tahu’s settlement remains as the Crown promised in 
1996. 
The Deferred Selection Process allowed TRONT to buy certain listed Crown 
assets within twelve months of the enactment of the legislation. Carrell 
explains that the purpose of the mechanism was to provide Ngāi Tahu with the 
opportunity to acquire “a range of assets in different economic sectors and 
locations, thus giving it a sound basis for social and economic 
development”.196 Parts 4-8 of the Act provide the legal processes through 
which the transfers of such property must be made. These provisions enabled 
Ngāi Tahu to purchase the fee simple to a large property base, including 
forestry land, high country stations and central Christchurch land including the 
Courts precinct. Some of these properties were then leased to or managed by 
the Crown exactly as they had been prior to the settlement.
197
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I consider that this interest in property has contributed to Ngāi Tahu’s strong 
claim to engage in power sharing schemes in resource management. This is 
because, as a significant property owner, TRONT is a natural partner; the body 
has a vested interest in the governance and management of these areas. This 
has been particularly pertinent to the Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere co-
governance scheme, and the Central City Rebuild co-management 
arrangement. Ngāi Tahu is fond of saying that they are not going anywhere, 
showing their continued commitment to the governance and management of 
the land within their rohe.  
Another settlement provision that has allowed TRONT to construct an 
influential commercial base is the section which allows for a Right of First 
Refusal (RFR) to purchase surplus Crown land. Part 9 sets out the provisions 
for RFR, with s 49 prohibiting a Crown body from disposing or attempting to 
dispose of relevant land except in accordance with the Act. Sir Tipene 
O’Regan, speaking of RFR, has noted that “in a lovely ironic twist… it’s the 
right of pre-emption that the Crown imposed on us at the time of the Treaty! 
We could only sell to the Crown. Well, if the Crown wants to sell, it can only 
sell to us”.198 This ‘twist’ reflects the Treaty relationship of land sales; I 
submit that the acquisition and return of land and the governance of that land 
has always been the focus of the Crown/Iwi relationship. 
RFR has allowed Ngāi Tahu to rebuild its land stocks. Rights of First Refusal 
were also important for the negotiation of the Canterbury Earthquake 
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Recovery Act. It has been hinted that one of the reasons Ngāi Tahu were given 
partnership status in the Act was to remove Rights of First Refusal 
responsibilities that the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority may have 
otherwise been forced to comply with.
199
 While this is speculation, it is a 
likely consequence of the RFR due to the significance of these provisions. The 
deferred selection process and RFR components of the Ngāi Tahu Settlement 
have given the tribe the capacity to build a large property base within their 
rohe. 
The commercial elements of the Settlement also gave Ngāi Tahu the financial 
means to build resource management power sharing ability. The tribe has used 
these commercial components to turn their $170 million into an asset pool of 
around $1 billion. Ngāi Tahu Property has around 30 percent of the 
Christchurch subdivision market and is a large landlord in the region.
200
 This, 
in turn, has translated into influence at a regional level. Ngāi Tahu Property 
CEO Tony Sewell is of the firm view that regional influence has come from 
“commercial clout”, noting that tribal business relationships extend into all 
manner of areas of commerce in Canterbury.
201
 The statutory environmental 
provisions in the Settlement Act, coupled with the genuine day-to-day 
influence that Ngāi Tahu has built through its commercial success, have 
provided the tribe with a solid base from which to engage in power sharing 
schemes across Canterbury. I conclude that the patchwork nature of the 
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construction of these schemes reflects that fact that such arrangements require 
the lobbying by iwi of the Crown to relinquish power. They sit on a spectrum 
of power sharing, and the Crown can use these arrangements as it sees fit to 
return decision making power. This does not occur in a uniform manner.  
6.5 Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere Co-governance Arrangement 
One of the most significant resource management power sharing arrangements 
between the Crown and Ngāi Tahu in Canterbury is the Te Waihora/Lake 
Ellesmere governance arrangement. This co-governance scheme emerged 
from the Ngāi Tahu Claims Settlement Act, and has developed from years of 
Ngāi Tahu advocacy. It sits alongside the Canterbury Water Management 
Strategy, and has been instrumental in allowing TRONT to gain more regional 
influence. Te Waihora is of huge cultural and economic significance to Ngāi 
Tahu, and was a core part of Treaty negotiations. Although the arrangement 
introduces the tikanga principles discussed in Chapter 5 into Canterbury water 
management, this arrangement has yet to achieve its full co-governance 
potential and I believe that the scheme can currently be more accurately 
described as co-management. This shows how the boundaries between the two 
concepts are blurred, as discussed in Chapter 5. I consider that this reflects the 
fact that the Crown is utilising the term ‘co-governance’ as a useful political 
compromise that can be moulded into devolving as much or as little power as 
the Crown chooses to relinquish.  
Te Waihora is a brackish lake close to Christchurch, with a catchment of 
Canterbury Plains waterways including the Rakaia and Selwyn Rivers. The 
lake is unique in that it can be closed and opened, and has been done so 
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historically by both Māori and settlers. A 2010 National Institute of Water and 
Atmospheric Research (NIWA) study reported that Te Waihora was one of the 
most polluted lakes in New Zealand, in terms of nutrient content and algal 
growth.
202
 It is mostly shallow, with a maximum depth of 2.1 metres, and has 
suffered from algal blooms since the 1968 Wahine Storm, when aquatic 
macrophytes in the lake were all destroyed.
203
 The high pollution levels have 
been attributed to the rapid intensification of farming in the catchment of the 
lake. Memon and Kirk explain that “the lake has been treated as a sink for 
waste, with the major causes of degradation being farm run-off, sewerage and 
the manipulation of the lake outlets to foster more arable farmland”.204 
Farmers have grazed stock right up to the lake’s edge, and the loss of lakeside 
vegetation and lake edge erosion have also been highlighted as contributing 
factors to the poor state of the lake.
205
 These issues have contributed to the 
need for a significant clean up endeavour.  
The tragedy of the lake’s pollution is compounded because of the cultural 
significance of Te Waihora to Ngāi Tahu. The iwi use the lake as a source of 
Mahinga Kai, and it was known as ‘Te Kete Ika a Rakaihautu’ or ‘The Food 
Basket of Rakaihautu’.206 It was a source of fish and bird stocks, including a 
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 The lake supports thirty three native fish species and 
five exotic species, although eel, flounder and mullet are the primary catch.
208
 
Traditionally, Ngāi Tahu managed the opening and closing of the outlet of the 
lake to help fish stocks to flourish.
209
 Several hapū claim Mahinga Kai rights 
to the lake and Ngāi Tahu whānui consider themselves kaitiaki of the lake.  




It is clear that Ngāi Tahu did not intend to part with this treasured 
fishery. We are satisfied they fully intended to retain unimpeded 
access to both Waihora and the spit. This they made abundantly 
clear to (Crown agent Walter) Mantell. He deliberately chose to 
disregard their rights. In doing so he failed to comply with the 
terms of the purchase which preserved to Ngāi Tahu their 
Mahinga Kai, and acted in breach of the Treaty. Serious detriment 
to Ngāi Tahu has continued down to the present day. 
For Ngāi Tahu, the loss of the lake through Crown actions was a tragedy and 
this became a focal point of the Mahinga Kai ‘tall tree’ of Te Kerēme. The 
tribe sought the return of the whole lake. Tikanga does not split a natural 
resource into various individual property rights as western law does, reflecting 
the kaitiakitanga approach to ownership taken by Māori described in Chapter 
5. However, this claim for the whole lake was only partially successful. The 
Crown returned only the fee simple of the bed of the lake, and s 171 of the Act 
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is firm that this return did not confer any rights with regards to the waters, 
aquatic life of the lake, or any structures attached to the bed. This directly 
conflicts with the tikanga principle that the lake is one entity.  
Prior to the 1998 legislation for the return of the bed of Te Waihora, Ngāi 
Tahu advocated for increased responsibility in governance and management of 
the lake. In 1993, an entity called the Te Waihora Management Board was set 
up under the mandate of the Papatipu Rūnanga Taumutu and involving six 
other rūnanga with interests in the lake. ECAN explains that “the Board’s 
composition is in recognition of whakapapa, kaitiaki roles and the flax-roots 
local knowledge of the Te Waihora environment held by the Board members 
and their respective Papatipu Rūnanga”.211 The Management Board is today 
the Ngāi Tahu advisory voice in the local politics that surround Te Waihora. 
In addition to the Ngāi Tahu-mandated Te Waihora Management Board, in 
2003 the broader community was included in the form of the Waihora 
Ellesmere Trust (WET). None of the Trustees of WET are Ngāi Tahu; instead 
the board is composed of non-mana whenua who have an interest in the 
restoration and future of the lake. These include local landowners, scientists, 
and environmental practitioners. WET was established to implement a 
Community Strategy, derived from the Canterbury Regional Council's 
Regional Policy Statement and its subsequent work plans.
212
 It was 
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specifically provided that the Community Strategy was not to conflict with 
Ngāi Tahu Freshwater Management Policy and plans centred on Ngāi 
Tahutanga including the Te Waihora Eel Management Plan.  
In 2005 another significant piece of Te Waihora policy was introduced. This 
was in the form of a Joint Management Plan between Ngāi Tahu and the 
Crown, called Mahere Tukutahi o Te Waihora. This plan was provided for 
outside of the RMA, and was the first statutory joint land management plan 
between the Crown and any iwi in New Zealand to do so. From here, 
negotiations began to extend this JMA into a full co-governance arrangement. 
In 2011, the Te Waihora Management Board, representing Te Rūnanga o Ngāi 
Tahu, signed a relationship agreement with ECAN, signalling “a shared 
commitment to the restoration and rejuvenation of the mauri and ecosystem 
health of Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere”.213 At the same time, an interim co-
governance arrangement was signed, indicating that both parties intended to 
establish a longer term co-governance scheme. 
Running alongside the relationship agreements that were being signed at this 
time was an announcement from the then Minister for Conservation, Dr Nick 
Smith, that the government intended to funnel $11.6 million into a clean-up 
project for Te Waihora.
214
 The project was named Whakaora Te Waihora, and 
this $11.6 million figure was sourced from the Central Government, ECAN, 
Fonterra, Ngāi Tahu, Selwyn District Council, Waihora Ellesmere Trust and 
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Lincoln University. The project was announced as a multi-year endeavour that 
would be led by TRONT and ECAN and was based on their relationship 
agreement.
215
 It can be seen that the involvement of multiple parties in the 
clean-up of the lake reflects the tikanga concept of manaakitanga discussed in 
Chapter 5. Ngāi Tahu are actively engaging with other parties who are regular 
visitors to the lake in order to effectively manage this plan. 
The focus of the arrangement is on reducing farming nutrient runoff.
216
 Smith 
noted that it would be “New Zealand’s most difficult lake cleanup”, and 
highlighted the importance of education and support for the effort.
217
 Ngāi 
Tahu Kaiwhakahaere, Sir Mark Solomon, echoed these comments and 
remarked on the collaborative nature of the clean-up effort, “today’s a good 
step because it’s not just about us – it’s about us, ECAN, Fonterra now, the 
Government – it’s about, hopefully, the community getting on board”.218 I 
consider that Solomon’s comments reflect the essence of co-governance 
arrangements and manaakitanga – bringing different stakeholders into the mix 
to produce a better result for the resource in question.  
In late 2012 two important arrangements were signed between the Crown and 
Ngāi Tahu. On 23 November 2012, the formal Te Waihora Co-governance 
Agreement between Te Waihora Management Board and Te Rūnanga o Ngāi 
Tahu as the representatives of the tribe, and Canterbury Regional Council 
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(ECAN) as the representative of the Crown, was signed. On 7 December 2012, 
Tuia, the Relationship Agreement between Ngā Papatipu Rūnanga and 
Environment Canterbury was signed. The eighteen Papatipu Rūnanga of Ngāi 
Tahu represent the hapū level of the tribe. Tuia is important to both the Te 
Waihora co-governance scheme and broader tribal resource management 
power sharing arrangements as it provides the basis for how these 
arrangements should be conducted. Tuia recognises stewardship and 
kaitiakitanga, mutual respect and good faith and unity. Tuia acknowledges the 
mana whenua of each Papatipu Rūnanga, acknowledging that they hold 
customary authority within their rūnanga.  This essentially means that other 
hapū cannot influence resource management power sharing arrangements that 
are outside of their rohe.
219
 Tuia provides the background relationship 
agreement to the formal Te Waihora co-governance arrangement (TWCGA).  
The TWCGA is the first co-governance arrangement in New Zealand to be 
entered into by the Crown separate to a Treaty settlement. It is a policy that 
has been formed outside of the RMA. This reflects the fact that the RMA is an 
ineffective vehicle for facilitating effective power sharing arrangements as 
discussed in Chapter 5. The arrangement is between TRONT, the Te Waihora 
Management Board, which is a TRONT-funded entity given the mandate to 
deal with Te Waihora issues, and ECAN.  
The document that sets out the TWCGA includes: the functions, powers and 
duties of the parties; a catchment vision to provide direction to the joint 
                                                 




exercise of those functions, powers and duties; operational process protocols; 
co-governance responsibilities; structural machinery for the co-governance 
entity; joint decision-making capabilities; reservations and conditions; and 




The Parties agree to: 
Approve any relevant management and/or operational plans, work 
programmes and budgets developed for the implementation of the 
Whakaora Te Waihora accelerated restoration programme.  
Provide leadership to the organisations and the community in 
relation to the Whakaora Te Waihora accelerated restoration 
programme. 
I contend that this definition sits at a much more operational level than a true 
co-governance arrangement would. While the board approves the management 
and operational plans, and ‘provides leadership’, it does not provide for any 
long term goal-setting, any decision making about what the serious issues 
facing the board are, or any other similar ‘governance-level’ decisions. This is 
an example of where the label ‘co-governance’ is used to describe an 
arrangement that the Crown are not fully engaged in at a governance level, 
reflecting the fact that this is a politically useful term used as the Crown sees 
fit.  
The Te Waihora Co-governance Board comprises of fifteen members, all 
seven Commissioners from ECAN and all eight members of Te Waihora 
                                                 





 The co-governance board is to be chaired 
jointly by both ECAN and TWMB. Decisions of the co-governance group are 
made on a consensus basis.
222
 This consensus is not a consensus between all 
the individual members of the group, but rather a consensus between a 
majority of the Commissioners and a majority of the TWMB. The current co-
governance board is co-chaired by Dame Margaret Bazley (Chief 
Commissioner) and Sir Mark Solomon (TRONT Kaiwhakahaere). Despite the 
lack of governance level decision making that this power sharing scheme 
entails, I believe the fact that both Ngāi Tahu and ECAN have sent their 
“Chiefs” to chair the organisation shows the strong co-operative commitment 
to the governance arrangement of both parties. 
The somewhat limited impact of the co-governance scheme for Te Waihora is 
echoed by responses from stakeholders from both sides of the co-governance 
scheme that the author interviewed. These stakeholders identified that the 
current state of the scheme is at more of a co-management level. ECAN 
Commissioner, Peter Skelton, stated simply that “what we have been talking 
about is close to co-governance but it’s not quite there. It’s a co-operation, a 
collaboration”.223 Te Waihora Management Board member Anake Goodall 
was blunter about the efficacy of the co-governance arrangement, making the 
observation “I think the thing is pretty shallow, or has been operating in a 
shallow way. … So it’s sort of a glorified Te Waihora Management Board 
                                                 
221 At 10.3 
222 At 10.5-10.6. 
223 Interview with Peter Skelton, ECAN Commissioner, (Rachael Harris, 11 March 2014). 
118 
 
that’s been managing flax bush plantings and really operational stuff”.224 
Goodall was critical of the human resourcing of the board, noting that the 
teams provided to work on the clean-up effort are often working split roles and 
are distracted by other professional obligations. He made the point that 
“there’s no urgency, no power, no particular sharp edge. … I think what we 
are doing is scratching at the glass ceiling of what co-governance might look 
like”.225 Goodall’s comment exposes a reality of co-governance – all forms of 
power sharing arrangement are not created equal. 
In addition to the fact that this arrangement does not meet full co-governance, 
the literature has identified that power sharing arrangements for Te Waihora 
have not returned full tino rangatiratanga to Ngāi Tahu. About six months 
before the signing of the formal co-governance arrangement, Memon and Kirk 
produced a paper analysing collaborative governance in the area. They noted 
that the property right of the return of the lakebed:
 226
   
Has enabled Ngāi Tahu to exercise rangatiratanga in limited 
capacities (such as rent on commercial eel fishers and 
rehabilitating customary fisheries), it does not provide new 
capabilities for management of the lake’s water … effective 
Māori agency in the lake and wider catchment continues to be 
burdened by the historical forces of institutional inertia.  
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Memon and Kirk conclude that true Ngāi Tahu rangatiratanga over the lake is 
limited, despite their participation in lake management.
227
 Despite the fact that 
a co-governance arrangement is now in place, I would argue that power 
sharing regimes never fully return tino rangatiratanga, as by its nature it is not 
a concept that can be shared between iwi and Crown. A tribe either has tino 
rangatiratanga, or the Crown has sovereignty, and there is little overlap 
between the two. 
While this power-sharing arrangement is a co-governance scheme in name, it 
is questionable as to whether it actually achieves co-governance. I consider 
that a more appropriate name for this scheme would be ‘co-management’, as 
the decisions that are being made by the board are much more to do with day-
to-day management that the philosophical, long-term goals that co-governance 
arrangements typically address. I therefore posit that this current iteration of 
the co-governance arrangement is simply one building block for future Ngāi 
Tahu regional influence. This arrangement has not reached true co-
governance, however it can be seen that it has built up functional power 
sharing capacity, and will enable the tribe to participate in other resource 
management power sharing schemes in the future.   
6.6 The Canterbury Water Management Strategy 
Another power sharing arrangement that Ngāi Tahu are involved in is the 
Canterbury Water Management Strategy (CWMS). The Te Waihora/Lake 
Ellesmere Co-governance Arrangement and the CWMS can be seen to 
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represent two strands of a rope, winding together to create a stronger strand of 
regional influence for Ngāi Tahu in the area of water governance. The CWMS 
sits alongside the TWCGA, complementing it, and mirroring, to a lesser 
degree, the power sharing aspect of water governance.  Ngāi Tahu have used 
the CWMS as another building block to gain influence. The CWMS is not a 
bilateral Iwi/Crown co-governance arrangement; it is a multi-party governance 
scheme of which TRONT is a key stakeholder. 
Ngāi Tahu’s influence on water usage in Canterbury is important to the tribe 
as water is of great economic importance in the region. According to a 2014 
study, Canterbury allocates 58% of New Zealand’s water, generates 24% of 
the nation’s power through hydroelectric schemes, and has 70% of the 
country’s irrigated land.228 Canterbury has braided rivers, lakes, and lowland 
streams and wetlands, and is relatively dry, with a high water table in some 
areas.
229
 The current ‘first-in first-served’ system of water allocation in New 
Zealand does not allow for water to be distributed according to the most 
worthy application, or for any monetary compensation, or along any grounds 
of iwi-based prioritisation. Instead, water is allocated to those who apply under 
the RMA and are the first to file their applications. This allocation system has 
been tested by land-use changes and the intensification of farming practices.
230
 
The rise of dairy farming as a major money earner in the New Zealand 
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economy has seen many former sheep and beef farms convert to dairy, and 
such conversions see a large increase in irrigation and water usage. Canterbury 
has the largest number of cows per hectare of land in New Zealand.
231
 This 
rise in dairying has also seen another water-based issue – increased levels of 
nutrient contamination and run-off in water levels. This combination of greater 
demand for water resources and the decrease of an adequately clean water has 
led to the so-called “water woes” of Canterbury.232 
In an attempt to solve the water problems of Canterbury, the Canterbury Water 
Management Strategy was adopted in 2009 after seven years of 
development.
233
 The Strategy takes a collaborative, community-based 
approach to water management.
234
 The CMWS is broad, and its direction and 
implementation were supported by stakeholder groups including Ngāi Tahu. 




The CWMS aims to provide a long-term direction for water 
management in the region, combining current and contemplated 
projects and activities, and integrated infrastructure, 
environmental flows, water quality, land use, water allocation, 
ecosystem protection and restoration, together with demand 
management. 
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The CWMS is set up as a method of bringing local community leaders 
together at a governance level to balance the economic issues of water 
distribution with the environmental protection issues that are facing the region. 
It is a form of co-governance, but it is a multi-lateral form of co-governance 
rather than a strictly bilateral Crown-Iwi co-governance scheme. 
Soon after the adoption of the CWMS, regional governance in Canterbury 
became complicated. In 2010, the central Government removed the elected 
Environment Canterbury regional councillors from their roles for their failure 
to consent water allocations in due time, and for “dysfunction at a councillor 
level”.236 The alleged ‘defective’ nature of the councillors was contested by 
some, including the councillors themselves. However, instead of fourteen 
democratically elected councillors, the Government installed seven 
commissioners, headed by Dame Margaret Bazley, to correct the defective 
allocation system. Their term was extended in 2012 to end in 2016.  
At a practical level, the CWMS splits Canterbury into ten zone committees. 
Each of these zone committees is comprised of local community leaders, 
including one ECAN Commissioner, and at least one Ngāi Tahu 
representative. This Ngāi Tahu representative ensures that the iwi have a form 
of influence in this community-based multi party governance arrangement. 
The influence of Ngāi Tahu on Canterbury water governance is reflected in 
both the text of the CWMS and the practical outcomes from the work of some 
of the zone committees. In the text of the CWMS, there is an emphasis on 
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involving Ngāi Tahu in decision making and governance. The Kaitiakitanga 
section outlines goals and tikanga principles for water management in the 
region with direct reference to Ngāi Tahu, and Ngāi Tahutanga. There are six 
key points that sum up the entirety of the chapter. These are:
237
 
 Water is a taonga that provides for and sustains all life. It is 
integral to cultural and personal identity and wairua for 
whānau, hapū and iwi. 
 Water is central to the Ngāi Tahu resource management 
philosophy ‘Ki Uta Ki Tai’ – from the mountains to the sea. 
For Ngāi Tahu this requires an holistic view of the world and 
integration and co-operation between agencies, legislation and 
management frameworks. 
 Kaitiakitanga is about the active protection, use of and 
responsibility for natural and physical resources by tangata 
whenua – it requires both an active role in decision-making 
and achievement of environmental outcomes. 
 Priorities for Ngāi Tahu include protecting wāhi tapu, wāhi 
taonga, and Mahinga kai, preventing further decline in quality 
and quantity of drinking water, increasing understanding of 
and provision for customary values and uses in particular 
zones, and involvement of Papatipu Rūnanga in CWMS 
work.  
 Ngāi Tahu is particularly concerned with the impacts of land 
use intensification on water quality & quantity. Adverse 
effects of degraded waterways impacts on the health and 
wellbeing of waterways and ability to access life sustaining 
resources of the waterways. 
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 Ongoing discussions between Ngāi Tahu, the Crown and 
Canterbury local government will lead to increased clarity 
around the arrangements and commitments needed to give 
effect to the Treaty, aboriginal and customary rights 
The formalisation of Mahinga Kai and Ngāi Tahutanga in this policy is an 
example of how Ngāi Tahu are integrating the tikanga values discussed in 
Chapter 5 into the mainstream.   
6.7 Freshwater governance – policy v practice 
While it is notable that Ngāi Tahu values are incorporated into freshwater 
governance policy, the question must be asked, how much of a practical 
influence is the tribe having on regional water governance? Of particular note 
here is the Selwyn/Waihora zone committee. This zone committee is unique in 
that it has more than one Ngāi Tahu representative. There are six Ngāi Tahu 
representatives from the hapū that associate with the lake, and the ECAN 
Commissioner on this zone committee is Donald Couch, who is also Ngāi 
Tahu. Six Ngāi Tahu representatives on a committee of twelve “raised a few 
eyebrows” in the farming community, but ECAN Commissioner David 
Caygill explains that it was not deliberate to install so many Ngāi Tahu 
representatives on this committee.
238
 Rather there was a desire to involve all 
the affected rūnanga in the zone committee, rather than say to Ngāi Tahu “we 
know that six rūnanga are all interested in the lake – but pick two”.239 This 
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approach is indicative of substantial Ngāi Tahu influence over water 
governance in the Selwyn/Te Waihora area.  
The zone committee and the Te Waihora Co-governance Arrangement are 
separate bodies, but the zone committee will have some effect on the Co-
governance scheme as it will have some control over resource management 
law for that area. By having influence in both these governance groups, Ngāi 
Tahu is able to ‘cover their bases’. Having a heavy Ngāi Tahu influence in this 
zone committee has had a positive effect on the resource management policy 
for the area. Recommendations for a comprehensive set of changes to land 
management in the Selwyn Catchment have included suggestions that are 
reflective of tikanga Māori. Specifically, the zone committee has 
recommended rules designed to address the mauri of Te Waihora.
240
 I consider 
this shows that participation in the zone committees under the auspices of the 
CWMS is enabling Ngāi Tahu are using to widen their influence at a regional 
level. 
Another zone committee that is engaging with tikanga Māori is the Ashburton 
zone committee, which covers the Rakaia and Rangitata River. There are two 
Ngāi Tahu representatives on this committee. The zone committee had to 
consider whether some bodies of water could be considered ‘streams’, and 
others ‘drains’ in the Hinds catchment, with the practical consequence that 
drains would be ignored in their engagement.
241
 An Arowhenua representative 
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explained that Ngāi Tahu did not make such a distinction as “water is water 
and wherever it is it has mauri”.242 The zone committee adopted the Ngāi Tahu 
approach of not differing between streams and drains, and did this directly as a 
result of the input from the Arowhenua representative. I consider that this 
occurred as a practical consequence of the interaction of tikanga protocol into 
mainstream policy. This is, in effect, what a working power sharing 
arrangement should look like – tikanga and western science working hand in 
hand to protect the resource as kaitiaki.  
Ngāi Tahu are able to use their involvement on the CWMS zone committees to 
advance their regional influence and ensure that their values are contributing to 
discussions under this scheme. The tribe is engaging in water governance at a 
regional level, and is using this as one way to promote the interests of their 
people. It is not mere consultation – the tribe are engaging in the real decision 
making that is happening as part of the CWMS. However, this is not a co-
governance scheme or a co-management scheme. Rather it is a multi-party 
governance arrangement of which Ngāi Tahu are a major stakeholder. 
Nonetheless, I consider that this scheme is an effective partnership for 
delivering Ngāi Tahu regional influence, particularly as water is such an 
important resource in Canterbury. This kind of arrangement proves that the 
Crown and Iwi can work together as partners in a range of different power 
sharing schemes, even those that are beyond the traditional co-management or 
co-governance schemes discussed in Chapter 5.  
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6.8 Ngāi Tahu and the Canterbury Rebuild 
6.8.1 The Background to the Ngāi Tahu role in the rebuild 
One innovative tool that Ngāi Tahu is using to build regional influence is 
through the central city rebuild of Christchurch. Ngāi Tahu hold a unique 
position in the rebuild, as legislation has granted TRONT partner status with 
the central and local governments. This arrangement is a little different from 
previous resource management power sharing schemes, as it involves the 
rebuild of an entire central city, rather than the restoration of a more ‘natural’ 
environment, such as a river or a lake. While this arrangement resembles more 
closely a co-management scheme than a co-governance scheme, it is 
undoubtedly influential and will allow the tribe to make a significant 
contribution to the changing face of Christchurch.  
On 4 September 2010, at 4.35 AM NZST, a magnitude 7.1 earthquake 
occurred on a previously unknown fault line in Darfield, Canterbury.
243
 This 
quake caused both significant damage in the Christchurch city area and the 
surrounding region, and created a 29.5 kilometre long surface rupture, now 
named the Greendale fault.
244
 Subsequent to the Darfield earthquake, 
extensive aftershock activity was documented, and more than 4300 
aftershocks with local magnitudes of up to magnitude 5.4 were recorded by the 
Geonet seismograph network between 4 September 2010 and 22 February 
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 Five and a half months after the Darfield earthquake, a magnitude 6.3 
quake struck on 22 February 2011 at 12.51 PM NZDT.
246
 The ground shaking 
was severe; with an epicentre around six kilometres southeast of the city centre 
of Christchurch, the whole city felt considerable ground movement. The 
effects of the February quake were devastating – 185 people were killed, at 
least NZD $11 billion worth of building damage occurred, and there was 
widespread soil liquefaction across the entire city, predominately affecting the 
central business district and eastern suburbs of Christchurch.
247
 
Within ten days of the 4 September quake, the Canterbury Earthquake 
Response and Recovery Act 2010 (CERR Act) was enacted by Parliament 
under urgency. The Act was designed to aid with the response and rebuild of 
the affected areas of Christchurch.
248
 Broad powers given to the Crown by the 
Act drew criticism from academics for their breadth and power.
249
 While the 
legislation was of importance at the time of enactment, the CERR Act was 
soon repealed by the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011. 
                                                 
245 At 305. 
246 At 307. 
247 At 309. 
248 Kenneth Palmer “Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 - a legislative opportunity?” 2011 9(52) 
Butterworths Resource Management Bulletin. 
249 Charlotte Brown, Mark Milke and Erica Seville “Legislative Implications of Managing Disaster Waste in 
New Zealand” 2010 14(2010) New Zealand Journal of Environmental Law. 
129 
 
Following the February quake, the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 
was enacted, again under urgency, and came into force on 19 April 2011. In 
the first reading, the Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery stated:
250
 
The purpose of the Bill is to provide appropriate measures to 
ensure that greater Christchurch and its communities respond to, 
and recover from, the impacts of the earthquakes; to enable 
community participation in the planning, the recovery, and the 
rebuilding of affected communities without impeding a focused, 
timely and expedited recovery; to facilitate and direct the 
planning, rebuilding, and recovery of affected communities, 
including the repair and rebuilding of infrastructure and other 
property; and to restore the social, economic, cultural, and 
environmental well-being of greater Christchurch communities. 
The CER Act created a cross-party forum of parliamentary members from the 
greater Christchurch area to provide information and advice to the Minister, 
and, crucially, established the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority 
(CERA), in the state sector.
251
 
The CER Act creates a role for Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu as a partner in the 
recovery process. I consider that this is not a full-scale co-governance 
arrangement as the tribe are not influencing the governance-level decisions of 
the rebuild, but it is a different form of resource management power sharing 
arrangement than those that Ngāi Tahu have been engaged in previously. This 
is because it allows the iwi to be engaged in co-management decisions 
regarding complex arrangements including new buildings, river management, 
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and parks redevelopment. I contend that this is a more multifaceted kind of co-
management than the two arrangements explained above, and sits closer along 
the spectrum to co-governance as discussed in Chapter 5. 
Section 11(4) of the CER Act requires the Minister to develop the Recovery 
Strategy in consultation with the Christchurch City Council, Environment 
Canterbury, Selwyn District Council, Waimakariri District Council, and, 
crucially, Ngāi Tahu, as well as ‘any other persons or organisations that the 
Minister considers appropriate’. Section 17(2) requires that CERA, 
Environment Canterbury, and Ngāi Tahu must have the opportunity to provide 
input into the development of the Recovery Plan for the Christchurch Central 
Business District. Section 20(1) provides that a copy of any draft Recovery 
Plan for the CBD must be available to CERA, Environment Canterbury, and 
Ngāi Tahu. I consider it noteworthy that while Ngāi Tahu were allowed to 
comment on the Recovery Strategy and provided consultation, they were not 
involved in the early stages of this Strategy, and therefore did not participate in 
making any governance level decisions. On these facts, I believe that the 
Crown did not want Ngāi Tahu to be of equal partnership status at this stage in 
the decision making process for the Rebuild, and it was instead content to keep 
the tribe at a management level.  
Section 59 of the CER Act governs the application of the Ngāi Tahu Claims 
Settlement Act. It states that: 
(1) Nothing in this Act affects the operation of the Ngāi Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998 
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(2) To avoid doubt, if the chief executive wishes to exercise his or her power under this Act to 
dispose of land to which that Act applies, he or she must do so in accordance with the Ngāi 
Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998 
The practical application of this section is to confirm the grant of the first right 
of refusal concerning land disposal. This has been an influential regarding the 
acquisition of land during the rebuild. In the first reading of the Canterbury 
Earthquake Recovery Bill, then Member of Parliament for Te Tai Tonga, 
Rahui Katene highlighted the importance of this section, stating:
252
 
This is so important not just because it demonstrates that the 
Government has agreed that the existing first right of refusal is 
sacrosanct and should be protected, but also because it 
demonstrates the care taken in respect of formalising the Treaty 
relationship with mana whenua… Ngāi Tahu expresses their 
particular appreciation of the way this legislation embodies the 
commitment of Ngāi Tahu to be a partner with central and local 
government in developing a recovery strategy. 
There are no specific provisions in the Act recognising the principles of the 
Treaty of Waitangi; however, this statutory co-management partnership that is 
created between central government and Ngāi Tahu by the Canterbury 
Earthquake Recovery Act is unique. The arrangement has been reported by 
media as a trail-blazing arrangement.
253
 Even Ngāi Tahu Kaiwhakahaere Sir 
Mark Solomon admits to being shocked that TRONT was legislated into the 
recovery.
254
 Sir Mark acknowledged the Treaty settlement that provided for 
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Ngāi Tahu partnership roles provided the basis for Ngāi Tahu influence, but is 
in no doubt that the earthquakes sped up Ngāi Tahu’s rise to prominence in 
city affairs.
255
 While this is indeed a unique arrangement, I posit that the Ngāi 
Tahu are a natural partner in the Central City Rebuild, due to their proven 
capacity in power sharing arrangements and their large property stocks within 
the rebuild area. Ngāi Tahu’s involvement in the rebuild builds on 
arrangements such as those under the Canterbury Water Management 
Strategy.
256
  The tribe has displayed their ability to work efficiently with the 
Crown in prior resource management power sharing arrangements, and has 
built up the capacity required for such arrangements. Additionally, it has been 
hinted that Ngāi Tahu was placed in their position in the rebuild so they were 
unable to compete with buying land.
257
 Regardless of whether this rumour is 
true or not, it is undeniable that the iwi has built up influential property 
holdings in the Central City through their purchasing of property through RFR 
and the deferred selection process, and have authoritative sway as large 
landowners in the area.
258
  This role has allowed Ngāi Tahu to significantly 
increase their wider regional authority. 
6.8.2 Actual effect of the CER Act for Ngāi Tahu 
Following the legislation of a co-management role for Ngāi Tahu in the 
Christchurch rebuild, the tribe has attempted to use this leverage to increase its 
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influence in the region. However, this has not been straightforward for the iwi, 
and some have observed that this partnership is not being used to its full 
potential. I consider that these frustrations reflect the complex and often non-
defined nature of co-governance. 
The Central City Recovery Plan (CCRP) includes plans for eighteen anchor 
projects within the boundaries of the ‘Four Avenues’ of Christchurch’s Central 
Business District. The CCRP is the statutory document that is the blueprint for 
the rebuild of Christchurch’s central city. These anchor projects are overseen 
by the Central City Development Unit (CCDU), an arm of CERA. As per the 
statutory partnership created by the CER Act, each anchor project is led by 
CERA, Christchurch City Council (CCC), TRONT, or a combination of 
CERA and CCC.
259
 Even if an anchor project is not led by one of these three 
entities, each partner is allowed input into that project if they choose to do so. 
TRONT has created a specific voice for funnelling input. 
Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu was named the statutory partner in this arrangement 
by this legislation. However, the hapū Ngāi Tūāhuriri are the mana whenua for 
Christchurch, and this is acknowledged by the CCRP.
260
 The hapū are based in 
Tuahiwi, Kaiapoi. In order to provide an effective consultation arm to 
maximise the Ngāi Tahu role in the rebuild, a steering committee was 
established under the mandate of Ngāi Tūāhuriri called Nga Matapopore Trust. 
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This trust was developed early on in the rebuild process after mana whenua 
began to fear that they would be left out of the rebuild.
261
 Matapopore are a 
group of mana whenua with different skills who are providing a unified Ngāi 
Tahu voice and bringing tikanga principles, like those discussed in Chapter 5, 
into the rebuild. 
Initial engagement between Ngāi Tahu and the rebuild did not start on a 
positive footing. The traditional tension between iwi and non-iwi came to the 
fore with the first anchor project to get off the ground – the Te Papa 
Ōtākaro/Avon River precinct project. The issues that occurred with the bid for 
this project display the complexities of power sharing arrangements, and how 
iwi can sometimes be side-lined in such schemes, especially when outside 
commercial interests who are not a Treaty Partner are involved. As part of the 
CCRP, the importance of the Avon/Ōtākaro River to Ngāi Tahu was 
emphasised. Ōtākaro is at the top of this list of places of significance to Ngāi 
Tahu.
262
 The section of the CCRP that deals with the Avon River Precinct, and 
the way that it must be developed, specifically mentions, “Ngāi Tahu through 
Te Ngāi Tūāhuriri Rūnanga will advise and guide CERA and Christchurch 
City Council to ensure their values are appropriately integrated into the new 
project”.263 The Plan acknowledges both the mana of Ngāi Tūāhuriri as 
kaitiaki of the river, and the importance of Mahinga Kai values to Ngāi Tahu, 
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particularly with regards to the river.
264
 The CCRP is clear that the river is of 
great significance to Ngāi Tūāhuriri and that the hapū are to be consulted 
throughout the process of this anchor project. I would consider that the CCRP 
sufficiently recognises the Treaty obligations of the Crown to mana whenua in 
the rebuild. However, this situation was complicated when a commercial 
enterprise not in the role of Treaty Partner, was introduced into this process. 
The bid to complete the Avon River project was won by engineering 
consultancy OPUS and BDP Consortium in a contestable process.
265
 Despite 
the clear CCRP guidance to involve Ngāi Tūāhuriri in the Te Papa Ōtākaro 
anchor project, OPUS and BDP Consortium failed to do so. Ngāi Tahu reports 
on the OPUS/BDP concept design are scathing of the lack of Ngāi Tahu 
values. A review of the concept design by Tau highlighted that the OPUS/BDP 
design failed to adequately portray the important concept of Mahinga Kai as a 
key principle; failed to demonstrate any insight or understanding of Ngāi 
Tūāhuriri requirements; did not show a Ngāi Tahu or even a Canterbury/New 
Zealand aesthetic; contained cultural constructs that misrepresent Ngāi Tahu 
whakapapa; and wrongly identified sites of significance to Ngāi Tahu/Ngāi 
Tūāhuriri.266 Rakihia Tau Jr states that an independent review of the draft 
concept design by CCDU identified that “embedded cultural engagement with 
Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tūāhuriri has to date been inadequate and is inconsistent 
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with requirements set out in the Recovery Plan”.267 OPUS/BDP failed entirely 
to follow proper process to engage with mana whenua and in doing so, 
produced a concept design that was inconsistent with the guidelines of the 
CCRP as well as insulting one of the three rebuild partners. 
It appears that OPUS/BDP consortium failed to consult properly with mana 
whenua because they lacked an understanding of the correct tikanga. 
OPUS/BDP, instead of consulting with mana whenua Ngāi Tūāhuriri, decided 
to consult with other Māori, assuming, somewhat naively, that other Māori 
could speak on behalf of Ngāi Tūāhuriri. These other consultants included the 
OPUS Māori consultancy in the North Island, and members of Ngāi Tahu who 
did not have the mandate to consult.
268
 Under tikanga, this is impolite and 
incorrect, and their actions have been described as ‘culturally thick’.269 The 
mistakes made by OPUS/BDP are a good example of some of the issues 
facing participants in resource management power sharing schemes. I believe 
that this shows a clear contrast between the general willingness of the Crown 
to engage with Iwi as a Treaty Partner, and private business interests who see 
engagement with mana whenua as a ‘box-ticking’ exercise. Although the 
Crown has been guilty of ‘box-ticking consultation’ in the past, it would 
appear that in this case it has been more responsive to Treaty obligations than 
private industry. 
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Despite the failure of OPUS/BDP to act with cultural integrity, CCDU and 
CERA staff acted in good faith towards this concept design.
270
 Following the 
mistakes made by OPUS, CCDU and Nga Matapopore undertook discussions 
to ensure that such an issue would not occur again. A Heads of Agreement was 
negotiated and signed between CCDU and Ngāi Tūāhuriri that set out the 
requirements of anchor project engagement by Nga Matapopore.
271
 The 
objectives for the Heads of Agreement are given as:
272
 
 To provide for effective and meaningful integration of Ngāi 
Tahu values, histories, narratives and aspirations into all 
anchor projects, as agreed by the Parties; 
 To provide for transparent, accountable and high quality 
provision of advice from Ngāi Tūāhuriri to CCDU on the 
integration of Ngāi Tahutanga into the anchor projects; 
 To achieve clear and effective communication between the 
Parties; and 
 To support an enduring relationship between the Parties that 
aligns with the redevelopment programme of the city. 
This arrangement was signed on 27 April 2014 and now dictates the way that 
Ngāi Tahu engages in the resource management power sharing arrangement 
that is facilitating the Central City Rebuild. I consider that this arrangement 
outlines a role that sits at more of a consultation or management role, rather 
than elevating Nga Matapopore to sit at a governance level.  
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Through the voice of Nga Matapopore, a Ngāi Tahu aesthetic is currently 
being woven into several anchor projects, and eventually a more Ngāi Tahu 
cultural feel will be present in the whole of the central city. Despite initial 
teething problems, there is now more significant Ngāi Tahu involvement in the 
Avon/Ōtākaro River Precinct. There is provision for Mahinga Kai; in the form 
of rain gardens, in-stream improvements to promote the return of indigenous 
fish species, and the planting of indigenous shrubs, and ‘noble trees’ such as 
tōtara and mataī.273 Ngāi Tahu narratives are being introduced along the river 
banks, and traditional games are being incorporated into playground 
equipment design. Along the river there is an Art Trail composed of thirty 
works that tells the stories of the River. Two of these works are Ngāi Tūāhuriri 
stories that are receiving government funding, including one called ‘Nine Tall 
Trees’, portraying Te Kerēme.274 Weaving patterns are also to be integrated 
into paving. The history of Victoria Square as a trading point for Māori and 
European settlers will be prominent.
275
 I believe that this shows that whilst the 
Avon/Ōtākaro River project started under a cloud of controversy, Ngāi Tahu 
and the Crown have managed to negotiate their way through this, enabling the 
Ngāi Tahu voice to be integrated into this project.  
Another anchor project that will be reflective of a heavy Ngāi Tahu influence 
in the Christchurch Rebuild is the Bus Interchange. This project will have a 
strong incorporation of Ngāi Tūāhuriri travel narratives throughout it, so 
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commuters can understand some of the journeys that mana whenua took 
throughout their rohe. The intention is to have Ngāi Tahu artworks in the Bus 
Interchange, and for there to be signage in Te Reo Māori throughout as well. 
Through these details, the Ngāi Tahu presence and influence in Canterbury 
will be obvious to the everyday Cantabrian on their daily commute.  
Other anchor projects that are yet to fully get underway will also have a Ngāi 
Tahu influence. One such project is the Ngāi Tahu-led cultural centre, Te Puna 
Ahurea. The CCDU website promotes this cultural centre as:
 276
  
A world class centre for celebrating Ngāi Tahu and Māori culture, 
and acknowledging Christchurch’s place within the Pacific. Te 
Puna Ahurea Cultural Centre will be a unique, vibrant visitor 
destination that supports central city recovery through increased 
cultural, retail and hospitality activity. 
 This building will not be a mārae, but it will be used for pōwhiri and for 
Māori performing arts. The site for this cultural centre is likely to be on iwi-
owned land on Durham St, but so far there has been little development and the 
iwi “will not rush” the project.277 Te Puna Ahurea will be a strong 
representation of Ngāi Tahu in the city, and the iwi will no doubt use this as a 
focal point of their influence in Canterbury. 
 A second anchor project which will have an exciting, strong Ngāi Tahu focus 
is the Justice and Emergency Services Precinct, where Matapopore have 
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provided consultation with regards to the Māori Land Court, Environment 
Court and Youth Court design. Matapopore consultation on this project has 
suggested that the layout for the Māori Land Court should reflect a mārae 
environment, and that whānau rooms be included so people can study 
whakapapa records without disturbance.
278
 Ngāi Tahu art will feature in this 
precinct, and the intention is to make the Courts a less intimidating space for 
Māori. The Cultural Centre and Justice Precinct are two key anchor projects 
that will have an obvious and significant Ngāi Tahu aesthetic and influence in 
the rebuilt Christchurch. I consider that having such a strong Ngāi Tahu 
presence in the city is a visual reminder of the Treaty partnership. Although 
this will have been achieved through a co-management regime rather than a 
co-governance scheme, I do think that this arrangement is a worthwhile 
engagement for the tribe, despite the lack of governance direction that the tribe 
has been able to give.  
Ngāi Tahu are involved in various other aspects of the Christchurch rebuild 
aside from the anchor projects. As a major partner in the central city rebuild, 
their voice has been sought on a number of projects. In the eastern suburbs, 
community gardens used to build Mahinga Kai capacity are being 
developed,
279
 Ngāi Tahu recently expressed support for a ‘living cathedral’ 
proposal to replace the damaged Christchurch Cathedral,
280
 and additionally, 
Ngāi Tahu deferred their Right of First Refusal on surplus Crown land to 
                                                 
278 Email from Aroha Reriti-Crofts (Chair, Nga Matapopore) to Rachael Harris (20/05 2014). 
279 Radio New Zealand “Group gathers red zone renewal ideas” Online Ed. (10/07 2014). 
280 Georgina Stylianou “Iwi considers living cathedral” The Press (Christchurch, 13/09 2014). 
141 
 
enable a land swap to provide space for a redevelopment of Christchurch 
Hospital.
281
 I contend that the increased involvement of the tribe in such 
projects, and the fact that they are being involved at all, shows the way that 
Ngāi Tahu are now a significant player in Canterbury, having  utilised the 
tools available to them to construct power and authority in the region.  
Despite the influential nature of the Ngāi Tahu role in the rebuild, some within 
the tribe have expressed the view that the partnership is not being utilised to its 
full potential. Sir Tipene O’Regan has compared the three pronged partnership 
to ‘The Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost’, asking wryly “and who’s the 
Holy Ghost?”.282 He is concerned that Ngāi Tahu involvement in the Rebuild 
loses sight of what is actually important for the iwi.
283
 O’Regan’s comments 
are echoed in somewhat stronger language by Tony Sewell, who called the 
rebuild partnership “bloody nonsense”.284 Sewell thinks that the governance is 
“flawed” and has highlighted the unequal relationship between the parties. 
These anecdotes would appear to show that while on face value Ngāi Tahu 
engagement is at an equal level to the Crown in the rebuild, in reality their 
voice is side-lined on some issues, and the iwi have not always utilised the 
opportunities that are available to assert their authority.
285
  The arrangement 
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lacks the efficacy that members of the iwi might have expected it to have. I 
believe that this exposes how iwi expectations are often not met in resource 
management power sharing schemes, as the Crown will use these 
arrangements to meet its own political goals and will retain ultimate control 
over the matter. 
Iwi, as has often happened throughout our colonial history, get the raw end of 
the deal in power sharing regimes. A more efficacious arrangement would be 
one that resembles more closely co-governance, rather than co-management. 
Currently, Nga Matapopore engagement is predominately operational and 
involves tasks such as securing artists and designing native planting schemes. I 
consider that if TRONT had been involved at the governance level of the 
rebuild, for example in a dedicated role in the Crown Blueprint design team, or 
at a higher level, perhaps in an advisory role to the Minister, tribal engagement 
in the rebuild may have more successful.  
 Others outside of the iwi have claimed that there is a conflict of interest, as 
Ngāi Tahu Property is one of the biggest stakeholders in commercial property 
development in the city.
286
 Some have claimed that Ngāi Tahu “have a 
privileged role in the rebuild”, a claim which Sir Mark Solomon refutes.287 
Solomon has responded to these accusations by highlighting the difference in 
the sections of Ngāi Tahu, “this role, which emerged from our role as Treaty 
Partner, is undertaken by our tribal leadership and this role is partitioned from 
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our commercial structure”. 288 These criticisms levelled at the Ngāi Tahu role 
in the Central City Rebuild can thus be seen to be invalid.  
The Ngāi Tahu role in the Christchurch rebuild is complicated but hugely 
influential. The iwi used the influence that they have gained from other 
resource management power sharing schemes to show that they had capacity 
to be involved in such a co-management scheme, and were therefore included 
in the arrangement. The OPUS issue shows the complexity of such 
involvement, and has highlighted the cultural issues that such power sharing 
schemes can create. Ngāi Tahu involvement in the Central City Rebuild will 
see a future Christchurch that reflects the shared history of the region – rather 
than the ‘Englishness’ that it was known for pre-quake. The role of Nga 
Matapopore reflects the kaitiakitanga role that Ngāi Tūāhuriri hold in 
Canterbury. The Ngāi Tahu role in the rebuild is an acknowledgement of a 
living, breathing Treaty partnership, and I consider that despite the limitations 
of the arrangement, the tribe have used this to some extent to advocate for their 
regional authority. 
6.9 Ngāi Tahu and Canterbury in the Future 
Canterbury is facing a unique set of circumstances with the reformation of the 
regional council and the transition of CERA powers back to local authorities. 
The term for the government-appointed ECAN commissioners finishes in 
2016. The method of appointing commissioners to replace the democratically 
elected representatives has received mixed reviews. While the Green Party 
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made “restoring local democracy to Christchurch” an election priority,289 Ngāi 
Tahu Property CEO Tony Sewell proposes the slightly anti-democratic 
approach of installing commissioners for every regional council.
290
 At the time 
of writing, the new form of regional governance for Canterbury has not been 
finalised. It is not known whether ECAN will return to a democratically 
elected council, or will be formed by representatives that are half appointed 
and half elected like a Health Board, or whether another structure will be 
implemented.  
While there are many questions regarding the form of the new regional 
council, what is clear is that there will be an initial vacuum at the regional 
governance level.
291
 This may be an opportunity for Ngāi Tahu, as they wish 
to gain a more concrete seat at the top table in regional governance. Their co-
management and co-governance schemes show that they have the capacity to 
make worthwhile and productive contributions to regional governance. Future 
Ngāi Tahu involvement might include permanent representation at the regional 
council level. This kind of governance power would be a very effective way 
for the tribe to advance the influence of the iwi and it members.  
Māori representation on regional councils is not a new concept. In a 1998 
report on establishing a Māori constituency for Environment Bay of Plenty, 
Judge Peter Trapski considered more than 300 submissions on this topic, the 
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majority of which were in support.
292
 Judge Trapski considered such 
representation to be “constitutionally sound, paralleling and reflecting the 
delivery of democracy in the government of New Zealand”.293 He also noting 
that such an action had the potential to “heal the wounds of separatism; it 
would emphasise the concepts of partnership and proportional representation. 
It would get to the Council table people who were truly representative of the 
population at large”.294 As a result of this report, under the Bay of Plenty 
Regional Council (Māori Constituency Empowering) Act 2001, three Māori 
seats were established on the Council. Two Māori wards were also introduced 
by Environment Waikato in the 2013 election, although Hamilton City 
declined to follow suit.
295
 
None of the Māori local authority seats are designated to any one hapū or iwi, 
and the candidates are voted in by the Māori electoral role. Introducing Māori 
wards into the Canterbury Regional Council would not necessarily fulfil the 
Crown’s responsibilities as a Treaty Partner to mana whenua, as there is no 
certainty that any elected member would speak with the Ngāi Tahu kaupapa. If 
Ngāi Tahu’s role in Canterbury was to be genuinely reflected at a regional 
council level, I consider that it would be appropriate to appoint a designated 
councillor from Papatipu Rūnanga who would then be able to speak with the 
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mandate of the Rūnanga behind them. This would deliver meaningful 
governance power at a top level in the region. 
One system that would be ineffective to reproduce is in Auckland. The City of 
Sails became a Super City in November 2010. The National Government 
rejected the suggestion by the Royal Commission on Auckland Governance 
that three elected Māori seats be established on the new council. Instead, a 
nine member advisory board was established comprising seven mana whenua 
nominated representatives and two ngā mataa waka representatives.296 This 
role is not strictly advisory, as there are two representatives of this Board with 
voting rights on eleven of the eighteen Council Committees.
297
 However, other 
non-councillor members of committees also held voting rights.  
Ngāti Whātua joined this board reluctantly, releasing a statement:298 
We are very clear that this lightweight board does not replace 
direct consultation with Ngāti Whātua that is a Treaty obligation 
for the Auckland Council under the Local Government Act and 
the Resource Management Act. 
We are joining this Maori Advisory Board on the basis that it is 
there to advise only and contact between the Advisory Board and 
the Council cannot be construed as consultation with Ngāti 
Whātua proper. 
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The Iwi continue to fight for Māori seats on the Council. I therefore conclude 
that this is a failed method of delivering tino rangatiratanga to mana whenua, 
and this model should not be replicated in Canterbury if Ngāi Tahu wish to 
participate as an equal Treaty Partner in the resource management decision 
making process. 
Another factor contributing to this power vacuum is the transition of CERA 
powers back to local authorities in Canterbury. The CER Act expires in April 
2016, and as such, decision-making power will be handed back to the region. 
Former Prime Minister Jenny Shipley has been chosen to head a committee of 
Canterbury power brokers, including Ngāi Tahu Kaiwhakahaere Sir Mark 
Solomon, to decide how this transition will take place.
299
 The gradual scaling 
back of CERA powers could potentially see Ngāi Tahu receiving 
responsibility for some of the functions that were previously held by the 
Recovery Authority. This could be another method which Ngāi Tahu could 
use to gain regional influence. However, as the committee only began sitting 
in January 2015, not much is known about how this transfer will work.  
A Ngāi Tahu role at the regional governance level is supported by ECAN 
commissioners interviewed by the author. Rex Williams would see a 
representative on the group who provides a Ngāi Tahu voice, he notes “we 
must not think of them as a lobby group, but as representing a different 
approach to thinking about stuff and get their views on a whole range of 
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issues”.300 Peter Skelton echoed these comments, and commented that ECAN 
Commissioners have been “pushing very hard” for a Ngāi Tahu voice on 
whatever governance authority is created.
301
 These comments suggest that in 
future regional governance, it is likely that Ngāi Tahu will have a designated 
role. 
6.10 Conclusion 
Ngāi Tahu’s co-governance journey is a story of patchwork functionality 
adding up to significant regional governance power with room for further 
growth. Ngāi Tahu has engaged in a manner of power sharing arrangements 
that have been provided for outside of the RMA in Canterbury. None of these 
arrangements can be described as full co-governance, but they have allowed 
the tribe to build the functionality required for future regional governance 
power. The capacity of the tribe to be engaged in co-management and co-
governance schemes has been created by several different ‘building blocks’.  
One of these building blocks was the Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu Act, which 
gave the tribe back their legal personality. This paved the way for the Ngāi 
Tahu Claims Settlement Act, which provided the foundations for the tribe to 
be involved in such power sharing schemes. The Settlement Act provided both 
specific provisions that have allowed the development of power and 
information sharing arrangements, and more general sections that the iwi have 
utilised to build their commercial influence in the region. Crucial provisions 
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included those relating to Aoraki/Mount Cook, Tōpuni, and the commercial 
redress components. The Settlement provided the basis for Ngāi Tahu to 
engage in specific arrangements in the Canterbury region. 
Ngāi Tahu have engaged in three key power sharing arrangements in 
Canterbury. The tribe are involved in a ‘co-governance’ scheme for Te 
Waihora/Lake Ellesmere. This was the first co-governance scheme to be 
actioned outside of a Treaty Settlement, but it has yet to fully reach its 
potential. There is no doubt, however, that this scheme has boosted Ngāi Tahu 
influence in the area. The Te Waihora Co-governance scheme sits alongside 
another collaborative governance scheme, the Canterbury Water Management 
Strategy. The CWMS is not a bilateral co-governance scheme, but is a 
community governance scheme in which Ngāi Tahu are one of the many 
community stakeholders. Ngāi Tahu have used their position in this scheme to 
change aspects of water policy to better reflect tikanga Māori.  
The success of Ngāi Tahu’s contribution to these two prior governance 
schemes acted as building blocks for the widest reaching co-management 
scheme that Ngāi Tahu has been involved in yet. Ngāi Tahu’s role in the 
Christchurch Central City Rebuild has not been without controversy, nor has it 
been a simple task. As the rebuild itself is vastly complex, so is the role of the 
tribe and tikanga in the space of a ‘new’ Christchurch. The OPUS issue is a 
key example of what can happen in such a space when tikanga is not correctly 
understood or is ignored. What is certain is that the introduction of a Ngāi 
Tahu aesthetic into the rebuild will imprint a future Christchurch for years to 
come. The introduction of Ngāi Tahu into an ‘everyday’ Christchurch will 
help to de-alienate the tribe in a city that is very aware of racial differences. 
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Other cities such as Auckland and Hamilton have a more visible Māori 
presence, but Christchurch has always been a more ‘Anglified’ city. The Ngāi 
Tahu will result in “genuine meaningful changes” in the way that Christchurch 
looks in the future.
302
  The increased Ngāi Tahu influence in the Canterbury 
region has been brought about not by one Act of Parliament, but rather over 
the course of a generation’s worth of work done by tribal stakeholders who 
have taken their Settlement Act and used it to build power sharing capacity 
from this. Ngāi Tahu have used resource management power sharing 
arrangements as a means of increasing regional influence in Canterbury. 
Ngāi Tahu have yet to achieve full co-governance in Canterbury. However, 
this may change with the new form of regional governance that will be created 
with the reconstitution of Environment Canterbury and the transition of CERA 
powers in 2016. These changes will see a vacuum in regional governance, and 
raise many queries as to what future governance might look like. Ngāi Tahu 
wish to have some form of permanent governance influence in Canterbury. I 
believe that their successful engagement in current power sharing 
arrangements might see this happen.  
One clear conclusion that I draw from this Ngāi Tahu case study in Canterbury 
is that the term ‘co-governance’ can mean many things to many people, as 
earlier discussed in Chapter 5. The Crown can use this term as a political tool 
to appear, on face value, that they are meeting their Treaty obligations. 
However, iwi can often be effectively shut out of the real decision making in 
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these schemes, and it can be difficult for them to assert their tino 
rangatiratanga. Although ‘co-governance’ in Canterbury appears to be an 
effective compromise of alleviating Treaty grievances, Ngāi Tahu will need to 
continue lobbying to break through the glass ceiling to claim genuine Iwi-led 




7 Ngāi Tūhoe and resource management power 
sharing schemes 
Ngāi Tūhoe are engaging in a new form of power sharing arrangement in 
resource management, changing the face of co-governance entirely. This 
chapter will outline how Ngāi Tūhoe have gained major regional governance 
power in Te Urewera through their Treaty Settlement, with a new co-
governance style arrangement. I will show how legal personality has been 
adapted to form a compromise that does not fully return Te Urewera to the 
Tūhoe people, but does hand over a level of control unprecedented since the 
signing of the Treaty of Waitangi. This is a consequence of the Crown using 
resource management power sharing arrangements as a political tool that the 
Crown retains ultimate control over.  I will show that this new arrangement 
goes beyond the previously defined boundaries of co-governance, and that this 
in turn reflects the issues of defining these arrangements discussed in Chapter 
5. I will subsequently outline that Tūhoe are using this new form of co-
governance to advance the influence of the tribe and the welfare of their iwi 
members.  
Ngāi Tūhoe (Tūhoe) are the mana whenua of the Te Urewera region. Often 
titled with the romanticism ‘People of the Mist’, a reference to the heavy fogs 
that often settle over the Urewera Ranges, Tūhoe are one of the most remote 
people in New Zealand. Te Urewera was one of the last parts of New Zealand 
to be mapped by colonial settlers, and it is prized for its wilderness areas and 
original flora and fauna. Tūhoe trace their descent to their ancestor, Tūhoe-
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Pōtiki, and are the sixth-largest iwi in New Zealand, with nearly 35,000 people 
identifying as Tūhoe in the 2013 census.303 The majority of Tūhoe do not live 
inside the Tūhoe rohe-pōtae (tribal boundary) as many have left home to seek 
work outside of the Urewera area. The iwi has arguably one of the most 
fractured and difficult historical relationships of any iwi with the Crown; the 
174 year period since the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi has seen warfare, 
famine, land thefts and illegal police raids all within the Tūhoe rohe-pōtae.  
The Tūhoe people are represented by the governance entity, Tūhoe Te Uru 
Taumatua (TTUT). TTUT has seven trustees who represent around 30 hapū 
and 40 mārae within the four Tūhoe regions of Ruatoki, Te Waimana, 
Waikaremoana and Ruatāhuna. Tūhoe do not split their financial wing and 
their development wing like Ngāi Tahu. Rather, the board oversees five key 
offices: the Office of the CEO, the Office of Anamata (futures), the Office of 
Ōnukurana Tūhoe (natural resources), the Office of Tūhoe Development (iwi 
development), and the Office of Whairawa (assets). The map below shows the 
Tūhoe rohe:304 
                                                 
303 Statistics NZ, above n 153. 




Figure 6: Ngāi Tūhoe area of interest. 
In June 2013, after many years of fraught relations with the Crown, Tūhoe 
signed an historic Treaty of Waitangi settlement. As well as addressing the 
long list of historic grievances perpetrated by the Crown against Tūhoe and 
apologising for these, this settlement offered the iwi substantial commercial 
redress and set up the framework for a new method of governance of the Te 
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Urewera area. For the first time in New Zealand’s history a national park has 
been given its own legal personality, much as a corporation is considered its 
own legal person.  I believe that this is a ground-breaking and innovative form 
of management that will drastically affect the way Te Urewera will now be 
governed. I make this conclusion as this new arrangement for Te Urewera is 
substantively similar to co-governance, but takes this concept beyond previous 
schemes and creates a new form of governance.  
This chapter will first outline some of the crucial historical events in the 
Tūhoe-Crown relationship in order to show how this relationship has always 
been influenced by land governance. Important events include the creation of 
Te Whitu Tekau, the Urewera District Native Reserve Act 1896, consolidation 
of Tūhoe lands, and the creation of Te Urewera National Park. I will show that 
the difficult Crown/Tūhoe relationship has directly led to the compromise that 
is legal personality for Te Urewera. I will then explain the governance and 
legal personality components of the Tūhoe Treaty Settlement, and how these 
combine to form the overall power sharing scheme in Te Urewera. The next 
section of this chapter will show the structures that are in place between Tūhoe 
and government agencies, how these fit into the governance of Te Urewera, 
and the vision that Tūhoe have for the future in Te Urewera. I contend that 
whereas Ngāi Tahu have some authority in various factors of regional 
governance, Tūhoe now have significant influence over the governance of 




7.1 Tūhoe and the Crown – Co-governance history 
Tūhoe and the Crown have shared a tumultuous history since the signing of 
the Treaty of Waitangi.  I believe that this difficult relationship has been 
directly responsible for the compromise created in the Tūhoe Treaty 
Settlement that is legal personality for Te Urewera and the governance regime 
that springs from this. Throughout post-Treaty history, Tūhoe have promoted 
the interests of their people through asserting their self-determination. This 
section will analyse how the Tūhoe/Crown relationship evolved in a post-
settlement era, how Tūhoe ‘mana motuhake’ or self-determination was 
continually affirmed by the tribe, and how this has led to the current co-
governance style relationship that the iwi share with the Crown. I believe that 
Tūhoe are using this contemporary co-governance-style regime as a tool to 
assert their self-determination and self-governance of Te Urewera, effectively 
taking the compromise that the Crown has been willing to offer and moulding 
it to fit the Tūhoe agenda.  
Early settler influence in Te Urewera, as opposed to the South Island and Ngāi 
Tahu, was relatively limited, due to the isolation of the area. Tūhoe 
predominately became followers of the prophet Te Kooti, rather than the 
Christianity that other Iwi embraced.
305
 Tūhoe were not present at the signing 
of the Treaty of Waitangi on 6 February 1840, nor would they ever sign the 
Treaty. While Crown representatives did take the Treaty to Whakātane in June 
1840, they did not take it into Te Urewera, and Tūhoe were unlikely to have 
                                                 
305 Judith Binney, Gillian Chaplin and Craig Wallace Mihaia: the prophet Rua Kenana and his community at 
Maungapo hatu (Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, N.Z, 2011). 
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seen the Treaty or have had the opportunity to consider it.
306
 The lack of a 
formal signed Treaty agreement between Tūhoe and the Crown contributed to 
the difficult relationship between the two parties.  
Despite their isolation, Tūhoe did engage in the politics of colonial New 
Zealand, and from an early stage were in opposition to the Crown, a theme 
which was to continue for generations. Their political stand led to confiscation 
of their lands, and this in turn fuelled their fire for self-determination and 
control over their rohe. At an 1857 hui, Tūhoe pledged their allegiance to the 
Kingitanga, despite having some reservations about the movement.
307
 Elsdon 
Best suggests the tribe did so to protect their land interests, a theme which 
recurs throughout the Tūhoe narrative.308 In 1864 Tūhoe were first involved in 
fighting in the Waikato, engaging in battles at Rangiaohia, Haerini and 
Orakau.
309
 This involvement had consequences. The New Zealand Settlements 
Act 1863 was a scheme implemented to punish Māori who were seen to be in 
rebellion against the Crown. The preamble reveals the racist attitudes of the 
time with reference to “the evil disposed persons of the Native race”. Section 2 
of the Act provided for land confiscations when the Governor in Council 
determined that ‘any Native tribe or section of a Tribe or any considerable 
number thereof’ had been in rebellion since 1 January 1863. 
                                                 
306 Anita Miles Te Urewera (Waitangi Tribunal, Wellington, N.Z., 1999) at 43. 
307 At 74-75. 
308 Elsdon Best Tuhoe (4th ed, Reed, Auckland, 1996) at 323 at 566. 
309 At 566. 
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The Settlements Act was swiftly utilised to compensate large tracts of Tūhoe 
lands as a punishment for their involvement in the Waikato Wars, and for their 
alleged involvement in the murder of a missionary.
310
 This land included the 
most fertile land suitable for agriculture, and the confiscations are understood 
to have been unfair.
311
 Best notes that in 1871, following confiscation and 
raids by colonial forces, Tūhoe resolved to have nothing to do with Europeans. 
They set up a carved post on the confiscation boundary at Ruatoki – hai arai i 
te pākehā me āna mahi – to keep off the white man and his works.312 Later 
colonial Compensation Courts established to evaluate the confiscation process 
failed to adequately compensate the tribe for their unfairly taken lands. The 
confiscation boundary is still there today, and is an active reminder of the 
difficult relationship between Tūhoe and the Crown with regards to Tūhoe 
lands. I believe that confiscation can be seen to be one of the root influences 
on Tūhoe’s continual assertion of self-governance of Te Urewera.  
Following the confiscation of Tūhoe’s best land, the relationship between Te 
Urewera iwi and the government grew frostier, and Tūhoe continued to seek 
their own self-determination in their rohe. When the prophet and rebel Te 
Kooti took shelter in Te Urewera to escape Crown forces, the Crown 
responded by engaging in scorched earth tactics to flush him out.
313
 Four raids 
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311 Best, above n 308 at 665. 
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were instigated by the Crown to catch Te Kooti, however all four raids failed. 
The troops did succeed in wiping out kāinga (food stores), crops, livestock, 
dwellings, and shelter, leaving many Tūhoe to starve and die from disease and 
suffer from lack of shelter.
314
 A peace was eventually negotiated in exchange 
for Tūhoe giving up Te Kooti to the Crown.315 The march of Crown forces 
against Tūhoe people has remained an historical bone of contention, and has 
contributed to their ongoing desire to regain self-governance over Te Urewera.  
Tūhoe are a tribe that has continually grappled with the Crown for governance 
and control of their own lands. The first effort to establish collective land 
governance in Te Urewera occurred in 1872-1878, with the creation of Te 
Whitu Tekau, or Union of Seventy. Seventy chiefs formed an alliance to 
present a united front against the colonial government’s pursuit of their land. 
The government was not shy in its attempts to ‘open-up’ Te Urewera; land 
sales were engaged in all around the Te Urewera area in order to isolate the 
people as much as possible. I believe that establishing Te Whitu Tekau was a 
significant landmark in the history of post-colonial Te Urewera governance as 
it was the first attempt at pan- Tūhoe collaborative governance, rather than the 
traditional hapū-governed model.316 The Crown avoided any formal 
recognition of the group, although initially respected the opposition of the 
                                                 
314 Judith Binney Encircled lands: Te Urewera, 1820-1921 (Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, N.Z, 2009) at 
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operation. 
316 Binney, above n 314 at 216. 
160 
 
group to any road building within Te Urewera boundaries.
317
 However, while 
Te Whitu Tekau attempted to provide a consolidated Tūhoe voice, not all rules 
laid down by the group were unanimously supported by all hapū.318 The 
underlying issue was “a tense dynamic between the interests of the tribe, as 
advocated by Te Whitu Tekau and the authority that hapū or chiefs had 
traditionally exercised over their own land and people”.319 I consider that in 
essence, Te Whitu Tekau represented a nascent governance board. However, 
the group was affected by its lack of mandate, and eventually Te Whitu Tekau 
became redundant in the politics of Urewera land. Nonetheless, I contend that 
Te Whitu Tekau is a good example of the continual Tūhoe assertion of self-
governance over their land.  
Another significant example of early co-governance emerged in 1896 in the 
Urewera District Native Reserve Act 1896 (UDNRA). I believe that this 
arrangement is the most significant early example of Tūhoe using resource 
management power sharing techniques to promote the interests of their people. 
It is the earliest recorded co-governance style arrangement in New Zealand. 
UDNRA was important in solidifying the relationship between Tūhoe and the 
Crown and its constitutional importance has been recognised to such a degree 
that there has been a suggestion that the Crown-Tūhoe relationship should, in 
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161 
 
fact, be grounded in this agreement rather than in the Treaty of Waitangi.
320
 
Despite this suggestion arguably having some merit, a Treaty of Waitangi 
Settlement has been signed between the tribe and the Crown on the basis of the 
Treaty.  
The UDNRA emerged as a result of ongoing discussion between Tūhoe and 
the government regarding land purchases and the ‘opening-up’ of Te Urewera 
lands for settler purchase. Tūhoe were extremely reluctant to sell land and 
wished to continue self-governance of their land, but the government began to 
assert more and more pressure on the iwi to sell. In 1894, Premier Richard 
Seddon and the member for Eastern Māori, James Carroll, visited Te 
Urewera.
321
 The result of these meetings was the 1895 Te Urewera compact, 
comprising of six core ideals:
322
 
 Te Urewera would be established as an inalienable reserve to 
provide permanent protection for its people, their lands, 
forests, birds, taonga, and their customs and way of life 
 The Native Land Court would be excluded from the reserve 
and an alternative process developed to create Crown-derived 
land titles 
 Land titles would be awarded at a hapū level, in a form that 
facilitated hapū and tribal control 
                                                 
320 Hannah Blumhardt “Multi-textualism, 'treaty hegemony' and the Waitangi Tribunal: making sense of 19th 
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 The peoples of Te Urewera acknowledged the Queen and the 
Government and would obey the law 
 The government would protect the people and promote their 
welfare in all matters, and provide a package of social and 
economic assistance; and 
 Development should occur in the reserve, in a manner in 
keeping with the primary nature of the reserve (including 
roads, tourism, farming and gold mining). 
This compact formed the basis of an early co-governance-style resource 
management power sharing arrangement, and was remarkably cooperative 
considering relations between both parties had never been particularly warm. 
During these negotiations, Seddon stated to the iwi of Te Urewera “you 
acknowledge that the Queen’s mana is over all, and that you will honour and 
obey Her laws”.323 As Judith Binney notes, “Seddon’s statement recognised 
that the request for internal autonomy was neither separatist nor disloyal. This 
was a significant legal advance”. I contend that Seddon was willing to 
recognise an ideology that contemporary governments have struggled with. 
The 1895 compact formed the basis for the 1896 UDNRA. The practical 
governance arrangements established by the UDNRA provided for the 
establishment of the Urewera Commission, a body of eight whose role was to 
establish land ownership.
324
 Initially, five of these eight were ‘natives’; the 
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other three were Percy Smith, Elsdon Best and Judge Butler.
325
 The 
Commissioners were to determine on the basis of hapū boundaries the 
ownership of blocks, the ownership share of each family who had claim to that 
block, and the individual shares due to each member of that family. In 
addition, a General Committee was established to make decisions about local 
governance and alienation of land to the Crown.
326
 The process to determine 
land titles was an extremely long and drawn out process, plagued by appeals. 
The Chair of the Commission was always European, and Tūhoe’s role was 
often limited, meaning claimant communities were frequently ignored.
327
 I 
consider that while, on face value, the arrangement appeared to be a 
cooperative and effective method of involving the Tūhoe community in land 
governance, in reality the UDNRA turned into another colonial tool for 
alienating land from tangata whenua. Consequently, the arrangement proved to 




I contend that in order to evaluate the present-day co-governance arrangement 
it is important to remember these historical precedents and to observe how the 
Crown has used these types of schemes to further its own end. Tūhoe have 
long sought to define their own governance structures, and to determine the 
future of their own people. UDNRA is the most significant early example of 
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this self-determination in action, although ultimately, for Tūhoe, the UDNRA 
represents failed promises.
329
 Due to the earlier confiscation of lands, famine 
hit at the same time UDNRA Commission inquiries were occurring. The 
population of Tūhoe was reduced by one-quarter between 1896-1901 (child 
and infant mortality also increased during this time).
330
 The people of Te 
Urewera were at their most vulnerable during the period in which UDNRA 
was active, and shortly afterwards, the iwi was invaded with the Rua Kenana 
raids of 1916.
331
 This was a delicate time for the iwi, but their quest for self-
determination was clear at this point. 
Following the disestablishment of UDNRA, the Crown and Tūhoe continued 
to compete for control and governance of Te Urewera lands. The Urewera 
Consolidation Scheme of the 1920s saw Tūhoe lose the majority of their rohe. 
The Crown’s consolidation scheme took place in 1922-1924, and by the end of 
consolidation, the Crown had awarded itself 482, 000 acres in a single title.
332
 
This left Tūhoe with only 14% of the original Urewera Reserve fragmented 
into over 150 titles, which was mostly land unsuitable for any form of 
settlement or economic development. The Crown then sought to sell its land, 
but found the rugged Urewera land unattractive to buyers and failed to make a 
single sale. 
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The difficult nature of the Crown/Tūhoe relationship continued throughout the 
20
th
 Century when the Crown sought to gain Lake Waikaremoana and the 
surrounding block of land. This was not done without protest, the Deed of 
Settlement reports that “The Crown’s acquisition of the Waikaremoana block 
was the most disputed aspect of the Urewera Consolidation Scheme”.333 The 
lake is of a high importance to Tūhoe and other iwi including Ngāti Ruapani, 
for reasons that are both cultural and economic. The Crown saw the lake as a 
potential hydro power resource, and sought to gain title through a series of 
mechanisms including court action. This process was drawn out, and the 
Crown never gained full title, instead, it was granted a long-term lease to the 
lakebed under Lake Waikaremoana Act 1971. By this point the Crown had 
already included Lake Waikaremoana in the Urewera National Park, without 
the consent of Tūhoe.334  
Upon gaining the Waikaremoana lease, the Crown constructed roads, a 
National Park headquarters, a hotel and a motor camp on the lakebed, without 
the consent of the land’s owners.335 Sewerage flow polluted tapu waters, much 
to the distress of the iwi. While Tūhoe landowners have managed to hold the 
title to the lake, the Crown has actively pursued removing it from them, and 
has treated the owners with disrespect. I consider that this shows how the 
Crown/Tūhoe relationship remained difficult from the 19th to the 20th Century, 
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and that this relationship helps explain the continual quest for Tūhoe to assert 
their self-determination and self-governance of Te Urewera.  
The creation of the Urewera National Park is another example of poor 
treatment by the Crown of Tūhoe and their lands. When the Crown could not 
sell the land it had acquired under the consolidation scheme, it did not return 
the land to the original owners. Instead, it followed a pattern of control over 
the Urewera natural resources that it had established as early as the 1910s with 
logging restrictions in the area, and turned the land into a National Park.
336
 
This was done without consultation with Tūhoe, and legislation was enacted to 
establish the Park in 1954. The Park included all of the now-Crown owned 
consolidated lands, Lake Waikaremoana, and other lands. While the Park did 
not include the remaining Tūhoe lands, it surrounded them, and locked them in 
an enclave. The rules of the Park did not recognise the iwi’s special 
relationship with the area, and restricted Tūhoe customary usage of Te 
Urewera.
337
 It reduced what little economic benefit of tribal land that the iwi 
had left into nearly nothing. Tūhoe suffered from the detrimental effects of the 
establishment of the Park, and most people left their rohe to look for work.
338
 
The current unemployment rate in Te Urewera is more than four times greater 
than the rest of the country.  I believe that this is a direct result of the 
acquisition of their land by the Crown and the restrictions placed on what was 
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left. It is clear that Crown actions have severely affected Tūhoe’s self-
determination and governance of their lands. 
Tūhoe’s continual pursuit of Te Urewera governance rights has been in the 
spotlight in recent times with the controversial 2007 ‘Anti-Terror Raids’ in Te 
Urewera. Police raided the Urewera town of Rūātoki and the nearby town of 
Whakatāne, arresting activist Tame Iti, on the accusation he had been running 
terrorist training camps “and was planning a guerrilla war to establish an 
independent state on traditional Tūhoe land”. 339  Others were also arrested on 
terrorism-related charges. Charges under the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 
were thrown out by the Solicitor-General, and lengthy court action established 
that police evidence was obtained illegally.
340
 The case against the alleged 
suspects was labelled a “house of cards”.341 Eventually, only four convictions 
were handed down, for firearms charges.
342
 A large amount of distress was felt 
by Tūhoe and other members of the community, who felt they had been 
unfairly targeted and badly treated during the raids.
343
 When legislation was 
passed enacting the Tūhoe Treaty Settlement in 2014, the Commissioner for 
Police, Mike Bush, apologised to the iwi for the raids.
344
 He specifically 
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apologised for the damage to the mana of the tribe. Whilst an official apology 
has been made, the Raids are an example of the tumultuous nature of the 
Crown-Tūhoe relationship regarding the governance of land.  
During the late 2000s the negotiations for a Treaty Settlement between Tūhoe 
and the Crown took place. For Tūhoe, there were three crucial elements that 
had to form any Settlement: the return of the Park; mana motuhake, and a 
decent quantum of settlement.
345
 The negotiations were stalled when Prime 
Minister John Key announced that vesting the title of the Park in Tūhoe would 
never happen.
346
 The iwi thought this was a breach of good faith, and 
negotiations were delayed. This refusal to grant Tūhoe full ownership of Te 
Urewera led to the negotiation team thinking more laterally about how to grant 
Tūhoe their request while not fully returning the title to Te Urewera. I believe 
that the unique governance arrangement in Te Urewera has been created as a 
compromise to deal with the ownership of Te Urewera. I think that this 
directly reflects the conflicted nature of the Crown and Tūhoe’s struggle for 
control in the area. This compromise suggests that the amount of authority that 
the Crown has been willing to cede in Treaty Settlements has shifted, and it is 
now significantly more than it was in the 1990s. I consider that this is also 
reflective of the isolated nature of Te Urewera and the fact the very few other 
parties have an interest in the area. 
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I believe that the fraught history of the Crown-Tūhoe relationship has provided 
the basis for the contemporary co-governance style arrangement in Te 
Urewera. Throughout the past 170 years, Tūhoe have continued to assert their 
mana motuhake, or self-determination. Their early attempts to protect their 
land were clear in the creation of Te Whitu Tekau, although that collective 
ultimately failed. An early co-governance arrangement was established by the 
Urewera District Native Reserve Act 1896. This appeared, on face value, to be 
a genuine attempt to allow the tribe to determine their own affairs with regards 
to their land. However, the UDNRA was quickly turned into a tool by the 
Crown to acquire more of the Urewera lands.  
Tūhoe were side-lined in Te Urewera governance in the 20th Century. The 
Urewera Consolidation Scheme, the active pursuit of Lake Waikaremoana by 
the Crown, and the creation of the Urewera National Park all ignored mana 
whenua, and as a result, the iwi were detrimentally affected. The Crown has a 
poor record of treating Tūhoe well, right into the 21st Century. Tūhoe have 
remained passionate about self-governance and have retained a burning desire 
for mana motuhake.
347
 I therefore conclude that the Tūhoe Treaty Settlement 
is ultimately a tool to achieve the goal of self-determination and governance of 
Te Urewera that the tribe has been working towards for many generations. 
7.2 The Tūhoe Treaty Settlement 
The Tūhoe Treaty Settlement sets out the framework for Tūhoe’s new co-
governance arrangement. On 4 June 2013, the Deed of Settlement of Historical 
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Claims was signed between Tūhoe and the Crown. I consider that the 
Settlement is notable for several reasons, including the Crown-Tūhoe 
relationship and the difficult negotiation period, but of note, I contend that it 
creates a whole new system of co-governance for the Te Urewera region. I 
believe that this new form of resource management power sharing 
arrangement goes beyond current co-governance arrangements discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 6, and forms a new kind of co-governance that is unlike any 
current arrangement in New Zealand. It can be seen that this arrangement has 
emerged from the struggle between the Crown and Tūhoe for control over the 
Te Urewera region. This section will show how the Treaty Settlement gives 
the iwi back its self-determination rights and allows them unparalleled control 
over Te Urewera.  
The Tūhoe Settlement and governance of Te Urewera have been legislated for 
in two separate acts, the Tūhoe Claims Settlement Act 2014 and Te Urewera 
Act 2014. These two Acts went through the parliamentary process as one Bill, 
and the Māori Affairs Select Committee reported back on the one Bill. This 
section addresses the Te Urewera Act and the creation of legal personality, as 
this legal fiction creates the basis for the governance arrangement. 
7.2.1 Legal Personality for Te Urewera 
A pillar of the Tūhoe Treaty settlement is the establishment of legal 
personality for Te Urewera. I contend that this arrangement was created to 
deal with the difficult ownership issue of Te Urewera and was a compromise 
for both sides, reflecting the fact that the Crown uses these types of 
arrangements as a political vessel to devolve as much or as little power to iwi 
as it wishes. The Settlement creates a form of ‘non-ownership’ for Te 
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Urewera, meaning it will own itself, rather than be owned by either Tūhoe or 
the Crown. It gives the area its own legal personality and removes the National 
Park status for Te Urewera, a first for New Zealand.
348
 The creation of legal 
personality has required the establishment of a new governance entity, and this 
arrangement has allowed Tūhoe to regain control over their rohe. I believe that 
this whole arrangement is a compromise that reflects the undefined boundaries 
of resource management power sharing schemes as discussed in Chapter 5. 
Legal personality for a non-human has been discussed in Chapter 5, where it 
was concluded that some configuration of legal person is required to form a 
partner in an effective co-governance scheme with the Crown. The 
incorporation of legal personality for a natural object into the Tūhoe 
Settlement came from a variety of sources, and can be traced back to the early 
writings of Sir John Salmond on legal fictions. Dr John Wood, Chief Crown 
Negotiator for both the Whanganui River and Tūhoe settlements,349 has 
highlighted Salmond’s work on legal fictions as the starting point for thinking 
about legal identity for Te Urewera
350
. The Crown negotiation team also 
looked at work conducted in the United States in the 20
th
 Century on granting 
legal personality to natural objects.
351
 The negotiation team then consulted 
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various members of the legal community to ask if the concept could be applied 
to New Zealand law, receiving an affirmative response, with qualifiers that 
such action must be efficacious and in the interests of the whole country.
352
 I 
consider that this reflects the fact that this co-governance arrangement was 
formed as an effective compromise. It was a way for the Crown to devolve 
some power back to Tūhoe without giving the tribe full ownership of Te 
Urewera, as a complete transfer of fee simple ownership of Te Urewera to 
Tūhoe was ruled out by the National-led Government for political reasons.353  
Granting legal personality to Te Urewera is a unique bargain. Instead of a 
direct handover of the fee simple title to Tūhoe, the Crown placed Te Urewera 
“beyond ownership”, similar to the precedent set by the Marine and Coastal 
Act 2011, expanded upon further in this chapter. The concept of legal 
personality for Te Urewera was work-shopped with bureaucrats, politicians 
and academic leaders; later, stakeholder groups including mountaineers, 
deerstalkers and fishermen were consulted in stakeholder summits held by 
Tūhoe. To the surprise of the Crown negotiation team, it was found that there 
was broad public stakeholder and political support of this concept.
354
 New 
Zealand is the first nation in the world to give legal personality to a natural 
object, and this has been done for the purposes of indigenous reconciliation, 
rather than for environmental reasons. I consider that for co-governance to be 
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an effective and equal power sharing model that the formation of such a legal 
person is required.  
In order to understand how this approach has been developed and how it might 
be applied in New Zealand, it is necessary to examine the legislation leading 
up to the Tūhoe settlement legislation, and then consider the applicability of 
the work of United States academic, Christopher Stone.
355
 
7.2.2 Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011 
One of the stepping stones for the introduction of legal personality for Te 
Urewera and consequently the co-governance style regime that came with this 
arrangement was the Marine and Coastal (Takutai Moana) Act 2011 (Marine 
and Coastal Act). This Act provided the concept of ‘non-ownership’ on which 
the Te Urewera legal personality is built. The Marine and Coastal Act was 
introduced into New Zealand legislation to repeal the controversial Foreshore 
and Seabed Act 2004. The Foreshore and Seabed legislation was enacted by 
the Clark Labour Government as a response to the decision handed down by 
the Court of Appeal in AG v Ngāti Apa [2003] 3 NZLR 643. Ngāti Apa was 
heard to decide whether the Māori Land Court had jurisdiction to consider 
whether the foreshore and seabed of the Marlborough Sounds was Māori 
customary land. The ruling granted the right to pursue such an interest in the 
Māori Land Court, and did not declare it impossible that such an interest 
existed.  
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The ownership of New Zealand’s foreshore and seabed then became a political 
issue.
356
  Parliament enacted the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 to vest the 
ownership of the foreshore and seabed in the Crown. After an urgent inquiry, 
the Waitangi Tribunal produced a report on the matter that was scathing of the 
government’s actions.357 The Tribunal stated that the Crown had breached 
Article Two of the Treaty of Waitangi twice over with the Act, and violated 
the Rule of Law by taking away the right of Māori to go to the High Court and 
Māori Land Court to seek their property rights.358The legislation also received 
international condemnation with the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 




The Marine and Coastal Act 2011 eventually repealed the Foreshore and 
Seabed Act. This Act introduced the concept of non-ownership that has 
formed the basis of the legal personality for Te Urewera. The 2011 Act was 
introduced by the National Government as a method of “balancing the 
interests of all New Zealanders in the marine and coastal area” and dealing 
with the ownership question of the foreshore and seabed.
360
 Instead of vesting 
the title of the foreshore and seabed in either the Crown or Māori, s 11 of the 
Act instead placed it beyond ownership. This was opposed by some 
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commentators, including former Member of Parliament and practising lawyer 
Stephen Franks, who stated in his submission to the Select Committee that:
361
 
The political pretence of non-ownership will disfigure our law… 
It is a legal nonsense to declare something incapable of 
ownership. Ownership is a description, not a status. Parliament is 
capable of declaring that there shall be no fee simple title, or 
leasehold title or other legally defined status, but ownership is a 
term that describes in summary the nature of a property right – 
the result of a relationship determined by a bundle of rights and 
powers in relation to land (or other assets). Whether land is 
owned or not is determined by those rights, not a political 
declaration dressed up as law.  
Despite Frank’s concerns that non-ownership creates a legal nonsense, the 
Marine and Coastal Act passed, and was the first piece of legislation to 
introduce this concept into New Zealand law. The concept of non-ownership 
forms a significant part of the subseqeunt Tūhoe Treaty Settlement 
compromise that is legal personality of Te Urewera. The concept that a piece 
of land is beyond ownership was further developed by the Whanganui River 
and Tūhoe Settlements. The Marine and Coastal Act is important as the 
precedent that has allowed non-ownership of Te Urewera. 
7.2.3 The Whanganui River 
Going beyond non-ownership, the concept of giving a natural object legal 
identity first entered New Zealand statutory consciousness in the form of an 
agreement between Whanganui River Iwi and the Crown. This occurred 
                                                 




shortly before the Tūhoe settlement was enacted. This arrangement mirrors 
the new Tūhoe governance arrangement in some aspects, and shows how 
the concept of legal personality for natural objects has been applied in 
another area of New Zealand.  
The Whanganui River is New Zealand’s longest navigable river, and is 
considered a national treasure. It is particularly important for the 
Whanganui River iwi who see themselves as belonging to the river, rather 
than the river belonging to them, this is manifested in the whakataukī “Ko 
au te Awa, ko te Awa ko au”. Whanganui River Iwi have been battling with 
the Crown to have their interests recognised from as early as 1873.
362
A 
recently signed Deed of Settlement has signalled that legal status is to be 
granted to the Whanganui River in the form of the official title ‘Te Awa 
Tupua’.  
 A 2011 Record of Understanding began the process of recognising legal 
personality for the river and this was followed by a 2012 preliminary 
agreement. A ratification document was sent out to Whanganui River iwi 
members for voting between 13 June and 11 July 2014, and the Deed of 
Settlement was signed on 5 August 2014.
363
 The Deed of Settlement is split 
into two documents, Te Mana o Te Awa Tupua (which outlines the new Te 
Awa Tupua governance arrangements for the river), and Te Mana o Te Iwi o 
Whanganui. At the time of writing, the Settlement legislation has not passed 
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through the Parliamentary process yet, however, the signing of the Deed 
recognises the end of the negotiation period. As a result of this Treaty 
settlement, the Whanganui River is to be given its own legal identity, and is to 
be placed outside of the ownership of the Crown and iwi, in a non-ownership 
status much like that which was created by the Marine and Coastal Act. The 
bed of the river is vested in the entity known as Te Awa Tupua, meaning the 
river owns itself. The Crown has chosen to not return full ownership of the 
river to the iwi. Ownership of the river was a hotly contested issue in 
2010/2011, before the Supreme Court decision to place ownership of the water 
beyond iwi in Paki.
364
 Nonetheless, this arrangement has still placed the 
resource beyond Crown ownership. I consider that this suggests that it may 
become a more frequent method that the Crown utilises to address contested 
ownership issues. 
Te Mana o Te Awa Tupua acknowledges the status of the river as:
365
  
Te Awa Tupua is an indivisible and living whole comprising the 
Whanganui River from the mountains to the sea, incorporating its 
tributaries and all its physical and metaphysical elements. 
Te Mana o Te Awa Tupua sets out at 2.2-2.3 that Te Awa Tupua is a legal 
person, with the rights, powers, duties and liabilities of a legal person. Of note, 
the document specifically recognises the interconnection between the iwi and 
hapū of the Whanganui River, and Te Awa Tupua.366 I believe that this 
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connection shows an increased mainstream legal recognition of the tikanga 
Māori concepts discussed in Chapter 5. I contend that such an inclusion 
suggests that future co-governance arrangements may also involve such 
recognition of the interconnection of iwi and their rohe.  
The Whanganui River governance structure is different from the Te Urewera 
structure in that it includes two different levels of governance. The top level of 
co-governance for Te Awa Tupua will be a body called Te Pou Tupua, this 
will be a human face to act in the name of Te Awa Tupua.
367
 This governance 
body must act in the interests of Te Awa Tupua, and is designated with 
functions that include the promotion and protection of the health and 
wellbeing of Te Awa Tupua. It is a role to be exercised jointly by one person 
nominated by Whanganui River iwi, and one person to be nominated by the 
Crown. I believe that this arrangement can be considered a form of co-
governance, but does not take the form of a bilateral co-governance board.
368
 
Sitting below Te Pou Tupua will be a second layer of governance. This 
structure will be called Te Kōpuka, and will comprise of a range of seventeen 
stakeholders including iwi, local and central government, commercial and 
recreational users and environmental groups.
369
 This group will perform the 
strategy function of Te Awa Tupua, and is tasked with developing and 
approving strategy to advance the environmental, social, cultural and 
economic health and wellbeing of Te Awa Tupua. I contend that as the 
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membership of the group will include representatives from stakeholders 
including Genesis Energy and Fish and Game, it is not a true iwi-Crown co-
governance scheme. I believe that rather it is something more akin to a multi 
party governance arrangement. Such a scheme has parallels to the Canterbury 
Water Management Strategy discussed in Chapter 6, which is also a multi-
party governance arrangement. I think that the unique nature of this 
arrangement reflects the fact that the Crown uses co-governance as a useful 
political tool to devolve as much or as little political authority as it sees fit. 
The past few years have seen significant political turmoil over the ownership 
of freshwater resources in New Zealand. Whanganui River iwi have been 
closely involved in this debate. I believe it is noteworthy, then, that the 
preliminary agreement specifically provides that the recognition of Te Awa 
Tupua as a legal entity does not, in itself, create any legal ownership in the 
Whanganui River or its waters.
370
 I consider that this reflects the traditional 
political tension between the Crown and Iwi over the ownership and control of 
resources, a tension that in essence a co-governance arrangement is supposed 
to overcome. I also note that this co-governance style compromise may 
possibly create more challenges than a straight handover of control; with an 
entity as vast as the Whanganui River there will no doubt be challenges, such 
as where the balance of power actually lies, and how the different Whanganui 
Iwi work together in practice.  
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The Whanganui River arrangement provides an example similar to the new 
Tūhoe governance scheme that has been introduced. The Whanganui 
arrangement does not provide iwi with as much governance control as Tūhoe 
have over Te Urewera, due to the second tier of community collaborative 
governance that exists in the Whanganui scheme. I conclude that the existence 
of two such schemes in a short amount of time suggests that legal personality 
for natural areas may well be a crucial part of future co-governance 
arrangements.   
7.2.4 Christopher Stone’s ‘Should Trees Have Standing’ 
In order to understand how legal personality for a natural object is practicable 
in New Zealand, and how the governance regime that is introduced by such a 
legal personality may work in Te Urewera, it is useful to examine the work of 
Christopher Stone, the leading theorist in this area. In 1972 Stone introduced a 
revolutionary idea into environmental legal theory. His essay ‘Should Trees 
Have Standing?’ mooted the concept that legal personality should be given to 
natural objects as a method of environmental protection.  
Stone’s theory, introduced to a United States (US) legal system that places 
tortious liability on such a commercial pedestal, suggests that giving natural 
objects legal status, and thus the right to sue in a civil suit, would provide a 
form of environmental protection. Whereas an ordinary citizen cannot sue on 
behalf of a natural object for damage inflicted by polluters, businesses and 
governments, a specially appointed guardian could. In short, Mother Nature 
herself could be the plaintiff in a suit for damages.  
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This theory arose by way of a case heard before the Supreme Court of the 
United States under the name of Sierra Club v Morton.
371
 In the 1971 case the 
Sierra Club, an environmental lobby group, brought court action on behalf of 
the Mineral King Valley wilderness area in California’s Sierra Nevada 
Mountains. Walt Disney Enterprises, Inc had been granted a permit to develop 
this area into a $35 million leisure and recreational complex, and the Sierra 
Club brought a suit for an injunction, maintaining that “the project would 
adversely affect the area’s aesthetic and ecological balance”.372 An earlier 
Appeal Court judgment had reasoned that the Sierra Club did not have 
standing, as they were not an aggrieved party, and Stone responded to this by 
way of a question: why not let the Sierra Club be characterised as the lawyer 




The first iteration of Stone’s paper was published before the case was heard by 
the Supreme Court. Despite the Supreme Court majority judgment against the 
Sierra Club, Douglas J, in his dissent, warmly endorsed ‘Should Trees Have 
Standing?’. He noted, “Contemporary public concern for protecting nature’s 
ecological equilibrium should lead to the conferral of standing upon 
environmental objects to sue for their own preservation”.374 This dictum 
supported the concept of legal personality for natural objects. Praise for the 
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idea reached the US Senate floor, ‘Should Trees Have Standing?’ was 
reprinted in the ‘Congressional Record’ and it received approval from 
lawmakers, journalists, and jurists.
375
 From here, the concept of giving natural 
objects legal personality entered the consciousness of the US legal system.  
While initially the idea of giving natural objects legal personality may seem 
radical and unworkable, legal personality has been applied to other such 
entities. Corporations have long been granted personality, and lawyers can act 
on behalf of a corporation’s interests, despite such a concept being “jarring for 
early jurists”.376 Similarly, trusts, ships, nation-states and foetuses have all 
been accorded legal status within the court system. Why then, should 
extending legal personality to environmental objects or areas not be similarly 
feasible? 
Stone gives three core reasons as to why giving natural objects legal 
personality would be an effective method of protection of these resources. 
First, the third party (such as the Sierra Club, or in a New Zealand scenario, 
perhaps an iwi organisation) would act as a guardian to speak on behalf of the 
natural entity rather than in the interests of that third party.
377
 Secondly, the 
focus would be on the actual effect of the damage on the natural area, rather 
than any loss suffered by a third party. Finally, the remedies would focus on 
directly restoring the natural entity to its original, undamaged state rather than 
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a focus on a third party’s estimated economic loss.378 As a hypothetical 
example of how Stone’s theory may be applied in a New Zealand context, take 
this scenario: 
Farmer A pollutes the Rangitata River with an illegal discharge of 
dairy effluent. The damage to the river is estimated at $1,000,000. 
Farmer B is affected by the discharge by $200,000 due to a loss 
of stock. Currently, the only entity that can sue is Farmer B, who, 
if he wins the suit, will pocket the $200,000 and use it to offset 
his losses, rather than use it to restore the Rangitata to its original 
condition. The Rangitata remains damaged to the tune of 
$1,000,000. If Stone’s theory was applied, a third party such as 
Ngāi Tahu, or Fish and Game, could sue on behalf of the 
Rangitata. If they were successful, the $1,000,000 awarded as 
remedy could be used for riparian repair and fish restocking, and 
the river could be returned to its original condition.379 
Despite an initially positive response, Stone’s theory has in fact had limited 
application in the US. The US court system has seen a variety of cases 
attempting to apply the theory, on behalf of a wide range of plaintiffs, but with 
limited success. One such group of cases has named endangered species as 
plaintiffs, although never as the sole plaintiff.
380
 However, in these cases, the 
species’ legal standing on its merits has not been considered by the court and 
“exclusive reliance on animal plaintiffs has proved unrewarding”.381 Another 
group of cases has named natural objects such as rivers as co-plaintiffs, but as 
natural areas cannot cover the costs of litigation, non-human plaintiffs have 
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been rare in the US system. Therefore, despite its promise, ‘Should Trees 
Have Standing?’ has had minor impact on the global stage. I conclude that one 
of the lessons that can be learnt from the failure of Stone’s theory to take hold 
is that funding for a Stone-esque guardian is necessary. However, this failing 
will not exist in the Te Urewera setting, as the quantum from the Tūhoe 
settlement will be used to fund the governance board that acts as a guardian.   
In New Zealand, Stone’s theory was considered and endorsed by James Morris 
and Jacinta Ruru in their 2010 paper ‘Giving Voice to Rivers: Legal 
Personality As A Vehicle For Recognising Indigenous Peoples’ Relationships 
to Water?’.382 The paper argues that the application of Stone’s theory to New 
Zealand’s river network “would create an exciting link between the Māori 
legal system and the state legal system”. Morris and Ruru claim that giving a 
river its own standing would recognise the mana and mauri of the river, and 
would align the dominant western legal system with tikanga Māori. I am in 
agreement with Morris and Ruru, and contend that the introduction of legal 
personality for natural areas into New Zealand’s law is therefore a positive 
recognition of the kinds of tikanga concepts discussed in Chapter 5.  
I consider it is particularly important in this context to discuss the concept of 
Kaitiakitanga as discussed in Chapter 5. A Stone-esque guardian acting on 
behalf of a natural object could do so in the role of kaitiaki. Morris and Ruru 
argue that applying Stone’s theory to New Zealand’s rivers would 
acknowledge the ancestral role that Māori see natural objects as taking, as well 
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as recognising the holistic nature of a river.
383
 This could potentially see a 
“move away from the western legal notion of fragmenting a river on the basis 
of its bed, flowing water, and banks”.384 Morris and Ruru conclude that 
Stone’s theory of granting legal status to natural objects has the potential to be 
beneficial in the context of Treaty negotiations. I believe it is possible that 
Morris and Ruru planted the seed for this concept to take root.  
Christopher Stone’s theory of granting legal personality to natural areas and 
objects helps to explain how such a concept can be applied in New Zealand. 
His idea of a guardian to act on behalf of a natural area fits well with the 
tikanga concept of kaitiakitanga. It is not clear whether his theory was 
specifically applied by negotiators in the Te Urewera context, but his theory 
helps one to understand how legal personality of a natural area for Te Urewera 
might operate. I contend that legal personality for Te Urewera recognises the 
inherent mana of the area, and has allowed Tūhoe to gain crucial governance 
power in the rohe.  
7.2.5 Te Urewera 
The continual desire for Tūhoe self-determination and the consistent demands 
of the tribe that Te Urewera be returned to them has seen the creation of Te 
Urewera as a legal identity. I believe that this is a compromise signalling how 
far the Crown was prepared to relinquish authority in the area, reflecting the 
fact that the Crown utilises resource management power sharing arrangements 
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to suit its own political purposes. Consequently, this has led to a new form of 
governance regime which goes beyond co-governance and creates a new form 
of governance different from those discussed in Chapter 5. With a full return 
of the former National Park off the table, the Crown required some other form 
of negotiation compromise. This came in the form of granting Te Urewera 
legal personality and putting it ‘beyond ownership’. Following on from the 
Marine and Coastal Act’s creation of ‘non-ownership’ and the granting of 
legal personality to the Whanganui River, the Tūhoe Treaty Settlement 
legislation has granted legal personality to Te Urewera and implemented 
Stone’s theory of legal personality for a natural object.  
The relevant section of the Te Urewera Act 2014 is: 
Section 11 – Te Urewera declared to be legal entity 
(1) Te Urewera is a legal entity, and has all the rights, powers, 
duties, and liabilities of a legal person. 
(2) However,— 
(a) the rights, powers, and duties of Te Urewera must be 
exercised and performed on behalf of, and in the name of, Te 
Urewera— 
(i) by Te Urewera Board; and 
(ii) in the manner provided for in this Act; and 
(b) the liabilities are the responsibility of Te Urewera Board, 
except as provided for in section 96. 
This section is followed by s 12, which vests all Crown-owned land, including 
conservation land, reserve land and land that was formerly National Park land, 
187 
 
in the entity that is now known as Te Urewera. Section 13 declares such land 
to be inalienable, and s 111 declares that land cannot be removed from Te 
Urewera except by an Act of Parliament. Land, including private land, can be 
added to Te Urewera under ss 104-106.  
The Explanatory Note to the Te Urewera-Tūhoe Bill 2013 gives some 
guidance as to the interpretation of s 11, stating: 
The purpose and principles of Parts 5 to 7 provide that Te 
Urewera will be preserved for its cultural, historic, and natural 
values, as well as for the use and enjoyment of the public. … The 
Bill recognises the mana and intrinsic values of Te Urewera by 
putting it beyond human ownership. It establishes a legal identity 
for Te Urewera, and vests the current national park land in that 
legal identity. Te Urewera will effectively own itself, in 
perpetuity. Legal identity is the vehicle by which the law of New 
Zealand recognises the existence of a separate and distinct entity 
which can be the subject of defined rights for legal purposes (as in 
the company model). 
As Te Urewera is a natural area without a human voice, a governance board 
has been set up to act on its behalf. This governance group will be one way 
that Tūhoe can show their influence in Te Urewera. Section 16 of the Te 
Urewera Act establishes the Board to act on behalf of Te Urewera. The 
purposes of the Te Urewera Board are set out by s 17: to act on behalf of, and 
in the name of Te Urewera; and to provide governance for Te Urewera in 
accordance with the Act. The functions of the Board, as given by s 18, include 
the strategy goals expected of a co-governance board such as preparing and 
approving a management plan, making bylaws for Te Urewera and promoting 
and advocating for the interests of Te Urewera.  
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I believe it is an important reflection of tikanga that the Board cannot disregard 
the interests of Tūhoe when governing Te Urewera. Section 18 gives the 
Board the ability to consider and give expression to Tūhoetanga and Tūhoe 
management concepts including rāhui, tapu and noa, mana and mauri, and 
tohu. These tikanga principles are discussed in Chapter 5.  Section 20 provides 
that the Board must consider and provide appropriately for the relationship of 
iwi and hapū and their culture and traditions with Te Urewera when making 
decisions, and this should reflect Tūhoetanga and Treaty responsibilities of the 
Crown. I consider the fact that the Board cannot disregard the interests of 
Tūhoe reflects the tikanga principle that iwi and the environment are 
interlinked in a metaphysical sense as discussed in Chapter 5.  
This new governance arrangement sets up a much more substantial 
guardianship body than is provided for in the Whanganui River arrangement. 
However, it echoes the Whanganui River scheme in that ownership of Te 
Urewera is placed beyond both the Crown and Tūhoe. I believe that this is a 
means of returning some control to iwi while denying tribes full legal 
ownership of the resource in question. This form of governance arrangement 
echoes co-governance, but goes further than any other co-governance scheme 
has done in returning authority and control to an iwi. I contend that this 
reflects the way that the Crown uses resource management power sharing 
schemes to devolve power as it sees fit. Nonetheless, I believe that the Tūhoe 
governance arrangement signals the changing face of co-governance in New 
Zealand, and that its existence suggests that more arrangements like it may be 
created in the future.  
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The membership of the Urewera Board is determined by s 21. Initially, the 
Board is to be comprised of eight members, four of whom are appointed by the 
trustees of Tūhoe Te Uru Taumatua, with the other four to be appointed jointly 
by the Minister of Conservation and the Minister for Treaty of Waitangi 
Negotiations. After three years, this will change to three Crown representatives 
and six Tūhoe representatives, seeing a Tūhoe majority on the Board.385 The 
first iteration of the Board has been announced and is comprised of members 
of the non-Maori community with links to governance or the environment, and 
representatives from TTUT.
386
 Of note, two Crown appointees are ex-
Ambassadors, perhaps reflecting the diplomatic nature of such a role and the 
way that these appointees will serve two cultures.  
I consider that this concept of a Governance Board acting as a guardian fits 
alongside both Christopher Stone’s theory in ‘Should Trees Have Standing?’, 
and tikanga. Stone suggested giving natural objects a guardian to act on their 
behalf in order to apply the rights and responsibilities of legal personality. 
Tikanga already provides for this kind of role in the form of a kaitiaki. The 
establishment of a guardian group for Te Urewera also serves to act as a 
kaitiaki. The Tūhoe settlement provides for the standard form of co-
governance but in a non-standard method. Like existing co-governance 
arrangements discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, this agreement places both iwi 
and government representatives in decision making roles on a Board 
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established to govern a natural resource. However, I contend that because of 
the legal personality granted to Te Urewera and the establishment of a Board 
to act on its behalf, this arrangement acts as very close to the concept of 
kaitiakitanga, allowing Tūhoe to promote the interests of their people in a way 
that is consistent with tikanga Maori.  
By granting legal personality to Te Urewera and establishing a governance 
board that will eventually be Tūhoe-dominated to administer the legislation for 
this, I believe that the Crown has created a new form of governance 
arrangement that goes beyond the boundaries of co-governance, reflecting the 
fluid nature of these arrangements as discussed in Chapter 5. Previous co-




One of the unique things about the Tūhoe settlement is that we 
start with co-governance, or something that looks very like it, and 
it nearly approaches it. But in fact, it doesn’t end up in a balanced 
arrangement at all. We’ve been quite open and specific about that 
within a relatively short time. The balance of appointments in the 
governing body shifts in favour of Tūhoe; that’s normally not 
what we mean by co-governance.  
In considering this statement, I believe the Tūhoe settlement develops the 
concept of co-governance in New Zealand so that iwi have more influence. 
Not only will Tūhoe have numerical dominance on the Te Urewera Board, but 
Tūhoetanga will be influencing decisions about the region. Additionally, I 
believe that the mana motuhake aspect of the settlement, in conjunction with 
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this governance scheme will also give the tribe more authority than previous 
co-governance arrangements. Moreover, I posit that the new arrangement can 
perhaps not accurately be called ‘co-governance’, as it goes beyond any co-
governance arrangement seen before and creates a whole new level of resource 
management power sharing scheme.  
7.2.6 Prospects of the Te Urewera Governance Board 
There are several unique aspects of the Tūhoe Treaty Settlement. The nature of 
the Urewera region and the Tūhoe people is likely to affect the way that Te 
Urewera will be governed in the future. This section will first outline the way 
that Tūhoe intend to utilise their settlement and the governance arrangements 
included to promote the interests of their people. I will then discuss one policy 
that has the potential to restrict the way that Tūhoe use this arrangement to 
promote the interests of their people. 
7.2.6.1 Mana Motuhake 
One of the aspects that will influence the new governance arrangements in Te 
Urewera is the acknowledgement in the Tūhoe Deed of Settlement of Tūhoe’s 
mana motuhake.
388
 Mana motuhake was one of the three ‘bottom lines’ in the 
Tūhoe settlement negotiations.389 The negotiators were not seeking to gain 
independence, instead they were pushing for formal recognition of their mana 
motuhake. Mana motuhake is an expression utilised by Tūhoe to describe the 
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relationship they want with the government. This is a relationship in which 
Tūhoe strives to reduce tribal reliance on the government. 
While mana motuhake means different things for different people, it is 
inherent to the Tūhoe way of being. For Tūhoe, Te Urewera and Mana 
Motuhake continue to be an innate part of who they are.
390
 Tāmati Kruger, 
Tūhoe Chief Treaty Negotiator, explained that “Mana motuhake is better 
described as interdependence, not separatism, not isolation. Tūhoe are a global 
people… we like to think we have dual citizenship”.391 Mana motuhake is a 
crucial part of Tūhoetanga – at every Tūhoe festival (held biannually), the idea 
is sung and spoken about and rehashed “over and over again”.392  
While there was some initial murmur in the media about public access to Te 
Urewera, and the ability of Tūhoe to create a ‘state within a state’, this 
dialogue appears to have ceased.
393
 I think this is likely because the term mana 
motuhake has been successfully explained by Tūhoe as not being 
independence in a sovereign sense, but rather inter-dependence and self-
reliance.
394
 Mana motuhake is a key principle for Tūhoe, and will affect the 
way they govern Te Urewera. 
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Guided by mana motuhake, Tūhoe intend to take the commercial redress 
portion of the settlement, in company with the Te Urewera governance role 
given, and use it to develop the autonomy of Tūhoe people and Te Urewera. 
They intend to remove all Tūhoe reliance on the government – this includes 
social services as well as infrastructure.
395
 In official language, mana 
motuhake was defined in the 2013 Ngāi Tūhoe Service Management Plan 
(SMP) signed between the Crown and Tūhoe. The SMP defines the 
relationship between Crown service providers and Tūhoe, and will allow the 




Progressively enhancing Tūhoe’s autonomy in decision-making 
matched by its growth in infrastructure, capability and leadership 
in social service provision. This is balanced by the Crown’s 
governance role under Te Tiriti O Waitangi. Through the Treaty 
Settlement practical steps will be taken for Tūhoe to manage their 
affairs within their core area of interest with the maximum 
autonomy possible in the circumstances 
The SMP signed between the Crown and Tūhoe sets out the relationship 
between Crown Service Providers (CSPs) and the iwi. Developed in 
conjunction with Tūhoe, it aims to improve social outcomes for Tūhoe. 
Although the SMP is not legally binding, it cements the relationship between 
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the tribe and CSPs. The goals of the SMP are reflective of mana motuhake. 
They are given as:
397
 
 The aspiration of Tūhoe to manage their own affairs to the 
maximum autonomy possible in the circumstances; 
 That over the first five year phase of this SMP and all agreed 
subsequent phases, the housing, health, education, training, 
employment, and family unit safety of Tūhoe will 
substantially increase according to the standard measures in 
place from time to time to validate such matters or such 
specific standards as the parties may agree; 
 That all parties recognise the importance of iwi, hapū and 
whānau in assisting in the achievement of these goals and 
undertake and agree to work with them and any appropriate 
facilitating and supporting programmes. 
 The parties specifically acknowledge that at any time Tūhoe 
may seek to join Whānau Ora or any programme replacing or 
supplementing it; 
 That all parties to this SMP recognise that they represent to 
Tūhoe a united voice of the Crown and will where possible 
and necessary work in partnership both among themselves 
and with Tūhoe, to achieve the aspirations and goals of 
Tūhoe. 
I believe that these goals, particularly the recognition that Tūhoe will be 
managing their own affairs, show that the Crown is taking Tūhoe’s mana 
motuhake seriously. Tūhoe wish to reclaim all their children from Child, 
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Youth and Family care, and remove benefit dependency within the iwi.
398
 The 
iwi also intends to develop enough electricity to remove itself off the grid and 
eventually take responsibility for funding road building in Te Urewera.
399
 The 
timeframe for these significant goals is only 40 years. I posit that the iwi will 
need a continuing positive relationship with the Crown to achieve these goals.  
Since the Deed of Settlement was released, the tribe has already established a 
travelling General Practitioner (GP) and dental service; previously, these were 
incapable of being provided by a Crown agency due to the stretched budgets 
of District Health Boards.
400
 A new clinic has been built in Taneatua that will 
provide access to a GP four times a week, whereas previously residents inside 
Te Urewera had to travel outside of the rohe to access essential health 
services.
401
 They have invested $2 million of their settlement into this health 
scheme.
402
 Other efforts to look after the interests of their people include 
establishing an archive centre in the new tribal building and installing one 
thousand smoke alarms in Tūhoe homes.403 While Tūhoe is actively engaging 
in activities to assert their mana motuhake and establishing some bold goals, 
they will continue to work with the Crown under the guidance of the SMP.  I 
believe that this arrangement reflects a working and dynamic Treaty 
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Partnership that goes beyond natural resource management.  Moreover, I posit 
that Tūhoe’s arguably more socialist spending of their Treaty settlement can 
be directly contrasted to the capital-building approach taken by Ngāi Tahu. 
The Tūhoe form of resource management power sharing scheme includes 
elements of the social services sector, as well as in the environmental sector, 
whereas I think that Ngāi Tahu have taken a more business and resource-
focused approach in their co-governance efforts.  
As a symbol of Tūhoe mana motuhake, the iwi has built a new tribal 
headquarters in Taneatua.
404
 Called Te Uru Taumatua after the taumatua trees 
which sustain life and its environment, the new building was built for $15 
million and represents the relationship that Tūhoe have with the 
environment.
405
 The building is a “living building”, and is constructed to be 
sustainable and regenerative; the roof is covered in solar panels and any extra 
power generated will be sold back into the grid.
406
 The people of Tūhoe were 
involved in building the project, some 5000 earth bricks were made by Tūhoe 
to line the walls.
407
 Kruger describes Te Uru Taumatua as “a symbol of 
wanting to leave behind the hurt, the anger of the last 170 years”.408 Te Uru 
Taumatua is a great source of pride to the iwi. I believe the building is a 
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physical symbol of Tūhoe mana motuhake, and indicative that the tribe truly 
wish to reinvest their settlement money in order to benefit iwi members. 
I contend that Tūhoe mana motuhake will affect the governance arrangements 
in Te Urewera as the iwi, mana motuhake, and the interests of Te Urewera are 
all so deeply entwined by culture, legislation and policy. They are three 
strands of a Tūhoe identity rope. Consequently, I posit that governance 
decisions regarding road construction and resource management decisions will 
reflect the need for the tribe to progressively increase their autonomy.  When 
the Governance Board produces management plans for Te Urewera, these will 
be influenced by mana motuhake. Here there will be an entanglement of 
indigenous economic and social development and environmental protection. I 
believe that Tūhoe are using this resource management power sharing regime 
to actively promote the social and cultural health of their people, and are 
extending co-governance beyond ‘just’ resource management to all areas of 
Tūhoe life. This reflects the interwoven nature of iwi with their environment, 
discussed in Chapter 5.  
7.2.6.2 Biosphere Reserves 
One policy factor that may potentially affect the governance arrangements of 
Te Urewera in the future is the potential for the area to be turned in a United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) 
biosphere reserve. During the negotiations for the settlement it was announced 





 UNESCO is the cultural branch of the United Nations. If this status 
was finalised, it would be a first for New Zealand, although the idea has been 
broached before as a possible management tool for Waiheke Island.
410
 
Biosphere reserves have been in existence since 1968, with some 580 sites in 
114 countries across the world.
411
 They are used to balance conservation 
interests with the interests of the local population – humankind working with 
nature.                                                           
Biosphere reserves are ‘special places for people and nature’ designed to 
promote a conservation function, to foster economic and human development 
that is sustainable, and to provide logistic support for research and monitoring 
for such functions.
412
 They provide a method of participatory conservation 
management, and generally allow for some sustainable development within 
the reserves, while still promoting the protection of the unique area of the 
reserve. Establishing a biosphere reserve in Te Urewera would potentially 
protect the world-class natural characteristics of the area while still allowing 
Tūhoe to build their economic development. As part of the process to facilitate 
the creation of a UNESCO biosphere reserve, Min. Finlayson has travelled to 
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France to conduct talks with the relevant authorities.
413
 At the time of writing, 
no further announcements have been made on this proposed new status.  
I believe that if a Biosphere Reserve is instituted for Te Urewera, this will 
likely alter the future path taken by the governors of Te Urewera. It is probable 
that instituting a Biosphere Reserve into Te Urewera was a negotiation point 
put forward by the Crown, rather than Tūhoe, and there may be some 
reluctance from the tribe in embracing this reserve status. This is 
understandable, considering Tūhoe have just been returned the effective 
control of their land; they will be reluctant to restrict themselves with 
externally imposed rules and regulations. I contend that if such a status is 
acquired for Te Urewera, Tūhoe will have to ensure that they balance the 
requirements of the reserve with the welfare of tribal members. Rules and 
regulations required of the Biosphere may potentially impact on Tūhoe mana 
motuhake, and impact on the ability for Tūhoe to utilise this power sharing 
arrangement to promote the interests of their people. 
7.3 Response to the New Te Urewera Governance 
Arrangements 
The Tūhoe Treaty Settlement and new governance arrangements for Te 
Urewera are an exciting and novel form of indigenous reconciliation, 
environmental management and Crown-Iwi governance arrangement. These 
arrangements have significant potential to offer a brighter economic and 
cultural future to Tūhoe, and will allow the iwi to advance the influence and 
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welfare of its members. The new structure also shows a changing approach to 
co-governance arrangements towards a new system where iwi have more 
influence. This reflects the fluid and dynamic nature of the boundaries of co-
governance as discussed in Chapter 5. As can be expected, such a unique 
scheme has attracted comment. 
The Parliamentary reception of this modern settlement has been mostly 
positive. During the First Reading of the Bill, Labour MP, Shane Jones, 
highlighted his surprise at Minister Chris Finlayson’s success in bringing the 
settlement forward as a model of governance, kaitiakitanga, and embedding 
Māori in the spirit of the new law.414 Surprise at Finlayson’s success in 
introducing this new concept to law was also expressed by Police Minister the 
Hon. Anne Tolley, who commented that she had earlier expressed the opinion 
on returning Te Urewera to Tūhoe as impossible.415 These remarks reflect the 
compromising nature of the legal personality deal; this arrangement was 
created as a direct response to the difficulties of handing back the full 
ownership of the Te Urewera which has been contested for generations. It is a 
novel arrangement, and has stretched the concept of ‘ownership’ to satisfy 
both the requirements of Tūhoe to feel like they have been returned their rohe, 
and the Crown’s need to maintain overall control over the area. The comments 
of the parliamentarians signal the novelty of this arrangement.  
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Stakeholder groups such as Forest and Bird and Fish and Game have 
recognised that there is potential within this agreement for Te Urewera to be 
governed more effectively.
416
 It has been recognised that DOC resources are 
spread thin, and that the increased contribution of human and financial 
resources by Tūhoe will help to protect and successfully manage the unique 
natural features of Te Urewera.
417
 Then Minister of Māori Affairs the Hon Dr 
Pita Sharples, described the Bill as “an enabler of a stronger Tūhoe economy. 
It is a lifeline that will help reinstate and redevelop Tūhoe independence and 
cultural permanency”.418 I believe that these comments reflect the ambitious 
nature of the mana motuhake provisions of the settlement.  
However, some negativity has come from some Parliamentary sources, 
including Mana Party leader Hone Harawira, who expressed the opinion that 
the scheme was unworkable.
419
 New Zealand First voted against the legislation 
when it went through Parliament, as it felt that the Waitangi Tribunal had not 
adequately addressed the counter claims to Waikaremoana land made by hapū, 
Ngāti Ruapani.420 Tūhoe will no doubt hope that positivity overwhelms this 
negativity, as it is important that the scheme does not mirror the failed 
Urewera District Native Reserve Act 1896. I contend that the Crown’s 
relationship with Tūhoe in this new form of co-governance must be co-
operative for the scheme to work. Ultimately, as the law is not entrenched, if 
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this scheme does not work for the Crown, it can introduce legislation to 
rewrite the governance arrangements. The tribe must therefore avoid separatist 
rhetoric and instead focus on fostering their relationship as ‘interdependent’ of 
the Crown, rather than ‘independent’ of the Crown.  
The response from Tūhoe has also been mostly positive. In a submission to the 
Select Committee, Tāmati Kruger, in his role as Chair of Te Uru Taumatua, 
was fully supportive of the legislation.
421
 His submission states that the new 
legal personality for Te Urewera strengthens and maintains the connection 
between Tūhoe and Te Urewera. He states that it preserves as far as possible 
the natural features and beauty of Te Urewera, the integrity of its indigenous 
ecological systems and biodiversity, and its historical and cultural heritage. He 
also argues that the legislation provides for Te Urewera as a place for public 
use and enjoyment, for recreation, learning, and spiritual reflection, and as an 
inspiration for all. I believe that these statements show that Tūhoe is willing to 
work within the boundaries of this settlement to achieve its goals, despite not 
being given full ownership of Te Urewera.  
Already, since the passing of the legislation, the entity that is Te Urewera has 
shown the Board intends to be a force of influence in the area. The new 
governance structure for Te Urewera is not just a ceremonial body, it has very 
real power and its actions show that Tūhoe do intend to use this structure to 
effectively govern Te Urewera. Within four weeks of the law passing, the 
Board “has developed annual priorities, formed the board, and begun work on 
                                                 
421 Tāmati Kruger Submission to the Māori Affairs Select Committee (1 December 2013). 
203 
 
developing infrastructure with Tūhoe and the Department of Conservation to 
progress operational programmes”.422 With the change of status of Te 
Urewera, DOC-issued hunting permits became invalid, hunters were asked to 
leave Te Urewera, and new permits were not being issued while the system 
was reviewed.
423
 Waatea News reports that there will be a change made by the 
Board with regards to the hunting permit system:
424
 
 “Tāmati Kruger says licensing hunters is not a revenue-gathering 
exercise. … "There is no arrangement of reciprocity of 
information that we would like to see, for example hunters to help 
us out by observing things around flora and fauna, about tracks, 
about huts, the hunters dogs in the area. We would like to have a 
relationship with these people, rather than just be a point that 
issues out a paper permit ", he says. 
Kruger’s comments reflect the importance of tikanga, as discussed in Chapter 
5. Here we can see the Te Urewera board change the way that activities have 
worked in the past in Te Urewera to benefit the region and reflect tikanga 
principles such as kaitiakitanga and manaakitanga. I believe that this shows 
that this governance structure is a very real tool for Tūhoe to manage their 
rohe effectively and advance the influence of the Iwi, and ensure that tikanga 
values are used in the governance of Te Urewera. 
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This chapter has shown how Tūhoe have gained regional influence through a 
new governance arrangement for Te Urewera, and how they are promoting the 
interests of their people through this. I first outlined the troubled history of the 
Crown-Tūhoe relationship, showing that governance and ownership of Tūhoe 
land has always been a large factor of influence on this relationship.  I have 
shown that throughout the history of this relationship, Tūhoe’s drive for their 
mana motuhake has been clear. The Tūhoe Settlement reflects this desire. 
This chapter then set out the legal personality provisions of the new Tūhoe 
Treaty Settlement, extending the definitions given in Chapter 5. I explained 
how this concept arose, and what legal personality and ‘non-ownership’ mean 
in the context of Te Urewera. I believe that this arrangement is a compromise 
that has stretched the concept of ownership – while it is not ownership in name 
it does give Tūhoe significant authority and control over the area. I posit that 
this compromise reflects the fact that the Crown changes the terms of co-
governance to give as much or as little power as it wishes to devolve, 
reflecting the fluid nature of these arrangements as discussed in Chapter 5. 
However, ultimately the critical power still vests in the Crown as it can revoke 
this devolution with future legislation. I have also explained the governance 
regulations that have been put in place by the legislation, and has discussed 
how the governors cannot ignore the requirements of mana whenua when 
governing Te Urewera, as Tūhoe and Te Urewera are deeply interlinked.  
The chapter has sought to explain the concept of mana motuhake. I have 
shown how Tūhoe is using the governance influence gained by their Treaty 
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settlement, in conjunction with the financial quantum, to develop the 
autonomy and self-reliance of their people. I discussed how such influence 
might be affected by a biosphere reserve if one of these was established in the 
area. This chapter ends with a summary of the response from Parliament, as 
the Crown’s attitude to this arrangement is important to ensure this 
arrangement continues smoothly and does not go the way of the UDNRA. I 
then explained how the Board has already begun to secure influence in the 
region. 
The governance arrangements for the new entity that is Te Urewera are clearly 
being used for Tūhoe to promote the interests of their people. I consider that 
the arrangement will allow Tūhoe majority control of their rohe, and will 
allow them to make resource management decisions that will develop the 
industries within the area that benefit Tūhoe people. The tribe is using their 
governance power in conjunction with the financial quantum given in the 
Settlement to make a better future for Tūhoe people based on Tūhoe tikanga 
values.  Tūhoe leadership is determined that the benefits that flow from the 
settlement will benefit every hapū, whānau, and every mārae.425 As Kennedy 
Warne notes “the economic reality must alter so that families can afford not to 
leave, instead of having no realistic option to stay”.426 I conclude that this is 
the ultimate Tūhoe goal – self-governance and a strong economy so their 
people can return to the area and prosper.  
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8  Conclusions 
This thesis has outlined how the concept of co-governance has been used by 
two iwi to advance their regional influence. I began with a literature review in 
Chapter 5 in order to define exactly what co-governance is. One of the 
significant conclusions from this literature review was that the concept of co-
governance means different things to different people. I believe that the Crown 
ultimately uses co-governance as an easily mouldable tool to devolve as little 
or as much power as it wishes to the other party engaged in the arrangement. 
Chapter 5 continued with a discussion of how the Resource Management Act 
1991 attempts to engage the Crown and Iwi in low level power sharing 
schemes. An evaluation of ss 33 and 36 concluded that the RMA is an 
inefficient vehicle for instituting proper co-governance.   
This literature review chapter then expanded upon the concept of tikanga, and 
the tikanga concepts that would likely be utilised in a co-governance scheme. I 
placed particular focus on the concept of Kaitiakitanga, and explained how this 
has been utilised in legislation, case law, policy and in practice. I concluded 
that it is necessary to understand the ethic and responsibilities of Kaitiakitanga 
as this will be a significant influence on the perspective of iwi co-governance 
board members. The final section of Chapter 5 outlines the concept of legal 
personality. I believe that a legal personality of some form must be in 
existence in order to form a true Treaty Partnership with the Crown and effect 
a genuine and effective co-governance arrangement.  
In Chapter 6 of my thesis, I explored the case study of Ngāi Tahu in 
Canterbury. I first outlined the crucial elements of the Ngāi Tahu Claim and 
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the resulting Ngāi Tahu Claims Settlement Act that have allowed the iwi to 
build up functional co-governance capacity. An integral part of this was the 
effort of the tribe to regain their legal personality, which in turn has enabled 
them to be a full Treaty Partner in co-governance arrangements. I concluded 
that the Settlement Act did not provide any power sharing schemes that 
resembled co-governance as any provisions sat at more of a co-management 
level. However the Act did provide the building blocks that Ngāi Tahu have 
used to develop other, more effective, power sharing schemes.  
Chapter 6 then outlined the three contemporary resource management power 
sharing arrangements that Ngāi Tahu are currently engaged in: at Lake 
Ellesmere/Te Waihora; in the Canterbury Water Management Strategy; and in 
the Central City Christchurch Rebuild. I believe that none of these Ngāi Tahu 
arrangements reach full co-governance capacity, although each of them sits at 
a different place along the co-governance spectrum discussed in Chapter 5. 
However, I posit that with the reconstitution of Canterbury Regional Council 
and the devolution of powers from CERA, Ngāi Tahu are in a strategic 
position to gain high level regional governance power. While this may not be 
co-governance, it will still offer the tribe highly influential authority in 
Canterbury. I think that the variety of power sharing arrangements that Ngāi 
Tahu have been involved in reflect my earlier conclusion that the Crown 
moulds these schemes to suit its own purposes and as it sees fit.  
In Chapter 7, I discussed the new Treaty Settlement arrangements for Ngāi 
Tūhoe that have thrust the tribe into a new governance role. I believe this role 
goes beyond traditional co-governance and into a new form of governance. I 
first highlighted the ‘legal personality’ elements of this Settlement that create 
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Te Urewera as a new entity that is beyond ownership. This is clearly a 
compromise designed to offer a viable alternative to Tūhoe after the outright 
ownership of Te Urewera was taken off the negotiation table. However, this 
legal personality element does provide an identifiable Treaty Partner for the 
Crown to engage with, and this is a factor that I believe is essential for 
formulating an effective co-governance scheme.  
In Chapter 7 I also outlined the legislation that has developed the concept of 
legal personality and the ability to put land ‘beyond ownership’. I also applied 
the theories of Christopher Stone to a New Zealand context. Further, I outlined 
the concept of mana motuhake, what this means, and how the mana motuhake 
of Tūhoe could be impacted by a Biosphere Reserve. I also outlined the 
Parliamentary response to the new arrangements. After considering these 
elements, I posit the conclusion that this is another example of the Crown 
utilising the concept of a resource management power sharing scheme in a 
manner that allows it to achieve a political compromise. I contend that the 
Tūhoe arrangement goes beyond the boundaries of co-governance and creates 
a new form of governance, especially as the arrangement involves social 
service elements, not just natural resource policies. In conclusion, this 
arrangement is another example of the way that the Crown uses these types of 
schemes to devolve as much or as little power as it wishes, while ultimately 
not returning full sovereignty or outright ownership and therefore retaining 
residual control.  
This chapter will explore some conclusions about each tribe’s co-governance 
arrangements and the influence of legal personality, what the practical 
negatives of co-governance arrangements are, and where the future of resource 
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management power sharing arrangements might be as a result of the efforts of 
both iwi.  
8.1 A Seat at The Table vs. The Whole Table 
Ngāi Tahu and Tūhoe are two unique iwi in two very different regions. Both 
of these iwi have engaged in various forms of resource management power 
sharing arrangements with the Crown throughout their histories, and now each 
iwi is engaged in co-management and co-governance style arrangements that 
are allowing them to promote the interests of their people. These different co-
governance arrangements show the changing face of Iwi/Crown resource 
management power sharing arrangements. I believe that while Ngāi Tahu have 
been engaged in such activities for a generation, they have yet to reach the 
level of influence that Tūhoe have been given in their 2014 Treaty Settlement.  
Co-governance and co-management are two forms of partnership agreements 
that sit on the spectrum of resource management power sharing arrangements, 
as discussed in Chapter 5. The two terms are used in various contexts by 
assorted groups of people, and it is difficult to provide a precise definition of 
the differences between the two types of arrangement, as I have discussed 
throughout this thesis. What is clear, however, is that co-governance operates 
at a higher level of power sharing. Co-governance schemes require each 
partner to be committed to a future vision, to develop strategy to meet this 
vision, and to debate the inherent issues surrounding each project. Partners in a 
co-governance scheme should be at an equal level of information sharing and 
participation. Co-governance schemes are closer to a Treaty Partnership than 
co-management. Co-management, while still an effective method of 
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introducing a tangata whenua voice in resource management, operates at a 
lower level of authority than co-governance. Co-management deals with the 
operational side of the issue at hand; examples include decision-making about 
native planting and artwork. Tangata whenua in a co-management scheme will 
be allowed some input into the day-to-day running of the scheme, but will not 
be involved in the overall directional policy. Co-governance allows iwi to 
weave tikanga principles throughout power sharing arrangements much more 
efficiently than co-management, and thus I consider that co-governance puts 
iwi in more of a position of influence.  
Ngāi Tahu and Tūhoe are two tribes who have utilised schemes that sit at 
different places along the resource management power sharing spectrum. Both 
iwi differ in many ways. Ngāi Tahu, in general, have a more European lineage, 
influenced by the genetics of the sealers and whalers who intermarried with 
the tribe in the early settler history of New Zealand, and then later by the 
flocks of settlers who came to Canterbury to farm. Ngāi Tahu signed the 
Treaty of Waitangi, and have long maintained that they hold a Treaty 
relationship with the Crown. Canterbury is a region of key economic 
importance to New Zealand, producing large quantities of agricultural 
products for both domestic consumption and for export. In the year ending 
March 2013, Canterbury contributed 13.2% of New Zealand’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). In the same year, Canterbury’s GDP increased by 6% - the 
overall nationwide increase was 2%.
427
 Canterbury includes the city of 
                                                 





Christchurch and other large towns such as Ashburton and Timaru. At the 
2013 census, 12.7% of New Zealand’s population was recorded as living in 
Canterbury.
428
 7.7% of the Canterbury population identifies as Māori, in 
comparison to the 15% of the National Māori population.  
Ngāi Tahu were one of the first tribes to settle with the Crown at a time where 
the parameters of the Treaty process were still being solidified. In their Treaty 
Settlement, the tribe were given the foundational building blocks which have 
allowed them to develop regional influence.  I believe that without the 
pioneering efforts of Ngāi Tahu in the early days of Treaty Settlements, it is 
unlikely that iwi including Ngāi Tūhoe would have been able to gain the 
ground that they have with their respective Settlements. I reach this conclusion 
as Ngāi Tahu were able to break the ground for how much in the way of non-
cash assets and power sharing authority the Crown was prepared to give away 
during Settlement negotiations, in comparison to the cash-only Waikato-
Tainui Settlement that had been signed previously.  
Ngāi Tahu have three core contemporary power sharing arrangements in 
Canterbury. None of these arrangements reach full co-governance, as all three 
deal with issues that are to do with operational management rather than the 
directional and policy based questions that a co-governance scheme deals 
with. As such, Ngāi Tahu have been able to intertwine less tikanga Māori 
principles through these arrangements in comparison to Tūhoe in Te Urewera. 
Nonetheless, the Ngāi Tahu involvement in the Canterbury Water 
                                                 




Management Strategy has allowed the tribe to have significant sway over one 
of the most economically important natural resources in the region. Ngāi Tahu 
participation in the CWMS has proven their capacity to engage in multi-party 
governance schemes. I consider that while this arrangement is not a traditional 
two-party co-governance scheme, it is an undoubtedly an important piece of 
the Ngāi Tahu strategy to gain more regional influence. 
The closest arrangement to full co-governance that Ngāi Tahu is involved in is 
the scheme that TRONT and ECAN are partners in at Te Waihora/Lake 
Ellesmere. This agreement is expressed to be a co-governance scheme and 
involves the top level ‘chiefs’ of each party. However, while this arrangement 
is called a ‘co-governance’ scheme, I believe it does not reach the 
requirements of true co-governance. This arrangement sits at a level of co-
management as it is focused on day-to-day management issues such as the 
planting of flax bushes, riparian repair, and clean up concerns. Co-governance 
level directional and strategy issues are not as fully addressed as they should 
be in an effective co-governance scheme. Nonetheless, I consider that the 
influence of the tribe in this area is undeniable, and this scheme is undoubtedly 
one method that they are utilising to build governance capacity at a regional 
level.  
The most recent resource management power sharing arrangement that Ngāi 
Tahu are involved in is in the Christchurch Rebuild. Ngāi Tahu, through their 
representatives Nga Matapopore, have an imitable opportunity to stamp a Ngāi 
Tahu aesthetic on the post-rebuild Christchurch.  I consider that this influence 
has been attained as a result of Ngāi Tahu’s commercial presence in 
Christchurch, and their proven capacity in such power-sharing arrangements. 
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However, while influential, I posit that this arrangement does not reach the 
level of co-governance. This is because CCDU developed the Central City 
Blueprint with some Ngāi Tahu consultation but did not involve the tribe at a 
full partner level at this stage in the formulation of the overall strategy for the 
rebuild. As such, Ngāi Tahu were excluded from the directional governance 
decisions, and were brought in at a lower level to consult on management 
issues. Although lacking input on the higher level decision making, the weight 
of Ngāi Tahu’s regional authority will be much more visible as a result of their 
input into the Central City Rebuild.  I believe that it can therefore be seen that 
for Ngāi Tahu, co-management functionality has been built up stage-by-stage 
in a piecemeal approach, with the tribe taking as much authority as the Crown 
has been prepared to offer. This is reflective of the early stage of the Ngāi 
Tahu Treaty Settlement, and the nature of the Canterbury region.  
Since the arrival of settlers into the region, Ngāi Tahu have had less and less 
regional influence as mana whenua became a smaller and smaller proportion 
of the population of Canterbury. From their Treaty Settlement in the 1990s this 
trend has reversed and the tribe have built up contemporary influence through 
their co-management schemes and commercial weight. Canterbury is still a 
very Pākehā-dominated region, and pre-quake Christchurch was renowned for 
its ‘Anglification’. Against this background and the importance of Canterbury 
to New Zealand’s economy, I believe that it is perhaps understandable that 
Ngāi Tahu have had to build up their influence piece by piece. They would 
never be given full regional co-governance in Canterbury. Instead, they have 
taken what they have been given and used it to build their influence and 
promote the interests of their people in a patchwork fashion.  
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In 2016, a new regional governance structure will be put in place for 
Canterbury. It is the wish of Ngāi Tahu that they have some form of formal, 
solidified role on this new authority.
429
 There is precedent for this; Māori seats 
at a Regional Council level already exist in the Bay of Plenty and in the 
Waikato. It is not yet known what the new Canterbury authority will look like. 
It may be fully elected, or might be composed of half appointed, half elected 
councillors.
430
 A super-city style unitary authority has been mooted for the 
whole region.
431
 Whatever the structure of the future regional governance 
body in Canterbury, Ngāi Tahu want a permanent role on this body. I consider 
that one such role could be one or two concrete seats on the council that are 
reserved for a Ngāi Tahu member. This would mirror the Bay of Plenty (BOP) 
example; however the three BOP Māori wards are not designated to any one 
iwi, due to fact that the BOP regional council has 27 iwi within its boundaries.   
If Ngāi Tahu were to gain a permanent and formal role in Canterbury regional 
governance, I believe that this would be a result of the patchwork of power 
sharing capacity that they have built, and wider New Zealand acceptance for 
these schemes as the discussion around Treaty obligations becomes more 
mainstream. Such an arrangement is highly unlikely to be a 50/50 Crown/Ngāi 
Tahu co-governance council. This is reflective of the racial makeup of the 
Canterbury region. However, while such an arrangement will not be co-
governance, I consider that it will give Ngāi Tahu a higher degree of authority 
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and influence than they have had previously. This seat at the table will have 
been gained partly as a result of Ngāi Tahu’s engagement in co-management 
arrangements that have allowed them to develop governance power-sharing 
capacity.  
I consider that Canterbury and Te Urewera could not be two more different 
regions. Statistical census information is not available for Te Urewera, but is 
available for the Bay of Plenty (BOP) region, into which Te Urewera falls. As 
at the 2013 census, 6.3% of New Zealand’s population lived in the BOP, and 
25.7% of the BOP population identifies as Māori.432 The BOP region 
contributed to 5.3% of New Zealand’s GDP for the year ending March 
2013.
433
 Te Urewera, as a smaller section of the region, will naturally have 
contributed less to the nation’s GDP. 
Due to the isolationist tactics and the geography described in Chapter 7 of this 
thesis, Te Urewera has remained a predominately Māori area. Unlike 
Canterbury’s flat plains, the region is mountainous, wild and unsuitable for 
agriculture. The main economic activities in the area are tourism (which has 
traditionally been limited due to the poor access roads into the area and the 
distance from main centres) and some hunting and fishing related activities. 
The high unemployment figures of Tūhoe reflect the economic reality of Te 
Urewera. 
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Tūhoe, as a people, have advocated for their own governance of their rohe for 
generations. The iwi’s goal to reclaim their mana motuhake has been a crucial 
part of their tribal identity. The Tūhoe Deed of Settlement has returned their 
mana motuhake of their rohe, and this is of significance, as it is the first Treaty 
Settlement in New Zealand to do so. The new governance structure will give 
Tūhoe majority control over the governance of the Te Urewera region. I 
consider that the arrangement goes well beyond co-governance, and into a new 
form of governance that the country has never seen prior to this settlement. I 
therefore posit that whereas Ngāi Tahu have spent twenty years crafting a seat 
to sit at the regional governance table, Tūhoe have been given the whole table.  
The creation of legal personality for Te Urewera has required the 
establishment of a guardian-like governance board, which will have control 
over the area. This is not an elected regional or district council, where 
councillors are voted in by the public. Rather, these governors will be 
appointed. I believe that this is potentially undemocratic in the mainstream 
definition, and could be a cause for concern.  
Te Urewera as a region will continue to sit within the boundaries of the 
regional councils that it did previously, such as the BOP Regional Council, 
however the Te Urewera Board will have effective control over the Tūhoe 
rohe. In future, the Tūhoe representatives on the Governance Board will be 
appointed by the four Tūhoe tribal authorities, or rohe committees, Ruatāhuna, 
Rūātoki, Te Waimana and Waikaremoana.434 These tribal authorities represent 
                                                 




65 hapū.435 The ‘tribals’ each contribute members to Te Uru Taumatua, the 
Tūhoe overarching governance structure. This reflects the traditional hapū and 
whānau-based governance of the tribe. The new Te Urewera governance 
structure will therefore not replicate a western system of democratically 
elected regional governors, but rather a tikanga Māori-based system of hapū-
nominated governors.  
I consider that this unique agreement is reflective of the inimitable nature of 
Te Urewera. The area is mostly Māori, and it is a deprived region which 
contributes comparably little to New Zealand’s wider economic growth than 
the agricultural powerhouse that is Canterbury. I believe that the new 
governance arrangements for Te Urewera are a gamble for the Government, 
but giving control of regional governance to mana whenua in Te Urewera is a 
much safer bet than in other regions of the nation. After all, the bulk of the 
people that Tūhoe will have governance power over will be Tūhoe themselves, 
and there are few other influential stakeholders in the region.  
Ngāi Tahu and Tūhoe have both utilised arrangements that are on face value 
designed for environmental protection and regulation, in order to further their 
own tribal agendas. This shows the intertwined relationship that both iwi have 
with the land and natural resources, as discussed in Chapter 5. It also reflects 
the historical dispossession suffered by each tribe with respect to their land 
and their subsequent desire to control their own natural resources. While Ngāi 
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Tahu have yet to attain full co-governance, Tūhoe have gained a form of 
power-sharing arrangement that goes well beyond co-governance.  
Another point of comparison for these two iwi is that initially, I consider that 
Tūhoe have taken a much more socially-conscious approach with their 
settlement funds. Their mana motuhake-driven strategy will see funds directed 
into social endeavours to better the everyday lives of their people. Their 
ultimate goal is to have complete interdependence within the rohe, and they 
are using their settlement funds to achieve this. Tūhoe have combined all of 
their endeavours, including their stakes in fisheries and the Central North 
Island Forests, into one entity, Te Uru Taumatua, in order to achieve this goal. 
In comparison, a large focus of Ngāi Tahu’s strategy has always been to 
acquire property and build their commercial influence. TRONT has split its 
endeavours into various commercial arms and has taken a more capitalist long 
term strategy. This commercial influence has contributed to the increase of 
influence in the Canterbury region. 
Although only two years into their arrangements with the Crown, I believe that 
Tūhoe have been much more visibly active in promoting the interests of their 
people with their power sharing arrangement than Ngāi Tahu. While Tūhoe’s 
approach is admirable, if they are to achieve the large scale goals that they 
have for full self-reliance they may wish to take a leaf out of Ngāi Tahu’s book 
and work on growing their Treaty quantum so they do not whittle this away.  
Ngāi Tahu and Tūhoe are two iwi who have taken diverse paths. I consider 
that the efforts of both iwi prove that co-governance and co-management 
arrangements are used as method for the Crown to devolve as much or as little 
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power as it wishes to do so, and I believe that the concept will remain one that 
is easily mouldable to suit the agenda of the Crown.  
8.2 Legal Personality 
The concept of legal personality has been a crucial focus for both Ngāi Tahu 
and Tūhoe in attaining their respective resource management power sharing 
arrangements. Ngāi Tahu regained their own tribal legal personality, and 
Tūhoe were given a governance arrangement that acts as a guardian for the 
new legal personality that is Te Urewera. Tūhoe have not regained their own 
tribal legal personality as Ngāi Tahu has. Nonetheless, Tūhoetanga sees Te 
Urewera and Tūhoe as an indivisible unit, and therefore the bestowment of 
legal personality onto Te Urewera is a significant recognition of the tribe’s 
own mana and identity. I conclude, therefore, that each conferral of legal 
personality has been a pivotal part of building successful resource 
management power sharing capacity for the iwi in question. 
The recognition of legal personality is the acknowledgment of the tikanga 
concept of mana, in a mainstream legal system. I believe that the legal 
personality of an entity mirrors the inherent rangatiratanga that the entity has. I 
consider that the government’s acknowledgement of the existence of the tribe 
that is Ngāi Tahu, and the personality of the natural area that is Te Urewera, 
therefore reflects that these entities exist in their own right and have their own 
mana. Under tikanga principles as discussed in Chapter 5, recognising mana is 
highly important. For Māori, the recognition of legal personality therefore 
carries substantial weight.  
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I posit that a successful co-governance style arrangement sees Iwi and the 
Crown at an equal level, participating in a resource management power 
sharing arrangement. If the Crown acknowledges the mana of an iwi through 
the recognition of legal personality, then both parties to that co-governance 
arrangement are at the same level of importance in the arrangement. Two of 
the biggest iwi in the country, Ngāi Tahu and Waikato-Tainui, have had their 
legal personality recognised. Whanganui River Iwi see the Whanganui River 
as an inseparable part of the iwi, just as Tūhoe see Te Urewera as an 
indivisible part of their tribal identity. I believe that the recognition of the legal 
personality of these two natural areas therefore recognises the mana of these 
tribes in a different way. 
I consider that a power sharing arrangement where legal personality has been 
recognised is a more equal and valid arrangement than one where this concept 
is absent. Thus, for a future co-governance-style arrangement to truly be equal 
and successful, legal personality, either to the tribe in question or the area 
being governed, should be applied. I believe that this kind of arrangement 
appears to truly recognise the mana of the tribe, and sets the Crown and the iwi 
at a more equal. Legal personality is not found in other power sharing 
arrangements in New Zealand, but it is present in the biggest and most 
ambitious of these schemes, therefore I believe that it is a pivotal element for a 
successful Treaty-based partnership in future arrangements.  
8.3 Pitfalls of co-governance 
 As part of the research for this thesis, I conducted socio-legal semi-structured 
interviews with stakeholders from both iwi and local authorities. From these 
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interviews it became clear that co-governance arrangements were not always a 
perfect means for delivering results for both iwi and authorities. The following 
concerns were raised in multiple interviews. I contend that reducing these 
pitfalls would make future co-governance style arrangements more effective.  
8.3.1 Capacity 
During the interviews I conducted, it was acknowledged by both iwi and local 
authorities that capacity is a big issue for tribes. Whereas local government 
bodies can employ a team of planners, architects, environmental consultants, 
and lawyers, often tribes have two or three people who are filling multiple 
roles.
436
 Rex Williams states “Ngāi Tahu don’t seem to have the whole range 
of support staff. Their efforts aren’t as good as they could be because they 
don’t have the resources to match the councils”.437 I think that this is a fair 
observation to make, as councils are funded by the tax payer, and iwi are self-
funded. 
In order to build capacity for effective engagement in collaborative 
governance, iwi will need to invest in their people. Anake Goodall states:
438
 
We’ve got to be asking the hard questions like, what are we doing 
to identify and train a pipeline of human talent? The tools, co-
governance and co-management, are really important, but it will 
only ever be anything over time if we can sustain it and it comes 
back to the human talent. … There’s a real burden, I think, in 
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223 
 
these tribal groups, to help educate young people and train young 
people so they can step up and discharge their treaty 
responsibility. It’s all very well to tell the government, oh you 
owe us this, but we have an equal responsibility. I think tangata 
whenua are the tuākana in the Treaty relationship because we 
were here first, so how does the tuākana discharge its 
responsibilities? It’s a bloody big investment. 
Taking into account Goodall’s remarks, the question must be asked as to how 
to remedy the situation. I believe that there are no better representatives for 
tribal interests than members of the iwi concerned. Rawinia Higgins has also 
highlighted the need to get the right people on the ground.
439
 This is an 
intergenerational responsibility, and as Goodall observes, it is reflective of the 
nature of the Treaty relationship. I consider, therefore, that an effective co-
governance scheme must have a pipeline of iwi talent who can take charge of 
their iwi responsibility to effectively discharge their obligation. Human 
resources must be a crucial part of any successful future co-governance 
scheme. I posit that iwi looking to build co-governance capacity must be 
careful to build their iwi human resource pool at the same time as building the 
legislative framework for co-governance. If the formal framework for a co-
governance style arrangement exists but the iwi cannot produce the people 
required to do the job, I believe that such an arrangement will be ineffective.  
8.3.2 Cost 
One of the complaints that have arisen from tribal members is the cost of being 
involved in co-management and co-governance schemes. Prior to the 
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introduction of such a scheme, these roles were predominately undertaken by 
local and regional governance bodies, and were therefore funded by taxpayer 
money. When a resource management power sharing regime is established, the 
Crown officials that sit on such a board remain on taxpayer funded salaries; 
however, tangata whenua representatives are not funded by the taxpayer. 
O’Regan observes that “Māori participation might involve taxi chits, but on 
the whole the community expects that that will be provided by the Māori 
side”.440 Māori participation will therefore be funded by the tribal entities that 
have been established to manage Treaty funds. 
For some, it seems counter-intuitive to spend tribal money on a job that was 
being funded by the Crown previously. Treaty settlement funds were hard-won 
for iwi, and there is a desire to manage them in the most efficient way 
possible. Using them to pay for a co-governance or co-management 
arrangement may be seen to be a drain on resources. Therefore, an effective 
future co-governance scheme should see the iwi representatives funded by the 
Crown also, in order to ensure equality for both sides. This would perhaps be 
politically unpopular, but would be one method to ensure a productive co-
governance arrangement that each party can contribute to in a meaningful way. 
However, I consider that the counter-argument to this is that Crown funding 
could potentially undermine the partnership aspect of co-governance, as Iwi 
representatives may in some ways be beholden to the Crown if they are being 
funded by it. I suspect, therefore, that this will remain a contended issue for 
some time to come.  
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8.3.3 Aligning perspectives and politics 
Māori and the Crown bring different perspectives to governance, and these 
perspectives can be hard to align. One concept is determining the measure of 
‘good governance’. What is ‘Good governance’ can be hard to define, and 
Pākehā and Māori will take different views. Skelton, who has long term 
governance experience in a variety of roles, believes you can’t define the term 
at all, preferring instead to give a description. He notes that governance:
441
  
Includes tolerance, understanding, being knowledgeable about the 
matters that you are being put in place to govern, and being fair 
about the way you administer your governance role. … Being 
tolerant of other people’s views and trying to work out a solution 
to problems is probably the single biggest attribute that good 
governors should have and develop. 
Skelton’s colleague, Caygill takes a more theoretical angle than Skelton. 
Caygill sees good governance from a philosophical viewpoint, stating that 
Good governance involves identifying and focusing on the 
relevant objectives: why are we here. … To think about the 
purposes of the organisation, whether those are being fulfilled, 
whether resources are being marshalled to those ends.  
These two Commissioners both take different approaches to their roles in 
ensuring best governance despite undertaking much the same role. I believe 
that this reflects the complex nature of such arrangements. 
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For O’Regan, ‘good governance’ is much simpler, and just means “Māori 
control of Māori things”. Co-governance in New Zealand brings both Māori 
and Pākehā to the table to decide crucial governance decisions. I consider that 
both ethnicities will be rooted in a different cultural context, and as such, what 
is considered ‘good governance’ will vary. This could cause problems at the 
boardroom table as iwi and Crown stakeholders grapple with what the true 
issues are.   
Another challenging issue is the impact of intra-tribal politics. Several ECAN 
Commissioners that the author spoke to highlighted the difficulties that they 
face when they are not presented with a united Ngāi Tahu front. Williams has 
noted that the Commissioners find the divisions between the Ngāi Tahu 
rūnanga to be frustrating at times.442 I consider that one way of delivering an 
effective future co-governance scheme would be to maintain a united front 
when dealing with council officials.  
8.4 Co-governance in the future 
The 2014 Waitangi Tribunal report on the Treaty of Waitangi and the 
Declaration of Independence produced a result which was considered to be 
groundbreaking.
443
 The report stated that iwi had never intended to give up 
sovereignty in New Zealand, in contrast to the traditional understanding of 
Treaty jurisprudence. This report suggested that a shift of power in New 
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Zealand government and governance needed to occur to rectify current 
arrangements to reflect the 50/50 nature of the Treaty partnership.
444
  
I contend that co-governance arrangements may therefore become more 
commonplace following the report, as the government looks for politically 
palatable ways to respond to the report without upsetting the status quo. So far, 
the government’s response to the report has been neutral, with Treaty of 
Waitangi Negotiations Minister Chris Finlayson stating “The tribunal doesn't 
reach any conclusion regarding the sovereignty the Crown exercises in New 
Zealand. Nor does it address the other events considered part of the Crown's 
acquisition of sovereignty or how the treaty relationship should operate 
today”.445 I consider this to be a non-committal response that the government 
is using to dodge responsibility.  
No action has yet been taken by the government in response to the report. 
However, as co-governance arrangements are already in existence and have 
been accepted as a functional way of engaging Maori as Treaty partners in 
resource management, I believe that they may be put forward by the 
government as a method to deliver the Treaty relationship that the Waitangi 
Tribunal report in question demands. This thesis has shown that the Crown 
uses co-governance and co-management arrangements as a mouldable vessel 
into which it can pour as much or as little authority as it likes. Thus I consider 
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that co-governance schemes may be used as a future compromise to settle the 
issues raised by the report, rather than more radical options such as 50/50 
Maori/Crown government proposed by the Tribunal.  
In November 2014, the Mayor of New Plymouth received criticism for 
suggesting that Māori dominated councils could be implemented.446 
Designated Māori seats are already in place at a regional governance level in 
the BOP and Waikato. Nelson City Council has also decided to create a Māori 
ward, a move that has received support from the Human Rights 
Commission.
447
 In the long term future I believe this may well become more 
commonplace. I consider that regional governance bodies need to engage with 
Māori in a more meaningful way, and this could be one method of ensuring 
Treaty partnership obligations are met.  
The Tūhoe Treaty Settlement gives a significant level of governance power to 
the iwi, and I consider that this has the effect of changing the face of co-
governance. The governance arrangements put in place by the settlement 
legislation allow Tūhoe effective control over their region and their self-
determination in a way that has not primarily existed. Other iwi are already 
looking to the Tūhoe settlement as the ‘gold standard’, and those who have 
already signed deals with the government are now looking to the “full and 
final” nature of their settlement and considering their options as to whether 
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they, too, can apply the ‘legal personality’ concept to their lands. Despite the 
“full and final” nature of Settlement, the Crown is prepared to adjust the terms 
of their relationship with Iwi in order to meet certain objectives. An example 
of this can be found in Northland, where Te Roroa are to be given further yet-
to-be-determined rights in order to facilitate National Park status for Waipoua 
Forest, despite settling in 2008.
448
 A new form of governance has been created 
for Tūhoe, and while it goes further than co-governance has ever gone before I 
believe there is potential for co-governance to be developed further.  
Although Wood has rejected the applicability of legal personality to anything 
that is not a major area of national significance, I believe that the nature of this 
arrangement means that other iwi will want to follow in the path of Tūhoe.449 I 
posit that future co-governance arrangements may well reflect the ‘legal 
personality’ concept that deals with the politically thorny issue of ownership in 
such a way that diplomatically puts the ownership of the entity in question 
beyond the ownership of any party. I thus conclude that should the Whanganui 
River and the Te Urewera legal personality arrangements prove to be effective, 
it is likely that this will become an acceptable and commonplace factor in 
future co-governance arrangements.  
I consider that the Ngāi Tahu path to co-governance also has the potential to 
change the face of co-governance. While the iwi has yet to fully engage in co-
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governance, the co-management and multi-governance arrangements that they 
have developed have gained the iwi a significant amount of regional influence. 
I believe that of particular note is the way that the iwi are changing how 
Christchurch will look in the future through their rebuild co-management 
arrangements. Iwi in future natural disaster areas may well become natural 
partners for local and central government bodies in the area in question if it 
can be proved that such engagement is constructive and positive for a Treaty 
of Waitangi partnership. I think that if Ngāi Tahu can show that their 
engagement in the rebuild is productive, they may well be engaged in other 
areas of their rohe in similar large-scale urban redevelopment projects in the 
future. 
Of great potential to Ngāi Tahu is the new regional governance structure that 
will be created as a result of ECAN changing form. I consider that if Ngāi 
Tahu can gain a seat at the regional governance table they can continue to 
build their influence. One potential structure could be one or more permanent 
Ngāi Tahu representatives on the council who answers to the Papatipu 
Rūnanga. Although s 33 of the RMA has yet to be utilised, with the shift in 
attitudes towards giving iwi more governance authority within their rohe, and 
the upcoming vacuum in Canterbury governance, now could be the time to see 
a s 33 transfer of powers to Rūnanga. I believe that if a s 33 delegation of 
powers was given to Papatipu Rūnanga to exercise RMA functions over 
traditional areas of their rohe, a degree of mana motuhake would be returned 
to the Papatipu Rūnanga. In turn, these Rūnanga could then answer to the 
permanent Ngāi Tahu delegate on the regional council, giving both Rūnanga a 
voice to the Council, and the Council a conduit to Rūnanga. If this was to be 
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proved productive and functional, I posit that it could potentially be a method 
of producing Crown/Iwi partnerships across the country.  
What is clear from how both these iwi are engaging in co-governance and co-
management arrangements is that the general trend across the country is to 
engage Iwi more in regional governance. This is reflective of the nature of 
Treaty Partnerships. The 2014 Waitangi Tribunal report will no doubt see an 
increase in the implementation of such partnerships. In the future, iwi-
dominated governance boards such as in Te Urewera, or permanent iwi 
representatives on regional councils, could become the norm. 
With all of the previously discussed factors taken into consideration, one thing 
must not be ignored – the agenda and the actions of the Crown. I believe that it 
is unarguable that both Ngāi Tahu and Tūhoe have made significant progress 
in their resource management power sharing regimes. The agreement between 
the Crown and Tūhoe shows the power of long term negotiation and creative 
thinking with regards to resource management and Treaty settlements. 
However, I consider that the Crown continues to hold the ultimate say in these 
relationships. As an example of this power dynamic, when Key stated that a 
transfer of the ownership of Te Urewera was no longer on the table, this was a 
non-negotiable point. Power sharing arrangements provide the Crown with a 
useful political tool to devolve as much or as little governance power as it 
wishes. The Crown gives away assets and concedes strong alternative 
governance and management arrangements only when it suits, and when there 
is little in the way of political risk. This is evident in Te Urewera where there 
is a slim resource base and a large Tūhoe population, and therefore little 
competition to such a governance structure. While the face of co-governance 
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will continue to change, I conclude it will ultimately be determined by the 
agenda of whichever political party is in government at the time.  
There can be no clinical definitive form of successful co-governance 
arrangement that can be applied to every iwi or hapū across the country, as 
discussed in Chapter 5 and evident through the examples I have provided in 
this thesis. Each iwi is different in terms of makeup, rohe, and tikanga. 
Additionally, what is considered ‘successful’ for iwi will differ to the markers 
of ‘success’ held by the Crown. However I believe that the examples that have 
been put forward by Ngāi Tahu and Tūhoe will no doubt continue to influence 
the resource management power sharing arrangements that iwi form with the 
Crown across the country. I conclude, therefore, that a 21
st
 Century Aotearoa 
should see more co-governance and majority-Iwi governance entities at a 
regional level that bring tikanga Maori into a resource management power 
sharing context. A successful, forward-thinking co-governance arrangement 
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10 Appendix One: List of Interview Subjects 




 David Caygill, Environment Canterbury Commissioner  
 Donald Couch, Ngāi Tahu, Environment Canterbury 
Commissioner  
 Anake Goodall, Ngāi Tahu negotiator, member of Te 
Waihora Co-governance group 
 Nigel Harris, Ngāi Tūāhuriri member451 
 Dr Rawinia Higgins, Ngāi Tūhoe, Head of Māori Studies, 
Victoria University of Wellington 
 Stephen Lamb, Manager Natural Resources Policy 
 Patrick McGarvey, Ngāi Tuhoe, Te Uru Taumatua Board 
Member452 
 Sir Tipene O’Regan, Ngāi Tahu negotiator and Upoku 
 Tony Sewell, the CEO of Ngāi Tahu Property 
 Professor Peter Skelton,  
 Dr Te Maire Tau, Ngāi Tūāhuriri member, and head of the 
Ngāi Tahu Research Centre 
                                                 
450 Kataraina Belshaw and Stephen Lamb were interviewed together. This interview was lost due to 
equipment malfunction but some of the spirit of their interview is referenced.  
451 This interview was not recorded or transcribed at the request of the participant.  
452 This interview was lost due to equipment malfunction. 
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 Rex Williams, Environment Canterbury Commissioner  
 Dr John Wood, Chief Crown Negotiator, Tūhoe and 
Whanganui River Settlements 
 
 
